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GAS AND ELECTRICITY IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE

By

ROBERT L. HowARD*
INTRODUCTION

A

s originally conceived in the minds of the framers of our
constitution, the term interstate commerce probably was understood to embrace little, if anything, more than trade in ordinary
tangible commodities and their exchange or delivery by means of
water transportation.' Such a conception is far removed from
that which obtains at present. As the result of a process of
gradual judicial extension necessitated by our economic and social
development, interstate commerce has come to be understood
to embrace all types of commercial intercourse. The transportation
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.
"'At the time of the adoption of the constitution, navigation afforded
the only means of conducting commerce on a large scale .... Aside from
navigation, commerce among the states was, in 1787, conducted by coaches
and wagons, and it appears to have been considered that the control of vehicles engaged in this commerce did not belong to the Federal Government." Prentice and Egan, The Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution 2, citing Perrin v. Sikes, (1802) 1 Day (Conn.) 19.
Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the Court in Railroad Company
v. Maryland, (1874) 21 Wall. (U.S.) 456, 22 L. Ed. 678, said: "No doubt
commerce by water was principally in the minds of those who framed
and adopted the constitution, although both its language and spirit embrace commerce by land as well .... The navigable waters of the earth
are recognized public highways of trade and commerce . . . the vehicles of
commerce being instruments of intercommunication with other nations,
the regulation of them is assumed by the national legislature....

But it

is different with transportation by land. This, when the constitution
was adopted, was entirely performed on common roads and in vehicles
drawn by animal power. No one then supposed that the wagons of the
country, which were the vehicles of this commerce, or the horses by
which they were drawn, were subject to national regulation." See also 2
Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States, 2d ed., 734n; Prentice, Federal Power Over Carriers and Corporations, ch. V.
It is worthy of note in this connection that the status of navigation as
commerce was not entirely free from controversy until 1824 with the
famous decision of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Gibbons v.
Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23.
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of passengers 2 by land or water, 3 the transmission of information
or intelligence by means of the telephone 4 or the telegraph,' the
transmission of oil 6 and gas7 in pipe lines, and finally the transmission of electric light and power current, s and of ether waves
2

New York v. Miln, (1837) 11 Pet. (U.S.) 102, 9 L. Ed. 648; Passenger Cases, (1849) 7 How. (U.S.) 283, 12 L. Ed. 581; Henderson v.
Mayor of New York, (1875) 92 U. S. 2591 23 L. Ed. 543; Head Money
Cases, (1884) 112 U. S. 580; 5 Sup. Ct. 247, 28 L. Ed. 798; Gloucester
Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1885) 114 U. S. 196, 5 Sup. Ct. 826, 29 L. Ed.
158; Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, (1894) 154 U. S. 204,
14 Sup. Ct. 1087, 38 L. Ed. 962; Hoke v. .United States, (1913) 227 U. S.
308, 33 Sup. Ct. 250, 57 L. Ed. 473; Wilson v. United States, (1914) 232
U. S. 563, 34 Sup. Ct. 347, 58 L. Ed. 728.
3
See Mr. Justice Van Devanter's definition of commerce in the
Second Employers' Liability Cases, (1912) 223 U. S. 1, 46, 47, 32 Sup.
Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327.
4Pomona v. Sunset Telephone Co., (1912) 224 U. S. 330, 32 Sup. Ct.
477, 56 L. Ed. 788; Muskogee National Telephone Co. v. Hall, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1902) 118 Fed. 382; Oklahoma-Arkansas Telephone Co. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 995.
5Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (1877)
96 U. S. 1, 24 L. Ed. 708; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, (1881)
105 U. S. 460, 26 L. Ed. 1067; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton, (1887) 122 U. S. 347, 7 Sup. Ct. 1126, 30 L. Ed. 1187; Leloup v. Port
of Mobile, (1888) 127 U. S. 640, 8 Sup. Ct. 1380, 32 L. Ed. 311; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, (1918) 247 U. S. 105, 38 Sup. Ct. 438, 62 L.
Ed. 1006; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Speight, (1920) 254 U. S. 17, 41
Sup. Ct. 11, 65 L. Ed. 104. As stated by Mr. Chief Justice Waite in
Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (1877) 96
U. S. 1, 9, 24 L. Ed. 708, "The powers thus granted [to regulate commerce] are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce, . . .
known or in use when the constitution was adopted, but they keep pace
with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time and circumstances. They extend from the horse with
its rider to the stage-coach, from the sailing-vessel to the steamboat, from
the coach and the steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad to the
telegraph, as these new agencies are successively brought into use to
meet 6 the demands of increasing population and wealth."
Pipe Line Cases, (1914) 234 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 956, 58 L. Ed.
1459; Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, (1921) 257 U. S. 265, 42 Sup.
Ct. 101, 66 L. Ed. 227; Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier, (1925) 266 U. S.
555, 45 Sup. Ct. 184, 69 L. Ed. 439.
7
0Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., (1911) 221 U. S. 229, 31
Sup. Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716; Haskell v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., (1912)
224 U. S. 217, 32 Sup. Ct. 442, 56 L. Ed. 738; Public Utilities Comm. v.
Landon, (1919) 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268, 63 L. Ed. 577; Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., (1920) 252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct.
279, 64 L. Ed. 434; ,United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, (1921) 257 U. S.
277, 42 Sup. Ct. 105, 66 L. Ed. 234; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
(1923) 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117; Missouri v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., (1924) 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544, 68 L. Ed. 1027.
8Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public Service Comm., (1919) 84
W. Va. 662, 100 S. E. 557; Public Utilities Comm. of R. I. v. Attleboro
Steam & Electric Co., (1927) 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294, 71 L. Ed.
549; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, (1932) 286 U. S. 165, 52 Sup. Ct.
548, 76 L. Ed. 1038.
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giving rise to radio communication, 9 have all come to be included.' 0
Gas and electricity have now come to be definitely recognized
as proper articles of interstate commerce. A vastly increasing
importance is coming to attach to the problems to which their interstate transmission gives rise. This is due to the tremendously
increased production of these commodities,"- and to the facts that
a larger proportion of that produced is crossing state lines,' 2 and
that continually greater numbers of our population are coming
to be dependent upon their use," both for domestic and industrial
purposes. The situation with respect to electrical development
has been described rather vividly by the Federal Power Commission 1 as follows:
"The electric-power industry of the country continues to maintain an amazing growth. The rate of expansion during the past
decade has been equalled by but few of the major industries.
"Electric power is one of the most vital factors in modern
industry. Probably no single element has contributed more to the
unparalleled commercial expansion of the past decade. The electric age has come upon us so quickly that its possibilities are still
beyond human conception. It is not difficult to foresee, however,
that the economic progress of the future will be founded in a
large degree upon a low-priced, abundant, and reliable supply of
electric energy. Nearly all other industries are already more or
less dependent upon the electric industry, and in the constantly
extending application to uses on the farms, on the transportation
systems, and in household service electricity has become almost
indispensable."
OWhitehurst v. Grimes, (D.C. Ky. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 787; White v.
Federal Radio Comm., (D.C. Ill. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 113; United States
v. American Bond and Mortgage Co., (D.C. Ill. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 448;
Technical Radio Laboratories v. Federal Radio Comm., (D.C. App. 1929)
59 App. D. C. 125, 36 F. (2d) 111; City of New York v. Federal Radio
Comm., (D. C. App. 1929) 59 App. D. C. 129, 36 F. (2d) 115; Station
WBT, Inc. v. Poulnot, (D.C. S.C. 1931) 46 F. (2d) 671.
IOThe changing content of the concept, interstate commerce, was well
characterized by Mr. Justice Brewer in In re Debs, (1895) 158 U. S.
564, 591, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 1092: "Constitutional provisions do not
change, but their operation extends to new matters as the modes of business and habits of life of the people vary with each succeeding generation. . . . Just so it is with the grant to the national government of
power over interstate commerce. The constitution has not changed. The
power is the same. But it operates today upon modes of interstate commerce unknown to the fathers, and will operate with equal force upon
any new modes of such commerce which the future may develop."
"Moody, Public Utilities (1931) xxi, xxiii, xlviii.
"2Moody, Public Utilities (1931) xlix, 1; N. E. L. A. Statistical Bull.
No. 8 (July, 1932).
"sMoody, Public Utilities (1931) xxiii, xlviii.
14(1929) Ninth Ann. Rep. Federal Power Commission 1.
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The production of natural gas in considerable quantities is,
of course, restricted to localities not numerous, 15 and its extensive
use necessitates transmission from state to state. Suitable sites
for hydroelectric plants likewise are not equally available in all
states,' and not infrequently the places where such facilities are
most abundant are not those in which the developed power is in
greatest demand.' 7 Other resources, such as coal, also sometimes
influence the location of steam plants at points removed from the
chief centers of consumption. As a means of insuring continuous
and regular service, systems of interconnecting transmission lines
combining the current generated by different plants, both hydro
and steam, in different states are being set up.18 Not by any
means an unimportant feature in this connection is the concentration of control, financial and otherwise, in what is popularly referred to as the power trust, which has facilitated large scale
development. These factors, together with the recent improvements in the transmission of both natural gas and electrical energy
over considerable distances, give added significance to these industries from the standpoint of interstate commerce.
It becomes, therefore, a matter of some interest and importance
to consider the problems of governmental regulation and control
to which the interstate transmission of gas and electricity gives
rise,'19 and, if possible, to mark out somewhat the lines which
separate state from national control in these matters. To some
of the problems the courts have supplied adequate solutions. To
others future determinations are required to point the way.
Governmental regulation and control relative to both gas and
electricity, at present, largely take the form of state action by
means of public utility commissions. Municipal regulation and
15 Moody, Public Utilities (1931) xlix.
16(1929) Ninth Ann. Rep. Federal Power Commission 3; N. E. L. A.
Statistical Bull. No. 8 (July, 1932).

"7The Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast States have more than

two-thirds of the available water power resources of the country but
actually consume less than 18 per cent of the total product. Maine is

fourth among the states in potential water power, but consumes very much

less electrical energy than neighboring industrial states. (1929) Ninth Ann.
Rep Federal Power Commission 3; N. E. L. A. Statistical Bull. No. 8
(July, 1932).
IsFor a good illustration of this see South Carolina Power Co. v.
South Carolina Tax Commission, (D.C. S.C. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 528.
19"The public interests at stake . . . [are] too great to be waived aside
as inconsequential, and it becomes important to determine whether and by

whom these interstate energy transfers are to be regulated."
Ann. Rep. Federal Power Commission 8.

(1925) Fifth
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control, if not largely superseded by state control, at least is of
minor significance so far as the present consideration of interstate commerce is concerned. Prior to the National Recovery
Administration program, the federal government had not made
any attempt, either by means of the Interstate Commerce Commission, or by a specially created tribunal for the purpose, to
regulate the business conducted by gas and electric companies
in interstate commerce. 20 The result has been that either their
operations have been subjected to control by the states, or have
gone entirely without governmental regulation. The problems to be
considered, therefore, largely reduce themselves to a matter of
marking the proper limitations upon state control. As to some matters, the well known theory that the states may regulate local
aspects 21 of interstate commerce until Congress acts to cover the
field finds application. As to others, the equally familiar doctrine
prevails that with respect to matters of national concern requiring
a uniform plan of regulation only Congress can act, 22 and that the
silence 23 of Congress in such a situation is "equivalent to a declaration that interstate commerce shall remain free and untrammelled."' 24 Also, of course, before interstate commerce in the
gas or electricity begins and after it ends, the state is free to act.
It is therefore, in all cases, important to consider the instant of
time at which the transaction ceases to be local and becomes interstate, or in turn divests itself of its interstate character and again
becomes a matter of only local concern.
2"Act of Congress, June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. at L. 584, amending the Act to Regulate Commerce, specifically excepted from its operation the transmission of gas in pipe lines. Act. of 1910, ch. 309, sec. 7, 36
Stat. at L. 539, 544, 49 U. S. C. A. 1 (b), 3 Mason's U. S. Code tit. 49,
sec. 1(b).

The extent to which the federal government is undertaking to control
the gas and electric industries as a part of its national recovery program
will be discussed infra in Part II dealing with regulation of rates and
service.
21Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, (1851) 12 How.
(U.S.) 299, 13 L. Ed. 996; Escanaba & L. M. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, (1882) 107 U. S. 678, 2 Sup. Ct. 185, 27 L. Ed. 442; Covington &
Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, (1894) 154 U. S. 204, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087,

38 L. Ed. 962; Minnesota Rate Cases, (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729,
57 L.22Ed. 1511.

Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1885) 114 U. S. 196, 5 Sup.

Ct. 826, 29 L. Ed. 158; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., (1888) 125
U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 31 L. Ed. 700; Leisy v. Hardin, (1890) 135
U. S.23100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128.

For a discussion of the effect of the silence of Congress in such a

situation, see Bikle, The Silence of Congress, (1927) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 200.
24
Welton v. Missouri, (1875) 91 U. S. 275, 282, 23 L. Ed. 347.
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It has been thought feasible to treat the interstate aspects of gas
and electricity together because of the distinct similarities between
them. It is true that gas is found in nature and that electricity in
usable form must be generated or produced. Gas is transmitted by
means of pipe lines while electric current passes over wires. The
transmission of the latter is more instantaneous than that of the
former. In their fundamental characteristics, however, as affecting their means of interstate transmission and use, they are very
similar. Neither, ordinarily, is produced in advance and stored
for future use. The same process which removes the gas from
the well, or generates the electricity, transmits it to the point of
consumption in accordance with the consumer's demands as
manifested by turning on his gas jet in the one case, or his electric
switch in the other. The processes are so far similar that the
courts constantly use a determination with respect to one as a
complete precedent for the other. And while there are, no doubt,
limits beyond which the analogy cannot be carried, most of the
important problems here involved lend themselves quite readily to
a joint treatment of the two.

PART I.
RESTRICTIONS UPON THE EXPORTATION

OF NATURAL GAS AND

HYDROELECTRIC POWER FROM THE STATE OF ORIGIN
PRECEDENTS

The furnishing of natural gas and electric current for light
and power purposes are well recognized public utility services
which may properly be subjected to state control as to rates
charged and service rendered. Permits from state public service
commissions in the form of certificates of public convenience and
necessity, or otherwise, both for the establishment of hydroelectric
plants and transmission lines, and for gas pipe lines, are also common requirements. Attempts have been made by some states to go
beyond this type of control and assert a power proprietary in its
nature by which both gas and electricity may be entirely reserved
for consumption by their own inhabitants, or a preference enforced for the satisfaction of local demands before exportation
from the state will be permitted. In point of time such restrictions as to natural gas preceded those with respect to electricity.
But as to both, the states have based their claim of right upon
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Supreme Court decisions dealing with certain other natural resources.
The leading case to which any discussion of this question must
go back is that of Geer v. Connecticut." There the Supreme
Court of the United States sustained a statute of Connecticut
regulating the killing of certain game birds within its borders so
as to confine their use within the limits of the state. The Court
based its opinion very largely upon what it considered the proprietary interests of the state in the wild game found within its
own territory. Mr. Justice White, speaking for the majority of
the Court, went back to the time of the Greeks and Romans, and
traced the control of the state in this respect down through the
Middle Ages, through the development of the English common
law, and through our own colonial and early state periods. In so
doing he purported to show that at all times the state had possessed
such power, because of the common ownership of animals ferae
naturae, to be exercised as a trust for the benefit of all of its
people. The sole consequence, according to the Court, of the
statutory provision here in question "forbidding the transportation of game, killed within the state, beyond the state, was to
confine the use of such game to those who own it, the people of
that state. '26 The contention was urged that as the state permitted
the people with'n its borders to take game and dispose of it, it
thereby allowed such game when so taken to become an object of
state commerce, and "as a resulting necessity such property ...
[became] the subject of interstate commerce." But the Court
took the position that in view of the power of the state to affix
conditions to the killing and sale of game, based upon the peculiar
nature of such property and its common ownership by all the citi*zens of the state, "it may well be doubted whether commerce is
created by an authority given by a state to reduce game within
its borders to possession, provided such game be not taken, when
killed, without the jurisdict-on of the state.127 Such a common
ownership as exists in this type of case was sufficient, the Court
thought, to carry with it "a right to keep the property, if the
sovereign so chooses, always within its jurisdiction for every purpose." It was further asserted that limitations of the nature here
imposed "deprive no person of his property, because he who
25(1896) 161 U. S. 519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed. 793.
20(1896) 161 U. S. 519, 529, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed. 793.
27(1896) 161 U. S. 519, 530, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed. 793.
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takes or kills game had no previous right of property in it, and
when he acquires such right by reducing it to possession he does
so subject to such conditions and limitations as the legislature has
seen fit to impose. ' 2 Referring to state decisions that had
reached an opposite result, 29 the Court asserted that they were due

to a failure to consider properly the "fundamental distinction between the qualified ownership in game and the perfect nature of
ownership in other property."
While Mr. Justice White thus rested the decision very largely
upon the peculiar nature of the property involved and the special
nature of the state's relation thereto, it is important for present
purposes also to note that a second sufficient basis was asserted
to be found in the police power of the state, "wh'ch may be
none the less called into play, because by doing so interstate commerce may be remotely and indirectly affected." He asserted that
"the source of the police power as to game birds flows from the
duty of the state to preserve for its people a valuable food supply."2 0 That power, he thought, was properly exercised to retain for the people of the state articles which can only become the
subject of ownership in a qualified way, and "which can never be
the object of commerce except with the consent of the state and
subject to the conditions which.it may deem best to impose for
the public good."' 1
28

State v. Rodman, (1894) 58 Minn. 393, 400, 59 N. W. 1098; Ex parte
Maier, (1894) 103 Cal. 476, 483, 37 Pac. 402.

29Territory v. Evans, (1890) 2 Idaho 634, 23 Pac. 115; State v.
Saunders, (1877) 19 Kan. 127; cf. Sherwood v. Stephen, (1907) 13 Idaho

399, 90 Pac. 345.
30(1896)
161 U. S. 519, 535, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed. 793.
31Justices Field and Harlan dissented, asserting that when any such

game birds had been lawfully killed they became private property, legiti-

mate subjects of interstate commerce, and that the statute in question
was a violation of the commerce clause of the constitution of the United
States.
Justices Brewer and Peckham took no part in the decision.
The doctrine of the majority opinion has been frequently reaffirmea

See Ward v. Race Horse, (1896)

163 U. S. 504, 16 Sup. Ct. 1076, 41 L.

Ed. 244 (game) ; Patstone v. Pennsylvania, (1914) 232 U. S. 138, 34 Sup.

Ct. 281, 58 L. Ed. 539 (protecting wild life by prohibiting possession of
firearms by aliens); Kennedy v. Becker, (1916) 241 U. S. 556, 36 Sup.
Ct. 705, 60 L. Ed. 1166 (fish and game); Carey v. South Dakota, (1919)
250 U. S. 118, 39 Sup. Ct. 403, 63 L. Ed. 886 (birds) ; Locoste v. Depart-

ment of Conservation of Louisiana, (1924) 263 U. S. 545, 44 Sup. Ct. 186,

68 L. Ed. 437 (furs); McDonald & Johnson v. Southern Express Co.,
(D.C. S.C. 1904) 134 Fed. 282 (fish) ; Rupert v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1910) 181 Fed. 87 (quail) ; State v. Harrub, (1891) 95 Ala. 176, 10
So. 752 (oysters); Organ v. State, (1892) 56 Ark. 267, 10 S. W. 840
(fish and game); Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. State, (1906) 79 Ark.
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Of perhaps more immediate significance for present purposes
is the decision of the Supreme Court in Hudson County Water Co.
v. McCarter,"- upholding a statute of New Jersey asserting the
need of preserving the fresh water supply of the state for the
health and prosperity of its own citizens and forbidding the exportation from the state of any of the waters "of any fresh water
lake, pond, brook, creek, river or stream" within the state. The
New Jersey court, in sustaining the statute and enjo'ning the
diversion of water in large quantities from the Passaic River to
supply partially the city of New York, asserted that the "common
law recognized no right in the riparian owner, as such, to divert
water from the stream in order to make merchandise of it, nor any
right to transport any portion of the water from the stream to a
distance for the use of others,' 1 3 3 and that his rights of acquisition
were for purposes narrowly limited, and emphasized the proprietary
interest of the state in the waters of its streams.
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court and sustaining the holding below, asserted:
"We prefer to put the authority which cannot be denied to
the state upon a broader ground than that which was emphasized
below, since in our opiriion it is independent of the more or less
attenuated residuum of title that the state may be said to possess.
* * It is recognized that the state as quasi-sovereign and representative of the public has a standing in court to protect the
atmosphere, the water and the forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or dissent of the private owners of the land
most immediately concerned." 3 4

He thought there were few public interests "more obvious, indisputable and independent of particular theory" than that of a
state to maintain its streams substantially undiminished, except
so far as, in the interest of public welfare, it might permit. The
349, 96 S. W. 189 (fish and game); Fritz v. State, (1909) 88 Ark. 571,
115 S. W. 385 (fish and game); Jonesboro, L. C. & E. R Co. v.

Adams, (1915) 117 Ark. 54, 174 S. W. 527 (fish and game); Re Phoedovius, (1918) 177 Cal. 238, 170 Pac. 412 (game) ; Ex parte Florence, (1930)
107 Cal. App. 607, 290 Pac. 652 (abolone); Bayside Fish Flour Co. v.
Zellerbach, (1932) 124 Cal. ApD. 564, 12 P. (2d) 961 (fish); State v.
Northern Express Co., (1894) 58 Minn. 403, 59 N. W. 1100 (fish); Ex
parte Fritz, (1905) 86 Miss. 210, 38 So. 722 (fish) ; Cameron v. Territory,
(1906) 16 Okla. 634, 86 Pac. 68.
32(1908) 209 U. S. 349, 28 Sup. Ct. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828. See opinion of
the state court in (1906) 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 Atl. 496. See also East
Jersey Water Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, (1923)

J. L. 449, 119 Atl. 679.
33(1906) 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 708, 65 Atl. 496.
34(1908) 209 U. S. 349, 355, 28 Sup. Ct. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828.

98 N.
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right of a riparian owner to take water was asserted to be subject not only to the "rights of lower owners but to the initial
limitation" that he must not "substantially diminish one of the
great foundations of public welfare and health."
A. NATURAL GAS
With these cases as a background the first case involving
state restrictions upon the exportation of natural gas beyond
its boundaries came before the Court in 1911. 3 ' A statute of
Oklahoma provided that no corporation engaged in the transmission of natural gas within the state should be granted a
charter, or the right of eminent domain, or the right to use the
highways of the state, unless it be expressly stipulated in the grant
that it should neither transmit natural gas beyond the limits of
the state nor deliver it to anyone engaged in such transportation.
It was urged that the statute was a police measure calculated to
conserve the natural resources of the state and necessary to prevent the early depletion of the state's supply of natural gas.
It was not denied that a state might pass reasonable conservation measures to prevent loss or waste of its natural resources
such as gas and oil. The leading case to this effect, upon which
reliance was placed to sustain the Oklahoma statute, was Ohio
Oil Company v. Indiana.36 Mr. Justice White, speaking for a
unanimous Court, there recognized the peculiar characteristics of
gas and oil as having no fixed situs under a particular surface
and as requiring restrictions upon the wasteful operations of individual owners if the common supply is to be preserved. After
referring to a Pennsylvania case37 which alluded to water, oil,
and gas as minerals ferae naturae because "possession of the
land is not necessarily possession of the gas," he pointed out
very clearly the difference between natural gas and animals ferae
naturae, which distinction became controlling in Oklahoma v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co. 38 and similar succeeding cases. It was
asserted that while there is some analogy between animals ferae
naturae and the moving deposits of oil and natural gas, the analogy
is not complete. In things ferae naturae, it was pointed out, all
35 Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., (1911) 221 U. S. 229, 31 Sup.
Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716.
36(1900) 177 U. S. 190, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729.
37
Westmorland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, (1889) 130
Pa. St. 235. 18 Atl. 724.
38(1911) 221 U. S. 229, 31 Sup. Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716.
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persons have an equal right to acquire a private property therein
by seeking to reduce them to possession, but in the case of oil
and gas no such common right exists. That right exists only in
the owners of the surface under which the oil and gas may be
found. This difference was said to indicate the distinction which
exists between the power of the state over the two.
"In the one, as the public are the owners, every one may be
absolutely prevented from seeking to reduce to possession. No
divesting of private property, under such conditions, can be conceived because the public are the owners, and the enacting by
the state of a law as to the public ownership"9 is but the discharge
of the governmental trust resting in the state as to property of
that character. On the other hand, as to gas and oil, the surface
proprietors within the gas field all have the right to reduce to
possession the gas and oil beneath. They could not be absolutely
deprived of this right which belongs to them without a taking of
private property." 40
It was then held that, since there was a co-equal right in all such
surface owners to take from a common source of supply, and the
exercise by one or a few of their rights might result in the acquisition of an undue proportion to the detriment of others, or,
by waste, to the complete destruction of the rights of the remainder, it was proper for the legislature to enact measures to protect all by the prevention of waste. 41 Such a statute was said to
39
For a comparison of this notion of public ownership with the corresponding Roman Law concept of res communes, see Pound, Interests of
Personality, (1915) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 343, 352, 353.
40(1900)
177 U. S. 190, 209, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729.
41
For other cases sustaining similar legislation calculated to prevent
waste, see Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., (1911) 220 U. S.61, 31
Sup. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369, upholding a New York statute forbidding
wasteful or unreasonable pumping of certain classes of mineral waters for
their gas content; Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., (1920) 254 U. S.300,
41 Sup. Ct. 118, 65 L. Ed. 276, upholding a Wyoming statute restricting
the use of natural gas in the production of carbon; Bandini Petroleum Co
v. Superior Court of California for Los Angeles County, (1931) 284
U. S. 8, 52 Sup. Ct. 103, 76 L. Ed. 136 (natural gas); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm. of Oklahoma, (1932) 286 U. S. 210, 52
Sup. Ct. 559, 76 L. Ed. 1062 (oil); Sterling v. Constantin, (1932) 287
U. S.378, 53 Sup. Ct. 190, 77 L. Ed. 375 (oil) ; Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic
Oil Production Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1928) 22 F. (2d) 597 (oil); Van
Camp Sea Food Co., Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources of the State
of California, (D.C. Cal. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 111 (fish) ; F. C. Henderson,
Inc. v. Railroad Commission, (D.C. Tex. 1932) 56 F. (2d) 218 (gas);
People's Petroleum Producers v. Sterling, (D.C. Tex. 1932) 60 F. (2d)
1041 (oil and gas); People's Petroleum Producers v. Smith, (D.C. Tex.
1932) 1 Fed. Supp. 361 (oil and gas); In re Lathrop, (C.C.A. 9th Cir.
1932) 61 F. (2d) 37 (oil and gas): People ex rel. Stevenot v. Associated Oil Co., (1930) 211 Cal. 93, 294 Pac. 717 (oil and gas) ; State v. Rodman, (1894) 58 Minn. 393. 59 N. W. 1098 (deer); Russell v. Walker,
(1932) 160 Okla. 145, 15 P. (2d) 114 (oil, gas and reservoir energy);
Quinton Relief Oil & Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission, (1924) 101
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be, not one depriving owners of their private property without
due compensation, as charged, but, in substance, a measure protecting private property and preventing it from being taken by
one of the common owners without regard to the enjoyment of
others. No such purpose was served by the Oklahoma statute.
Mr. Justice McKenna pointed out that it did just what the Court
took pains to show that the Indiana statute did not do. Its provisions were not directed against waste but against any use of
the gas except within the state, not to the protection of the
property interest of the common owners but to the restriction of
the Tight of use and disposition after it had become private
property by being reduced to possession. If, as held in the Ohio
Oil Company Case, the surface owners could not be deprived of
the right to reduce the gas to possession, it was thought to be
quite clear that they could not be deprived of rights which attach
to it when in possession.
"Gas, when reduced to possession," said Mr. Justice McKenna,
"is a commodity; it belongs to the owner of the land, and, when
reduced to possession, is his individual property subject to sale
by him, and may be a subject of intrastate commerce and interstate
commerce. The statute of Oklahoma recognizes it to be a subject
of intrastate commerce, but seeks to prevent it from being the
subject of interstate commerce... . If the states have such power
a singular situation might result. Pennsylvania might keep its
coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining states their minerals.
• . . If one state has it, all states have it; embargo may be re42
taliated by embargo, and commerce will be halted at state lines.
In a situation such as this the fact that Congress has not acted
was asserted to be of no consequence. Natural gas lawfully reduced to individual possession becomes private property and a
legitimate subject of interstate commerce, and "the inaction of
Congress is a declaration of freedom from state interference
with the transportation of articles of legitimate interstate com43
nerce."
Okla. 164, 224 Pac. 156 (oil. and gas) ; C. C. Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v.
Capshaw, (1930) 145 Okla. 237, 292 Pac. 841 (oil) ; cf. McReady v. Virginia, (1876) 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. Ed. 248 (fish); Manchester v. Massachuseits, (1891) 139 U. S. 240, 11 Sup. Ct. 559, 35 L. Ed. 159 (fish); Silz
v. Hesterberg, (1908) 211 U. S. 31, 29 Sup. Ct. 10, 53 L. Ed. 75 (wild
fowl). For a more extended discussion of the problem of prevention of
waste as involved in the Ohio Oil Co. case and in Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., (1920) 254 U. S. 300, 41 Sup. Ct. 118, 65 L. Ed. 276, see Williams, The Power of the State to Control the Use of its Natural Resources,
(1927) 11 MINNESOTA LAW REvmVz 129, 233, 238 et seq.
42(1911) 221 U. S. 229, 255, 31 Sup. Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716.
48(1911) 221 U. S. 229, 261, 31 Sup. Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716.
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Considering the cases thus far dealt with, involving wild
game, fresh water, and natural gas, it seems that there is ample
justification for the distinctions made by the Court. The basis
of the distinctions would not seem to lie so much in the proprietary or non-proprietary interest of the state, indicated by the first
proposition in Geer v. Connecticut, as in the broader relation of
the state or the public to the natural resource in question, and
the consequent right to exercise the police power for its preservation. The power of the state in such a situation, properly considered, seems to be governmental in its nature rather than proprietary." This was particularly emphasized by Mr. Justice
McKenna in the Oklahoina Case when he discussed the opinion
in Hudson Cmnty Water Co. v. McCarter.45 The principle of that
decision was asserted to be that it was in the "interest of the
public for a state to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it
substantially undiminished, except by such drains upon them as
the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the purpose
of turning them to a more perfect use." The fresh water of the
state's streams was referred to as "one of the great foundations
of public welfare and health" which the private right to appropriate should not be permitted to diminish substantially. It was
thought to be hardly necessary to say that there was no purpose
in the Water Company Case "to take from property its uses and
commercial rights or to assimilate a flowing river and the welfare
which was interested in its preservation" to the regulation of gas
wells, or to take from the gas when reduced to possession the
attributes of property decided to belong to it."" In the case of
wild game it may be permissible to assert that the state bears
44The terms "governmental" and "proprietary," though frequently confused, are here used to distinguish between the power possessed by a government, by virtue of its sovereignty, to protect the interests of its citizens.
as the police power, and that of a proprietor to control because of special
property interest in the thing in question.
45(1908) 209 U. S. 349, 28 Sup. Ct. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828.
46Italics supplied.
47 Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., (1911) 221 U. S. 229, 259, 31
Sup. Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, (1900) 177 U. S.
190, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729, setting forth the Court's conception
of the nature of private property in oil and gas lawfully reduced to possession, had been decided eight years prior to the decision in the Water
Company case. In the excerpt here quoted from the Oklahoma case, the
Court is seeking to contrast "property" and "its uses and commercial
rights" as applied to natural gas, with "the welfare which was interested
in its preservation" as related to a flowing river, to show the difference
in the relation to the two, both of the individual who acquires possession
and of the public, as a justification for the difference in treatment.
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a special relation thereto, historically, as representative of the
public, sufficient to justify the holding in Geer v. Connecticut.48
With respect to both wild game and fresh water," the relationship of the public, as well as the nature and extent of the ownership acquired by one who reduces them to possession, is quite
different from the situation in a case where a commodity such
as natural gas is involved. It is believed that the interest of the
public in the preservation of a fresh water supply for local uses,
or as the Court has stated it "the welfare interested in its
preservation", is such that the state may be justified in pursuing
a definite policy for its conservation for use within the state.
It may, therefore, as a means of self preservation, properly
exercise its police power to impose restrictions which could not
be justified as to articles, the nature of the ownership of which
is different, and upon the preservation of which the people of
the state are less vitally dependent. This is not to overlook the
fact that the commercial and industrial welfare of a state may
be greatly dependent upon the disposition made of its other
natural resources, such as natural gas. Neither is it to lose sight
of the fact that the promotion of industrial and commercial well
being, as a part of the so-called public convenience and general
welfare is a legitimate purpose for the exercise of the state's
police power. Nor is it to question the proposition that the
police power of a state may not be used to destroy traffic in
legitimate articles of interstate commerce. 50 It is rather to assert
that the preservation of the natural fresh water supply for the
people of a state may be put upon a similar basis of necessity to
that which justifies quarantine laws." Surely if a state may pro48

See Mr. Justice White's discussion, (1896) 161 U. S. 519, 522-528,
6 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed. 793.
49
For a fuller discussion of the relation of the state to fish, game
and fresh water, and the effect of its proprietary interest therein, see Williams, The Power of the State to Control the Use of its Natural Resources,
(1927) 11 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 129, 238 et seq.
5
°Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., (1888) 125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup.
Ct. 689, 31 L. Ed. 700; Leisy v. Hardin, (1890) 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct.
681, 34 L. Ed. 128.
51
Morgan L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Louisiana State Board of Health,
(1886) 118 U. S. 455, 6 Sup. Ct. 1114, 30 L. Ed. 237; Rasmussen v. Idaho,
(1901) 181 U. S. 198, 21 Sup. Ct. 594, 45 L. Ed. 820; Smith v. St. Louis &
S. W. Ry. Co., (1901) 181 U. S. 248, 21 Sup. Ct. 603, 45 L. Ed. 847; Compagnie Francaise De Navigation A Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of
Health, (1902) 186 U. S. 380, 22 Sup. Ct. 811, 46 L. Ed. 1209; Reid v.
Colorado, (1902) 187 U. S. 137, 23 Sup. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed. 108; Ashbell v.
Kansas, (1908) 209 U. S. 251, 28 Sup. Ct. 485, 52 L. Ed. 778.
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hibit the exportation of unripe and immature citrus fruits5 2 in

order to protect the good name of its industry abroad, it may
withhold for the use of its own inhabitants its natural fresh water
supply upon which their very existence may depend. It may
readily be suggested that a similar argument might be made with
respect to a fuel supply or a food product, and that the matter of
necessity as a basis of distinction in such cases can only be a
matter of degree. But in addition to the difference in the nature
of private ownership with respect to the latter products, and the
fact that they are more readily available on the open market, it
may be answered that most distinctions upon the basis of which
lines are to be drawn "are distinctions of degree, and the constant
business of the law is to draw such lines.""5 It is believed that
the degree of difference involved here is a sufficient one.
It has been suggested 4 that a different basis for a distinction
between these cases, from that relied upon by the Court, exists
in the fact that in the first two cases the supplies of wild game
and of fresh water were not more than needed for domestic
consumption, while in the Oklahom gas case no showing was
made that the complete supply was really needed for local demands. 55 This would avoid entirely the necessity of making a
distinction between the cases on the basis of a difference in the
nature of the commodities in question, or in the relation of the
public or the individual thereto. It would suggest that a state
might restrict exportation of its natural resources to the excess
above local needs or prohibit it altogether when necessary to supply the demands of its own citizens, but where not necessary to
protect the needs within the state no power to restrict or prohibit
exportation might be asserted. Such, in substance, was the posit on taken by West Virginia as to its restrictions upon the exporta52 Sligh
53

v. Kirkwood, (1915) 237,U. S. 52, 35 Sup. Ct. 501, 59 L. Ed. 835.

Mr. Justice Holmes in Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, (1919) 249 U. S.

265, 269, 39 Sup. Ct. 273, 63 L. Ed. 597.

54
See Hardman, The Right of a State to Restrain the Exportation
of its Natural Resources, (1920) 26 W. Va. L. Q. 224; cf. Blue, Has the

Legislature Power to Restrict the Sale of the State's Natural Products
into Other States?, (1920 )90 Cent. L. J. 154; Note (1924)

Rev. 233.

10 Va. L.

55
The late Professor James W. Simonton of West Virginia University
School of Law in an interesting article, The Power of a State to Control the Export of Hydro-Electric Energy, (1932) 39 W. Va. L. Q. 4, 14, in
discussing the Oklahoma gas case suggests that if "Oklahoma could have
prohibited the export of natural gas the market of private owners would
have been so limited that this commodity for very many years would have
been almost worthless," and that its waste would have been greatly increased.
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tion of natural gas in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia." The
statute there involved required all persons or utilities furnishing
natural gas for public use within the state, to the extent of their
supply produced therein, to furnish, a reasonably adequate supply
to all consumers within the state, and empowered the public
service commission to enforce its provisions. This statute was
passed by West Virginia in an effort to preserve for its own
citizens, so far as possible, an adequate supply of a natural
resource produced within its borders. The obvious purpose of
this statute, as would have been its effect if it had been enforced,
was to restrict the exportation of natural gas produced within
the state to the extent necessary to supply adequately local needs,
even though exportation in interstate commerce should be entirely
destroyed.
In support of this restrictive provision, it was urged that the
gas companies operating the pipe lines transmitting gas within
and beyond the limits of the state were public utility corporations and that the statute merely required such companies to
furnish a reasonably adequate service within reasonable territcrial limits, an obligation which they assumed by virtue of their
quasi-public character. Second, it was asserted that the statute
was merely a legitimate conservation measure to preserve for
the people of the state one of its natural resources which had
come to be no longer sufficient to satisfy local needs if the use
abroad were unrestricted. Neither argument appeared convincing to the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, for the
majority, took the position that so far as the business was of a
quasi-public character involving an obligation to give adequate
service, that character attached to it in Ohio and Pennsylvania
as well as in West Virginia, with an equal power in those states
to insist upon adequate service. The second contention he regarded as in essence the same as that set up in Oklahoma v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co. 57 and as controlled by the decision in
that case. The doctrine was again asserted that when the owner
of the surface reduces natural gas to possession it becomes his
property and the subject of commerce like any other product of
the forest, the field, or the mine. The principal issue was said
to be whether a state in which natural gas is produced and is a
recognized subject of commercial dealings may require that in
56(1923) 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117.
57(1911) 221 U. S. 229, 31 Sup. Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716.
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its sale and disposition "consumers in that state shall be accorded
a preferred right of purchase over consumers in other states,
when the requirement necessarily will operate to withdraw a large
volume of the gas from an established interstate current whereby
it is supplied in other states to consumers there."58 This withdrawal from the current of interstate commerce for the benefit
of local consumers was regarded as such an interference with
interstate commerce as to be a violation of the commerce clause
of the federal constitution.5 9 The Court was apparently concerned not alone with the effects of such a practice in the single
case, but also with the broader policy of protecting interstate
commerce in general against such restrictions by the states. It
was said that "what one state may do others may," and "what
may be done with one natural product may be done with others."
In other words, if one state may reserve its natural products for
the use of its own citizens, all others may do likewise with the
result that interstate commerce will be seriously impeded. From
the standpoint of national welfare as distinguished from that of
the individual states, it is certainly a desirable matter of policy to
prevent the states from thus seriously interfering with the conduct
of interstate commerce; and the commerce clause of the constitution of the United States undoubtedly was inserted for the
very purpose of avoiding in the future state interferences which
so seriously hampered interstate and foreign commerce during
the period of the Confederation.6"
The Court did not regard the purported distinction from the
Oklahoma gas case on the basis of the inadequacy of the supply
as being important. Full reliance was placed upon that decision,
and the cases of Geer v.Connecticutol and Hudson County Water
2
Co. v. McCarter&
were not mentioned. Thus the basis upon
which those cases are to be distinguished, established by the Oklahoma gas case, and set out at some length above, would seem to
s8(1923) 262 U. S. 553, 595, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117.
59For cases applying a similar doctrine to hold invalid state statutes
attempting to retain for consumption within the state all coal mined therein, see Vandalia Coal Co. v. Special Coal & Food Commission, (D.C. Ind.
1920) 268 Fed. 572; Ohio Collieries Co. v. Stuart, (D.C. Ohio 1923) 290
Fed. 6 1005.
OReynolds, The Distribution of Power to Regulate Interstate Carriers
Between the Nation and the States, 29, 31; Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9
Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 190, 6 L. Ed. 23; Brown v. Maryland, (1827) 12 Wheat.
(U.S.) 419, 446, 6 L. Ed. 678.
6t(1896) 161 U. S.519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed. 793.
02(1908) 209 ,U.S.349, 28 Sup. Ct. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828.
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stand. In this connection should be mentioned the case of Foster
Fomitntain Packing Co. v. Haydel,6 3 which some have thought to
64
have the effect of modifying the doctrine of the Geer Case,
though the Court expressed its approval of that case and purported to distinguish it. The statute of Louisiana there involved,
among other things, made it unlawful to export from the state
any shrimp from which the heads and hulls had not been removed,
but placed no restrictions upon exportation after such removal.
The alleged purpose of the statute was the conservation of the
heads and hulls for use in manufacturing fertilizer and chicken
feed. The Court thought, however, that the real purpose was
to prevent the interstate movement of raw shrimp in order to
force the removal of the packing and canning industries from
Mississippi to Louisiana. There was no purpose to discourage
or restrict the taking of shrimp or their shipment out of the
state, but rather the opposite. Neither was there any purpose
to preserve any part of them for the use of the people of the
state, 5 but rather to condition their entrance into interstate commerce in such a way as to advance the commercial and industrial
interests of the state. In accordance with the doctrine of the
Geer Case, the Court took the position that Louisiana might have
retained the shrimp for consumption and use within the state,
but since it was not needed there for consumption and the state
authorized its unrestricted entrance into intrastate commerce, and
into interstate commerce after processed to a certain extent, it
thereby released its control and could not impose as a condition
of its entrance into interstate commerce that the heads and hulls
be removed within the state. The control by the state over
game and fish rather than its ownership was emphasized, thus
more nearly approaching the same police power basis that has
been applied in the case of other natural resources68 than was
63(1928) 278 U. S. 1, 49 Sup. Ct. 1, 73 L. Ed. 147.
64
See notes dealing with this case as follows: (1929) 3 U. of Cin. L.
Rev. 64; (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 355; (1929) 14 Corn. L. Q. 245; (1929)
23 Ill. L. Rev. 705; (1929) 35 W. Va. L. Q. 182.
65
Mr. Justice Butler asserted as a feature distinguishing this from the
Geer Case that, "The conditions imposed by the act upon the interstate
movement of the meat and other products of shrimp are not intended
and do not operate to conserve them for the use of the people of the state."
(1928) 278 U. S. 1, 10, 49 Sup. Ct. 1, 73 L. Ed. 147: cf. Jackson Mining
Co. v. Auditor General, (1875) 32 Mich. 488, holding invalid a tonnage tax
imposed on all iron ore or minerals exported before being smelted but
exempting ores smelted in the state.
66
1n Lacoste v. Department of Conservation of Louisiana, (1924) 263
U. S. 545, 549, 550, 44 Sup. Ct. 186, 68 L. Ed. 437, sustaining a state
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done in the Geer Case. 7 Mr. Justice McReynolds in h:s dissent,
however, reasserted in its full vigor the proprietary idea when he
said, "these crustaceans belong to her (Louisiana) and she may
appropriate them for the exclusive use and benefit of (her)
citizens." This power could be exercised, he asserted, to promote
the shrimp canning and packing industries in the state. Therefore, he thought it proper for the statute to fix the limits upon
entry into interstate commerce.
In so far as the attempt to retain fish and game within the
state is solely for the purpose of advancing manufacture and industry, as in the shrimp case, there would seem to be no justification not present in the natural gas cases. The historical argument
advanced above as a basis for the decision in the Geer Case would
apply only when the state is exercising its control for traditional
purposes, and not when asserted for purposes entirely foreign to
the reasons which gave rise to the doctrine. As a practical matter there seems ample justification for drawing the line as indicated by the Court between the Geer and shrimp cases. The
Louisiana statute would seem to have less to recommend it than
that of West Virginia in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia. In the
latter case the statute was clearly intended and would have
operated to conserve a needed supply of natural gas for the
people of the state in which it was produced.
This latter case, together with that of Oklahonza v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., would seem to put at rest the contention that
a state may so far prefer its own citizens in the enjoyment of
its ordinary natural resources as to interfere seriously with
interstate commerce therein, and, by the only decision consistent
with our national needs and a national policy, manifest since the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, to maintain the channels of
interstate commerce free from undue interference on the part of
the states.
Such a statement as this last should probably not be made,
however, without some reference to the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Holmes in the West Virginia Case, in which Mr. Jusseverance tax with respect to all furs taken within the state, greater stress
was placed on the police power as the basis of the state's control than in
the Geer case, though the proprietary idea was also reasserted.

67For a recent state case purporting to interpret and apply the distinction between the two cases, see Ex parte Florence, (1930) 107 Cal. Apo.
607, 290 Pac. 652. See also In re Phoedovius, (1918) 177 Cal. 238, 170
Pac. 412, Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Zellerbach, (1932)
564, 12 P. (2d) 961.

124 Cal. App.
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tice Brandeis concurred. Since the statute sought to reach the
natural gas before it became a part of interstate commerce, he
thought it should have been sustained. He took the position that
"the products of a state until they are actually started to a point
outside it may be regulated by the state notwithstanding the commerce clause. ' '68 In support of this proposition he relied strongly
upon Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord,69 which sustained an occupation tax upon the mining of iron ore although substantially all the
ore left the state in interstate commerce and most of it was loaded
upon cars for the interstate journey by the same single movement
which severed it from its bed.70 "But as it was not yet in inter68(1923) 262 U. S. 553, 600, 601, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117.
69(1923) 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup. Ct. 526, 67 L. Ed. 928.
7
0"Mining is not interstate commerce, but, like manufacture, is a local
business subject to local regulation and taxation." Mr. Justice Van Devanter in Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, (1923) 262 U. S. 172, 178, 43
Sup. Ct. 526, 67 L. Ed. 928. While this statement is clearly sound, the case
in question does present a situation in which the line between the local act
of mining and the interstate shipment of the product is extremely shadowy.
The purchase of goods for immediate shipment out of the state is a part of
interstate commerce, and the facilities incident to such shipment are facilities of interstate commerce. American Express Co. v. Iowa, (1905) 196
U. S. 133, 25 Sup. Ct. 182, 49 L. Ed. 417; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
Clark Bros. Coal Mining Co., (1915) 238 U. S. 456, 35 Sup. Ct. 896, 59 L.
Ed. 1406; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Sonman Shaft Coal Co., (1916)
242 U. S. 120, 37 Sup. Ct. 46, 61 L. Ed. 188; Dahnke-Walker Milling
Co. v. Bondurant, (1921) 257 U. S.282, 42 Sup. Ct. 106, 66 L. Ed. 239;
Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., (1922) 258 U. S. 50, 42 Sup. Ct. 244, 66
L. Ed. 458; Stafford v. Wallace, (1922) 258 U. S.495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397,
66 L. Ed. 735; Flannagan v. Federal Coal Co., (1925) 267 U. S. 222,
45 Sup. Ct. 233, 69 L. Ed. 583; Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co., (1925)
268 U. S. 189, 45 Sup. Ct. 481, 69 L. Ed. 909; cf. A. G. Spalding &
Brothers v. Edwards, (1923) 262 U. S. 66, 43 Sup. Ct. 485, 67 L. Ed.
865; Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, (1930) 280 U. S. 390, 50 Sup. Ct.
169, 74 L. Ed. 504. That being true, all of the acts of loading and
shipping pursuant to such purchase would seem to come within the
same category. Then when a purchase is made of unmined coal at the
open pit mines for immediate delivery on cars for shipment out of the
state, it would logically seem that both the purchase and the loading would
be parts of interstate commerce. Yet the same act that does the loading
also constitutes the mining, and the latter, we have just seen, is held to
be solely a local business. Something in addition to bare logic must be
employed in a rational disposition of this type of case. This situation
will be dealt with infra under the subject of state taxation. For an interesting case involving an application of the principles here discussed to
a production tax on the production of natural gas transmitted directly from
the wells to points outside the state, see Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall,
(1927) 274 U. S. 284, 47 Sup. Ct. 639, 71 L. Ed. 1049. However fine the
line of distinction may be in such cases between what is interstate commerce and what is local, the holdings would not seem to stand as authority
for such restrictive statutes as that of West Virginia. For another case
sustaining a non-discriminatory mining tax, the incidence of which was
alleged to fall on interstate commerce, see Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.,
(1922) 260 U. S.245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83, 67 L. Ed. 237; cf. Missouri, Kansas
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state commerce the tax was sustained." As the gas here had
not yet started on an interstate journey, he thought the same reasoning should apply, and that there is "no relevant distinction
between taxing and regulating in other ways." Other cases were
thought to involve more nearly complete analogies and even more
strongly to dictate an opposite decision. If a state may prohibit
the shipment in interstate commerce of citrus fruits when immature or otherwise unfit for consumption,7 1 or by its game laws
preserve for its own people a food supply notwithstanding an interference with interstate commerce7 2 or regulate the use of
natural gas to prevent waste 7 3 or prohibit the manufacture
of articles (liquor and colored oleomargarine) intended for export,7 4 he saw no reason why West Virginia might not be permitted to prefer its own citizens in the consumption of natural
gas produced within its borders. In the face of these cases,
however, it appears that there are sufficient differences upon which
to make a distinction and support the decision of the Court. In
the case of placing an occupation tax upon iron mining no discrimination was imposed upon interstate commerce, and the mere
fact that in a particular instance the statute was applied to a case
where substantially all of the ore was to be shipped out of the state
would seem to be immaterial. Taxation is not the same thing
a- prohibition, particularly when the tax is non-discriminatory.
The same absence of discrimination exists as to the gas conservation cases, and the majority opinion in the principal case as
well as in those here referred to would seem amply to justify
the distinction. In Walls v. Midland Carbon Co.,7 5 relied upon
in this connection by Mr. Justice Holmes, rather stringent statutory restrictions upon the manner of making use of an important
natural resource were sustained, no interference with interstate
& Texas Ry. Co. v. Meyer, (D.C. Okla. 1913) 204 Fed. 140. But see State
v. Cumberland & Pennsylvania Railroad Co., (1874) 40 Md. 22.
71Sligh v. Kirkwood, (1915) 237 U. S.52, 35 Sup. Ct. 501, 59 L. Ed.
835.
72
Geer v. Connecticut, (1896) 161 U. S.519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L.
Ed. 793; Silz v. Hesterberg, (1908) 211 U. S. 31, 29 Sup. Ct. 10, 53 L.
Ed. 75.
73
Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., (1920) 254 U. S.300, 41 Sup. Ct. 118.

65 L. Ed. 276.
7'Kidd v. Pearson, (1888) 128 U. S.1, 9 Sup. Ct. 6, 32 L. Ed. 346
(liquor); Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, (1902) 183 U. S.238, 22 Sup.
Ct. 120, 46 L. Ed. 171 (colored oleomargarine).
75(1920) 254 U. S.300, 41 Sup. Ct. 118, 65 L. Ed. 276.
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shipment being involved.71 The power to restrict the exportation
of citrus fruits to preserve the commercial good name of the
state was clearly based upon analogy to the power of a state to
exclude articles unfit for human consumption and thus not legitimate articles of interstate commerce, and to the power to pass
inspection and quarantine laws. The preservation of wild game
for consumption within the state is sufficiently dealt with above.
Manufacture, like mining, precedes and is not a part of interstate
commerce. 7 While colored oleomargarine, like liquor,78 may be
regarded as a legitimate article of interstate commerce 9 when
manufactured, the prohibition of its manufacture, for sufficient
police reasons, is not equivalent to a restraint upon the shipment
of an existing article of commerce.8 0 These cases do not question
the propostion that it is beyond the power of a state to forbid or
impede the exportation of goods once lawfully called into existence. The object of such statutes is 'not to prevent or restrict
the carrying out of the state of recognized articles of commerce
but to prevent the manufacture within the state of articles thought
to be harmful.
Mr. Justice Holmes considered the cases above discussed as
confirming what he thought plain without them,"" that "the constitution does not prohibit a state from securing a reasonable preference for its own inhabitants in the enjoyment of its products
even when the effect of its law is to keep property within its
7

6The earlier cases of Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, (1900) 177 U. S. 190, 20
Sup. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729, and Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
(1911) 220 U. S. 61, 31 Sup. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369, had merely sustained restrictions upon wasteful production. For a discussion of the Walls
Case and the distinction between it and the earlier cases, see Williams,
The Power of the State to Control the Use of its Natural Resources,
(1927) 11 MiNNEsorA LAW Rr-viEw 129, 239 et seq.
77"Commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part of it." Mr.
Chief Justice Fuller in United States v. E. C. Knight Co., (1895) 156
U. S. 1, 12, 15 Sup. Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325.
78
Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., (1888) 125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup.
Ct. 689, 31 L. Ed. 700; Leisy v. Hardin, (1890) 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct.
681, 34 L. Ed. 128.
79
Cf. Plumley v. Massachusetts, (1894) 155 U. S. 461, 15 Sup. Ct. 154,
39 L. Ed. 223; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, (1898) 171 U. S. 1, 18 Sup.
Ct. 757, 43 L. Ed. 49.
80"If it be held that the term [interstate commerce] includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended to be the subject of [interstate] commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that
it would also include all productive industries that contemplate the same
thing. The result would be that Congress would be invested, to the exclusion of the states, with the power to regulate, not only manufacture, but
also agriculture, horticulture, stock-raising, domestic fisheries, mining-
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s2
He
boundaries that otherwise would have passed outside."
admitted, however, that there was "some general language in
Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., s2 a decision that I thought
wrong, implying that Pennsylvania might not keep its coal, or the
Northwest its timber, etc. But I confess I do not see what is to

hinder."
It is submitted that there was ample justification for the decision of the Court, and that such legislation as that of West Virginia materially restricting the free interchange from state to
state of recognized articles of interstate commerce is not only
highly undesirable from the standpoint of national policy, but also
amounts to a substantial violation of both the terms and the
purpose of the commerce clause of the constitution of the United
States.'
B.

HYDROELECTRIC POWER

Whether the courts will follow the analogy of the gas cases
when they come to dealing with restrictions upon the exportation
of hydroelectric energy from the state of its production remains
to be seen."' Unless there is some fundamental difference in the
nature of the commodity involved and the relation of the state
thereto, or in the restriction imposed by the state, there would
seem to be every reason to expect that the same result would be
arrived at.
Only one state has undertaken to impose an absolute statutory

prohibition upon the exportation of hydroelectric energy generated
in short, every branch of human industry." Mr. Justice Lamar in Kidd v.
Pearson, (1888) 128 U. S. 1, 21, 9 Sup. Ct. 6, 32 L. Ed. 346.
81
Citing Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, (1908) 209 U. S.
349, 357, 28 Sup. Ct. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828.
82(1923) 262 U. S. 553, 603, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117.
83(1911) 221 U. S. 229, 31 Sup. Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716.
84
For other cases holding invalid statutes restricting or prohibiting
the exportation of natural gas from the state of its production, see Haskell
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., (1912) 224 U. S. 217, 32 Sup. Ct. 442, 56 L.
Ed. 738; State ex rel. Corwin v. Indiana & Ohio Oil, Gas & Mining Co.,
(1889) 120 Ind. 575, 22 N. E. 778; Manufacturers Gas & Oil Co. et al. v.
Natural Gas & Oil Co., (1900) 155 Ind. 545, 57 N. E. 912.
Indiana
8
5In determining that the transmission of electric current across state
lines is interstate commerce, and in dealing with problems in regard to
rates, service and taxation, to be discussed infra, the courts have relied
almost entirely on the analogy of the natural gas cases. See Public Utilities
Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam and Electric Co., (1927)
273 U. S.83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294, 71 L. Ed. 549; Utah Power & Light Co. v.
Pfost, (1932) 286 U. S. 165, 52 Sup. Ct. 548, 76 L.Ed. 1038; South Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm., (D.C. S.C. 1931) 52 F.
(2d) 515, (D.C. S.C. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 528; Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co.
v. Public Service Comm., (1919) 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S.E. 557.
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within its borders. Three others have sought to prefer their
own inhabitants and restrict exportation to the surplus above local
needs in a manner similar to the restrictions with respect to natural gas involved in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, while in still
other states public service commissions have from time to time
promulgated orders more or less restrictive in effect. Several
states have passed general water power statutes providing for
controlling and regulating the development of the potential water
power of their streams. Of these, some specifically assert all the
water power resources of the state to be the property of the
public for the benefit of all the people ;" others in more general
terms have been given a substantially similar interpretation by
the courts. 7 Practically all such statutes either express or seem
to imply the existence of a power on the part of the state to control development and disposition as it may see fit.
The state of Maine, since 1909, has had an absolute statutory
prohibition against the exportation beyond the limits of the state
of any hydroelectric energy generated therein. Aside from certain minor exceptions not here important, the prohibition applies
to all unless an express authorization is conferred by special act
of the legislature. " Such authorization has never been given,
however, and no question as to the enforcement of the provisions
of this statute has ever been before the commission or the courts
of the state.89 In 1929 the Maine Legislature passed a comprehensive act authorizing and making provision for the exportation
This act was
from the state of surplus power generated therein.
defeated by popular referendum, with the result that the prohibition against exportation remains substantially complete.
New Hampshire, by statute, imposes a similar prohibition
except upon the special authorization of the public service com8
6Nebraska Comp. Stat. 1929, 46-502; New Hampshire, Pub. Laws
1924, ch. 153, sec. 16. See also Virginia, Code Ann. 1930, sec. 3581 (1).
7
8 "All streams within the state capable of developing hydraulic, electrical or other energy or power, shall be under the control and supervision
of the state." West Virginia Code Ann. (Barnes, 1923) ch. 54B, sec. 2;
Acts 1913, ch. 11, sec. 1; Acts 1915, ch. 17, sec. 2.
For interpretation of this statute, see Royal Glen Land & Lumber Co.
v. Public Service Commission, (1922) 91 W. Va. 446, 448, 449, 113 S. E.
749.
88
Maine, Rev. Stat. 1930, ch. 68, sec. 1; Maine, Laws 1909, ch. 244,
sec. 89
1, 3.
Personal letter from the Maine Public Utilities Commission, February 914, 1933.
Maine, Laws 1929, ch. 280.
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mission of the state, with power in the commission to require
the discontinuance of such exportation as authorized whenever
the electric energy may be needed for use within the state.9 ' In
practice this is substantially the equivalent of the ordinary preference given to local needs. West Virginia, since 1913, and
Wisconsin, since 1915, have had restrictive laws regulating the
exportation of hydroelectric power. By an act of 1929 West
Virginia provided for a more mild sort of preference9 2 in favor
of local consumers. This act, however, has been declared unconstitutional 3 as in violation of certain provisions of the state
constitution, leaving in effect the more rigid act of 1915 by which
the state public service commission is fully empowered to control
the sale and distribution of hydroelectric energy to the extent of
completely prohibiting its exportation from the state.9 4 The Wisconsin statute prohibits the exportation of hydroelectric energy by
any grantee of a permit to generate such power, in such a way
or to such an extent as to disable the grantee from furnishing
adequate service at reasonable rates to consumers within the
state, and authorizes the state public service commission to
declare null and void any or all contracts for such exportation
in so far as they may be found to interfere with such service or
rates. 9 5

These statutes may be sufficiently accurately characterized by
saying that the one, that of Maine, is substantially a complete
prohibition upon any exportation from the state of hydroelectric
energy generated therein; while the statutes of New Hampshire,
O9New Hampshire, Laws 1929, ch. 106. Except for the provision requiring discontinuance of exportation on order of the commission, the
statute has been in effect since 1911. New Hampshire, Pub. Laws 1926,
ch. 240, sec. 33.
92
West Virginia, Acts 1929, ch. 58, sec. 6(f).
93
Hodges v. Public Service Commission, (1931) 110 W. Va. 649, 159
S. E.9 834.
4West Virginia, Code Ann. (Barnes, 1923) ch. 54B, sec. 15, Acts
1915, ch. 17, sec. 15. A somewhat less drastic restriction had been imposed by the 1913 statute. West Virginia Acts 1913, ch. 11, sec. 19.
9
sWisconsin, Statutes 1931, sec. 31.27; Laws 1915, ch. 380; Laws 1917,
ch. 474, sec. 27. By an amendment in 1929 each applicant for a permit
is required to file with the commission a written agreement to the exercise of the power of the commission to declare contracts void. Wisconsin, Statutes 1931, sec. 31.095.
For other statutes conferring very broad powers upon state commissions, which might be subject to an interpretation allowing such commissions to require a preference for local demands, see South Carolina, Acts
1932, No. 871, sec. 2 (i) and (j); Vermont, Gen. Laws 1917, secs. 5689,
5690. See also Virginia, Acts 1932, ch. 345.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

West Virginia and Wisconsin require a preference in favor of
intrastate consumers and restrict exportation to the surplus. It
is particularly worthy of note that in the last three states, not
only are restrictions imposed upon the granting of permits for
the generation of electrical energy and its transmission beyond
state lines in deference to local demands, but authority is also
placed in the appropriate commission to take care of future shortages of power or future increases in local needs by requiring the
curtailment or entire discontinuance of exportation originally
authorized. In the Wiscons'n statute this latter power is specifically authorized to the extent of declaring null and void existing
contracts for the sale and delivery of hydroelectric energy to
consumers in other states. 96 The other statutes, in so far as they
authorize the compulsory discontinuance of exportation, will, if
complied with, equally effectively prevent the fulfillment of such
contracts. 9 In none of the statutes is there a provision specifically requiring that extensions of transmission lines shall be made
within the state as new demands arise. 98 If the courts should at
any time interpret the statutory provisions as so requiring, or
if such extension can be compelled under the general law of public utilities, the potentialities of the restrictive provisions are measurably increased. 99
6
9"7Wisconsin,

Statutes 1931, sec. 31.27.

0ne state, without statutory provision, has attempted, through its

commission, to reach a somewhat similar result by attaching to its approval of certain interchange contracts of local power companies with a
company in another state the proviso that the commission should have

the right at any time to terminate the contracts "when in its opinion
public interest or convenience reauires such termination." Re Commonwealth Edison Co., (1927) 6 Ill. C. C. R. 576; Re Central Illinois Public
Service Co., (1927) 6 Ill. C. C. R. 880.
9
SThe nearest approach is the statute of New Hampshire which requires that "any public utility shall make, renew or extend any contraci
for the delivery of electrical energy to another utility upon such terms and
conditions as the public service commission shall order to be for the public
good." New Hampshire, Laws 1929, ch. 179. See also South Carolina.
Acts 1932, No. 871, sec. 2 (i) and (j). For an interpretation of the
New Hampshire statute to indicate that all reasonable demands for electric service within the state, in whatever locality, are to be satisfied in preference to demands of extra-state consumers, see Re Grafton Power Co.,
(1929) 12 N. H. P. S. C. 194, 198, 199; P. U. R. 1929E 250; Re Grafton
Power Co., (1929) 12 N. H. P. S. C. R. 379, 384; P. U. R. 1930B, 346.
99
A Connecticut statute enacted in 1915 regulating the sale and distribution of electricity within the state has been interpreted by the Publi, .
Utilities Commission of that state to express a "policy to prohibit within
the state the purchase, sale or distribution for power purposes of electricity
generated outside of the state." Re Grosvenordale Co., (1920) P. U. R.
io*nrl 1At (Conn. P.U.C. 1920), applying Connecticut, Gen. Stat. 1918, sec-.
3902. 3903.
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Without special statutory authorization, several state commissions have undertaken to impose restrictions similar in effect to
those embodied in the statutes just discussed. Apparently the
earl est instance of this practice, and at the same time the most
drastic in effect, was an order of the State Board of Irrigation
of Nebraska. 10 This order granted a permit to one Kirk to
appropriate the waters of the Niobrara River for power purposes,
but subjoined thereto the condition that the power generated under
and by virtue of the permit must not be transmitted or used beyond
the confines of the state of Nebraska. Authority for the exercise
of such power was alleged to be derived from the general provision of the statute asserting the water of every natural stream in
the state to be the property of the public and dedicated to the use
of the people of the state.' 0 '
Other orders of state commissions have taken the form of
requiring that preference be given to local demands or that only
the surplus above local needs might be exported, rather than
undertaking to impose complete prohibition on exportation.
The Public Service Commission of Vermont was apparently
the first state commission to impose the requirement of a preference for local consumers without statutory authorization. In
granting the petition of the Colonial Power & Light Company,
a Vermont corporation, to acquire the properties of certain other
local power companies and of a New Hampshire company, the
commission pointed out that the demand for electric current for
power, heat, light and other purposes in the territory reached by
the corporations in question at the time exceeded the ability of the
corporations to supply with their existing facilities, and that such
demands were on the increase. With that as its justification, and
without any attempt to base its action upon statutory authorization, 10 2 the commission conditioned the permit on the requirement
that in the sale of electric current by the purchasing company
persons doing business in that state requiring electric energy for
use therein "shall have first right to all electric energy developed
by said corporation in Vermont upon demand made for the same."
This condition was asserted to be a part of the contract between
the state and the grantee of the permit to purchase, any violation
l0OThis order was probably made in 1911. It came before the courts
in 1912.
°"'Nebraska, Rev. Stat. 1913, sec. 3370, supra note 86.
'O°-That it might conceivably have done so, see reference to statute
supra, note 95.
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ot which should forfeit the right of the grantee to do business
in the state. 0 3 The effect of such commission orders is quite as
restrictive as the statutory provisions for local preferences,
though the generality of their application depends, apparently,
upon the discretion of the commission in each particular case.
Somewhat similar action has, from time to time, been taken
by certain other state commissions to insure the supply of the
demands of local consumers. In granting its approval for the socalled Conowingo project in 1926, the Maryland Public Utilities
Commission used this device in a very interesting fashion. The
contemplated project called for an intercorporate set-up involving
two Maryland and two Pennsylvania -corporations for the purpose of hydroelectric development on the Susquehanna River.
The dam and generating plants were to be entirely within the
State of Maryland, but part of the pool created by the dam was
to be in Pennsylvania. The high-tension transmission lines were
to be largely in the latter state, and it was contemplated that most
of the power produced would find its market therein. The Maryland corporations were under definite charter obligations with
respect to supplying local demands to the extent of all of the
power developed from the Susquehanna River if needed. The
commission attached to its order approving the application the
provision that all electrical energy from the project, which thereafter should be called for by the commission for use in Maryland
in fulfillment of charter obligations of the Maryland companies,
should be furnished by those companies and distributed by agencies over which the commision had full control. It further provided that such energy should "not be delivered or distributed
in such manner, either wholesale or retail, as may cause it to the
extent the same is distributed or used in Maryland, to become in
114
any manner, shape or form, a part of interstate commerce."
In view of the charter requirements mentioned above, the practical effect of this provision was that all exportation of energy was
to be subordinated to local demands.
' 03Re Petition of Western Vermont Power & Light Co., Re Petition
of Colonial Power & Light Co., (1919) Vermont P.S.C.R. (1918-1919)
37, 41,04 44.

1 Re Susquehanna Power Co., (Md. P.S.C., 1926) P. U. R. 1926B
732, 745, 746, 759. See also the requirement of preferences for local consumers imposed by the Indiana Public Service Commission in approving
the construction of a generating project, in Re State Line Generating Co.,
(1929) 3 P. U. Fortnightly 166 (Ind. P.S.C., Nos. 9488, 9489).
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Perhaps the most interesting of the situations that have yet
developed out of the activities of state commissions, in attempting
to control the distribution of electric energy generated by use of
water power, is that of New Hampshire in the Bellows Falls
Canal Company Case.'05 The exportation of power generated
within the state was not directly involved, but the problem was
very closely related thereto. The Canal Company, a Vermont
utility, had for many years maintained a dam across the Connecticut River on the boundary between Vermont and New Hampshire.
It sought to improve its power facilities, and in so doing to increase the height of its dam. This required the permission of the
New Hampshire commission, as well as that of Vermont. Under
the New Hampshire statute the commission was authorized to
grant such permission only when it found it to be "for the public
use and benefit.'1 0 6 Since the electricity was to be generated
wholly within the state of Vermont, the statute authorizing the
commission to control the exportation of current could not
apply.'1 7 Furthermore, the generating company did not propose
to furnish electricity directly to New Hampshire, but only by
means of delivery to utilities in Vermont and Massachusetts which
in turn would transmit it to consumers in that state. The commission was accordingly of the opinion that it lacked authority to
control any of the current generated at the dam, that New Hampshire would not necessarily get the benefit of any of the electricity
resulting from the proposed increase, and that, therefore, it had
no authority to grant the permit. The commission took the position that so far as its power of control was concerned, the Vermont company might at any time completely cease delivering
current to the utilities serving New Hampshire consumers, or
might charge excessively high rates therefor.
"To overcome this objection, the Bellows Falls Canal Company entered into an agreement and stipulation submitting itself
to the jurisdiction of this commission as to the amount of electricity so generated that it should deliver in New Hampshire and
as to the reasonableness of the terms upon which it should be
delivered."' 08
This stipulation was made a part of the order of the commission approving the application, and asserted to be binding upon
1or(1927) 11 N. H.
10076New Hampshire,

P. S. C. R. 174.
Pub. Laws 1926, ch. 218, secs. 31-35.
1 New Hampshire, Laws 1929, ch. 106, supra note 91.
108(1927) 11 N. H. P. S. C. R. 174, 177, 180, 181.
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the successors and assigns of the Bellows Falls Canal Company.
In this manner the commission exerted a more far-reaching
control over its water resources than seems to have been contemplated by even the most rigorous of the restrictive statutes.
This is made particularly apparent in the opinion of the commission refusing, on the later application of the Bellows Falls
Company, 1 9 to strike out or modify the principal provisions of
this stipulation. The position of the commission was that unless
it had full control of the power to be created by use of the natural
resources of the state it could not find that it was for the "public
use and benefit" to erect the dam, and would have no basis upon
which it could grant to the company power to condemn New
Hampshire lands. Prior to the stipulation here involved, the commission was not in a position to exert any control over the power
being generated at the dam, half of which was within New
Hampshire territory. By the new arrangement it successfully
asserted full control over all the energy to be generated from its
own water resources, though generated outside the state, to the
extent of requiring all or any part of it to be delivered to con110
sumers within the state.
The above discussion indicates the present status of limitations,
statutory and otherwise,1 1 ' upon the exportation of hydroelectric
energy beyond the confines of the state in which it is produced.
The purpose of these restrictive measures has no doubt been
twofold: to insure for the inhabitants of the state an adequate
power supply at a reasonable rate, and to encourage industries
needing power to locate within the state. That they have effectively served either of these purposes seems open to serious
11 2
doubt.
109(1928) 11 N. H. P. S. C. R. 357.
somewhat different situations in which state commissions have
so exercised their control over local companies in the granting of permits
to enter into contracts with foreign companies as to secure delivery of
electric energy within the state from sources outside, see Re Central Illinois Public Service Co., (1921) 1 Ill. C. C. R. 165, and Re United Utilities
Co., (1922) 21 Ill. C. C. R. 45.
I"For other commission orders bearing less directly upon the immediate problem, see Re Twin State Gas & Electric Co., (1922) 8 N. H. P. S.
C. R. 378; Re Grafton Power Co., (1928) 11 N. H. P. S. C. R. 455, P. U.
R. 1929D 555.
There may exist other commission orders imposing restrictions upon
liOFor

exportation of hydroelectric energy, but none have been found by an examination of the commission reports available. According to information obtained by means of letters from the commissions in thirty-eight
states, in response to letters of inquiry sent to all states, no such orders
have been made.
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In no instance have the restrictive statutes been questioned as
to their validity under the commerce clause of the federal Constitution, either in the courts or before the state commissions.
Neither has any commission taken affirmative action to enforce
the provisions of one of these statutes by requiring the discontifuance of extra-state delivery 13 previously permitted, by avoiding contracts" 4 previously entered into, or by any other means." 5
With a single exception, commission orders restricting exportation have likewise escaped the scrutiny of the courts. The first
such order discussed herein," 6 by which the Nebraska Board of
Irrigation conditioned its grant upon a complete prohibition of
exportation, was appealed to the state court. It was contended
that such a prohibition was beyond the power of the board because it operated to interfere with interstate commerce. In sustaining the action of the board the Supreme Court of Nebraska" 7
discussed at length the distinction between the power of a state
over natural gas""' and over wild game, and took the position
that the situation involved was analogous to the latter." 9 The
court did not discuss the nature of the property rights of the
individual in the power produced, or the relation of the state
thereto, but dealt with the matter precisely as if the water were
being diverted outside the state.
"In this state," said Judge Sedgwick, "running water is publici
112See Nichols, Shall the States be Permitted to Export Surplus Power,
(1929) 4 P. ,U.Fortnightly 223; Corey, Keeping Water Power at Home:
The Effect on the State, (1932) 9 P. U. Fortnightly 342.
13This provision of the New Hampshire statute (Laws 1929, c. 106,
supra note 91) has never been invoked by the commission. Personal letter from
the commission, February 14, 1933.
114This provision in the Wisconsin statute (Stat. 1931 sec. 31,27,
supra note 95) has never been invoked by the commission. Personal letter from the commission, February 13, 1933.
"IsCommissions have, however, imposed in the terms of permits granted, as conditions thereof, the provisions of the statutes. Re Grafton
Power Co., (1929) 12 N. H. P. S.C. R. 194, 201, P. U. R. 1929E 250; Re
New-Kanawha Power Co., (1929) 17 W. Va. P. S. C. R. 19; Re West
Virginia Power & Transmission Co., (1930) 17 W. Va. P. S. C. R. 120.
11"This order was probably made in 1911. It came before the courts
in 1912.
"17 Kirk v. State Board of Irrigation, (1912) 90 Neb. 627, 134 N. W.
167. 8
11 The only natural gas case referred to was Manufacturers Gas &
Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co., (1900) 155 Ind. 545, 57 N. E.
912.
119The reasoning in Geer v. Connecticut, (1896) 161 U. S. 519, 16
Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed. 793, was thought to be controlling. Curiously
enough, Hudson County Water Company v. McCarter, (1908) 209 U. S.
349, 28 Sup. Ct. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828, was not mentioned.
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juris. Its use belongs to the public and is controlled by the state
in its sovereign capacity ....

The state may reserve such a right

of ownership and control of the beneficial use of the running
waters of the streams as will enable it to prohibit the transmission
or use thereof beyond the confines of the state."' 20
Not a little importance attaches to this decision because of the
fact that it stands alone upon this subject. It is unlikely, however, that it will be controlling when the matter eventually comes
before the federal courts. This paucity of court decisions, or
of attempts to question the validity of these statutes and orders,
is not believed to be due to any general acquiescence in their
validity, or any lack of importance attached to the matter involved.
It is perhaps due rather to the fact that in their application, or
lack of it, opportunity has seldom been presented for testing their
validity.
That the restrictive provisions here in question have operated
to retard interstate development seems quite apparent.' 2 1 That
when tested serious questions will arise as to their validity under
the commerce clause seems not open to doubt.
120(1912) 90 Neb. 627, 631, 134 N. W. 167.
21
1 1n Maine no company, except those so operating before 1909, exports any power. Letter from the commission, February 14, 1933. The
state merely refuses to create a corporation or grant a franchise for the
export of power. Yet Maine has hydro potentialities surpassed by only
three other states. N. E. L. A. Statistical Bull. No. 8 (July, 1932). It
is estimated tmat 60 per cent of its potential power is undeveloped. See
Corey, Keeping Water Power at Home: The Effect on the State, (1932)
9 P. U. Fortnightly 342, 344.
The exportation from Wisconsin has been inconsequential. That the
power to declare void all export contracts at any time might prove a deterrent is not improbable. Other features of the Wisconsin statute to be discussed infra have also probably contributed to the result.
The situation in West Virginia has been described by Chairman Coffman of the Public Service Commission as follows: "West Virginia's experience in the matter of hydro-electric development has not been a happy
one from the standpoint of securing the conservation of water power. The
$8,000,000 New-Kanawha Power Company project is the sole project of any
magnitude for which a license has been sought under the 1915 law.
"We depend very largely upon steam-electric power, on the distribution
and transportation of which there are no restrictions.
"The law (1915) contained other provisions (in addition to that allowing the commission to control the sale and distribution of power to the extent of retaining all within the state) which were intended to retard development and they have done so ....

Among such provisions were those re-

quiring a licensee to be a domestic corporation and that its securities should
be approved by the state and also a recapture provision very favorable to
the state." Corey, Keeping Water Power at Home: The Effect on the
State, (1932) 9 P. U. Fortnightly 342, 346, 347.
That the New Hampshire provision in effect since 1929, authorizing
the Commission to require a discontinuance of all export service at any
time, might prove an obstacle seems highly probable.
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1. Attempted Just:fication for Restrictive Measures
Two theories exist on the basis of which such measures are
sought to be justified. One is that the state is dealing with a
natural resource within its jurisdiction and over which it may
exert full and complete control. The other is that the state is
granting a privilege which it might withhold, and to which it
may attach such conditions as it sees fit.
It is proposed to examine these two alleged bases of justification in the light of the previous cases, keeping in mind the nature
of the interference with interstate commerce, to see if any rationalization can be arrived at as to the probable constitutional validity
of such measures. No attempt will be made to deal with each
particular statute or order in detail, but rather to generalize as
to the broader aspects of the problem involved.
Any litigation involving this problem will undoubtedly present
opposing contentions relying on analogy to the wild game1 22 and
fresh water supply cases1 23 on the one hand, and to the natural
gas cases' 24 on the other. Neither, however, furnishes a complete analogy, or points the way with abqolute assurance to the
proper solution. As to the former, it is clear that no attempt is
here involved to export the water itself, and therein may lie a
difference of some significance. On the other hand, the relation
of the individual or corporation to the production of water power,
and the relation of the state thereto, by virtue of its control
over navigable streams, can hardly be said to present the identical
problem involved in the case of natural gas.
A. Natural Resource Theory.-With respect to the first basis
of justification mentioned above, it may be at once suggested
that a natural resource is not being exported. It seems entirely
proper to assert that hydroelectric power is not a natural resource

of the state in which it it generated.

True, it is closely related

to and dependent upon a natural resource, but as much could be
said of scores of other commodities in everyday use. Hydroelectric power is generated or produced by the application of
122 Geer v. Connecticut, (1896) 161 U. S. 519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed.
793.

123Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, (1908) 209 U. S. 349, 28
Sup. Ct. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828.
124 Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., (1911) 221 U. S. 229, 31 Sup.
Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, (1923) 26Z U. S.
553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117.
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human ingenuity to forces existing in nature, but certainly is not
itself a natural force. Mechanical devices, including turbines and
generators, must be employed before electric power is produced.
Water power operates the turbines, but that is the end of its function. The turbines in turn operate the generators by which the
power is generated. The force of the flow of the river current,
or the mechanical energy of falling water, is not transported, but
by the application of human skill a distinct product is brought
into being which, alone, becomes the subject of exportation from
the state.12
The nature of electrical energy, once in existence,
would seem to be the same whether produced from a hydro plant
or a steam plant, yet it is hardly to be suggested that the product
of the latter is a natural resource of the state merely because it
is dependent upon an available natural water supply, or because
other natural resources, such as coal, are essential to its production.
If the above analysis, which the courts seem to approve, 126
is. sound, it would seem that the prohibition of exportation cannot
be justified on any theory of preserving a natural resource of the
state for the benefit of its own inhabitants.
Even if hydroelectric energy could be considered a natural
resource, or if its dependence upon the water power by which it
is generated be so complete and its relation thereto so close that
it is to be governed by the principles applicable to natural
resources, it does not necessarily follow that the state of its creation may compel its retention within its own borders. Mere reference to the natural gas cases suffices to demonstrate that.
Most land bordering upon running streams, as elsewhere, is
today in private ownership. Where the common law system of
riparian rights prevails, the riparian owner has certain important
rights to make use of the water and of the force of its flow as
it passes by or through his land. Subject to these rights the
5
The courts have distinctly emphasized this conception of the nature
-3.

of such power in cases involving the imposition of a tax upon its generation, and have likened generation to the manufacture of physical articles of

trade later to be shipped in interstate commerce. See Utah Power & Light
Co. v. Pfost, (1932) 286 U. S. 165, 179, 181, 52 Sup. Ct. 548, 76 L. Ed.
1038; South Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission,
(D.C. S.C. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 515.
"26"It is well settled that electricity made by artificial means is a product of manufacture, and is personal property." Hetherington v. Camp Bird

Mining, Leasing & Power Co., (1922) 70 Colo. 531, 533, 202 Pac. 1087,
citing numerous cases.
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state, for the protection of the interest of its inhabitants, exercises a broad control over the diversion of waters from its streams,
whether for use within the state 27 or without.128 The extent to
which the state may exert its control over the force of the flow
of a stream is not, by any means, free from doubt, despite the
fact that state legislatures not infrequently seem to imply a complete control. The riparian proprietor has, of course, no ownership of the flowing water in a natural stream. He has only a right
to take a reasonable quantity thereof for ordinary domestic and
industrial uses. He has in addition, ordinarily, a right to make
use of the flow of the current for power purposes which is a
valuable part of his property as riparian owner. As one writer
has stated it,
"the force of the flow of the current of a stream at any
point depends on the slope of the land through which it passes.
Ordinarily the natural characteristics of the land, including the
advantages due to its slope, belong to the owner of the land.
While the state in its sovereign capacity has a considerable power
of control over the taking of water from the stream, it does not
follow that it has a like power of control over the privilege of
utilization of the force of the flow of the water in the stream,
for the slope of the land which produces the power is a natural
characteristic 29of the land itself and presumably belongs to the
land owner.'.
This attitude appears to be borne out by the authorities. 30 The
same writer suggested, however, that if the force of the flow of
127Trenton v. New Jersey, (1923) 262 U. S. 182, 185, 43 Sup. Ct. 534,
67 L.28Ed. 937.
1 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, (1908) 209 U. S. 349, 28
Sup. Ct. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828.
229Simonton, The Power of a State to Control the Export of HydroElectric Energy, (1932) 39 W. Va. L. Q. 4, 5, 6, citing Gould, Waters, 3d
ed., sec. 204; Farnham, Waters, (1904) sec. 471. See n. 10, p. 6 of same
article for a brief discussion of some tendency toward the development of a
popular doctrine of complete state control.
23lCoulson & Forbes, Law of Waters, 4th ed., 120; Farnham, Waters,
secs. 467, 871; Gould, Waters 3rd ed., sec. 206; Long, Law of Irrigation,
2d ed., secs. 34, 63; Wiel, Origin and Comparative Development of the Law
of Watercourses, (1918) 6 Calif. L. Rev. 245, 342; Note, Extent of Detention or Retardation of Water Incident to Riparian Rights, (1931) 70 A.
L. R. 220. "The use of the hydraulic effect of the stream for the generation of electric current is, of course, a legitimate exercise of the riparian
right....
The essence of the riparian right to use water for power is that
the land owner is entitled to the benefit of the hydraulic effect of the natural
flow of the stream measured by its drop from the highest point to the lowest on his land. . . ." Seneca Consolidated Gold Mines Co. v. Great Western Power Company of California, (1930) 209 Cal. 206, 215, 219, 287 Pac.
93, and cases cited; Crum v. Mt. Shasta Power Corporation, (1931) 65
Cal. App. 791, 4 P. (2d) 564, and cases cited. "A riparian's right to the
use of the flow of the stream passing through or by his land is a right in-
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the current is the property of no one, and as a result its utilization
may be said to be within the control of the state for the benefit
ot all the people, perhaps the state may so far regulate hydroelectric development as to prohibit or restrict the exportation of
energy beyond its borders. On that premise, the analogy to
state control over wild game and running water was thought to
be controlling.'- If, on the other hand, the right to utilize the
force of the flow of the current for the production of power is
a property right of the riparian owner, the opposite result was
thought to be attainable.13 2 It is not proposed to enter here into
any elaborate discussion of the problem relating to the nature of a
riparian owner's property rights in the flow of the current of a
stream. Suffice it to say that the authorities cited above seem to
indicate the existence of a substantial property right therein in
most jurisdictions. Going on the basis of the latter assumption
made above, the conclusion arrived at would appear to be entirely
sound. The right of the riparian proprietor to utilize the water
power would seem to be substantially equivalent to the right of
a surface owner to reduce to possession oil or gas beneath his
land. This is not to lose sight of the fact that the state in all
cases has a control to protect the fresh water supply, the fish,
and the right of navigation. But aside from these considerations,
the power when generated would seem to become private property
just as does the oil or gas when reduced to possession. It is
definitely recognized as an article of interstate commerce. The
separably annexed to the soil, not as an easement or appurtenance, but as a
part and parcel of the land; such right being a property right, and entitled
to protection as such, the same as private property rights generally." City
of Fairbury v. Fairbury Mill & Elevator Co., (1932) 123 Neb. 588, 592,
243 N. W. 774: Dummer Power Co. v. International Paper Co., (1924)
81 N. H. 213, 124 Atl. 556. "The rule of law is familiar that each owner
of land contiguous to a natural watercourse has a right, as owner of such
land and as naturally connected with and incident to it, to the natural flow
of the stream along his land and its descent, and all the force to be derived
therefrom, for any domestic or hydraulic purpose to which he may decide
to apply it." United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp & Paper Co., (1919)
226 N. Y. 38, 44, 45, 123 N. E. 200; People v. New York & Ontario Power
Co., (1927) 219 App. Div. 114, 118, 219 N. Y. S. 497; cf. Central Maine
Power Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Turner, (1930) 128 Me. 486, 148
AtI. 799. But cf. East Jersey Water Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, (1923) 98 N. J.L. 449, 119 Atl. 679; Nekoosa-Edwards Paper
Co. v. Railroad Commission, (1930) 201 Wis. 40, 228 N. W. 144. Contra:
Royal Glen Land & Lumber Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1922) 91
W. Va. 446, 113 S. E. 749.
3
s' Simonton, The Power of a State to Control the Export of HydroElectric Energy, (1932) 39 W. Va. L. Q. 4, 6, 9.
'8 2 Simonton, The Power of a State to Control the Export of HydroElectric Energy, (1932) 39 W. Va. L. Q. 4.
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conclusion would then seem to follow that a state can no more
prohibit the exportation of such hydroelectric power, or enforce
a preference for consumption within the state, than it can impose
like restrictions in the case of natural gas heretofore discussed.
If, however, it is assumed that the force of the flow is not
property of a riparian owner, is not the property of any one,
does it necessarily follow that an opposite conclusion must be
arrived at? There would at least seem to be a legitimate doubt.
Upon this assumption, of course, the analogy to wild game or the
fresh water supply becomes much more striking. In those cases
the articles in question are not the property of any one in their
natural state, and, whether on the theory of proprietary interest
or of mere governmental control for the protection of the interest
of all its people, the state is permitted a control which the courts
have not as yet evinced a purpose to disturb. In those cases
a natural resource is being actually diverted outside the state.
The flowing water of one of the streams of a state is proposed
to be piped outside the state and sold to residents of another community. The state, under present decisions, may interfere to protect and preserve that supply of fresh water with which nature has
endowed it, for the benefit of its own inhabitants. In the case
here in question nothing found in a condition of nature is removed
from the state. Its waterfall remains where nature placed it. No
part of it is diverted to foreign territory. The water power from
artificial dam or natural waterfall spends itself when it passes
through the turbines and continues as it would had it not been
harnessed. Only the resulting "manufactured" product emanating from the generators turned by the turbines is removed from
the state. This product which is exported is clearly not something that can be said to be owned in common or by the public
and reduced to possession with the consent of the state as is wild
game or fresh water. It is an artificial product created by the
ingenuity of man and becomes his private property when so
produced, and, like other private property, may, it would seem,
be made the subject of interstate commerce without let or hindrance by the state.
While it is believed that the result indicated herein can be
arrived at on the basis of the above property right analysis, it is
also to be borne in mind that the court has from the earliest period
of our constitutional existence manifested a policy to enforce
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what it believes to be one of the important purposes of the Constitution, to protect interstate commerce from undue interference
at the hands of the states. This broad policy will undoubtedly
be of greater weight in the determination of such cases when they
arise than any nice considerations of the technical rights of property that may be thbught to be involved.
If, however, the assumption of lack of private ownership of
the force of the flow of the water's current may be thought to
lead necessarily to the conclusion that the state can control exportation, it must be by virtue of the second theory heretofore
mentioned upon the basis of which such a result is attempted
to be justified. Does this assumed absence of private ownership
lead to the conclusion that the state's control is such that it may
permit or refuse to allow the development of water power as it
sees fit, and in consequence may impose a condition of nonexportation ?
On the basis of what has gone before, a word might, not
inappropriately, at this point, be directed to such statutory provisions as that of New Hampshire requiring the discontinuance
of export previously allowed when the state commission finds
that the public good requires, 1' 3 or that of Wisconsin permitting
preexisting contracts for export to be declared void.114 Let it
be assumed that a corporation has been chartered or granted a
franchise to generate and transmit hydroelectric power with no
restrictions upon exportation. After it has entered into contracts
and begun the transmission of power to consumers both within
and without the state, the state of production attempts to require
that its exportation be discontinued in either manner suggested.
This would appear to raise a problem substantially the same as
that involved in the gas cases and to require a similar solution.
Such a corporation would be lawfully engaged in interstate commerce by transmitting a commodity of its own private ownership
to consumers in another state. It is not believed that there is any
element in this situation which will justify a differentiation from
the natural gas cases heretofore dealt with. In so far as the
provisos for the cancellation of contracts or the compulsory discontinuance of exportation are made terms of the charter or
franchise which the corporation must agree to in advance, the
133
4

13

New Hampshire, Laws 1929, ch. 106.
Wisconsin, Statutes 1931, secs. 31.27, 31.095.
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situation becomes again that of granting a permit upon condition.
B. Grants Upon Condition.-In considering the matter of state
power to grant or withhold permits for the development of its
water power resources and to impose conditions in connection
therewith, at least three important aspects deserve attention. In
the first place, as indicated above, it is urged that the state has
such control over all of its natural streams and the water power
sites therein that it may grant or withhold permits to erect dams
and develop the water power as it sees fit, and may condition its
grant upon the non-exportation of the power. In the second
place, if this it not true as to all streams, navigable streams are
peculiarly within the control of the state, subject, of course, to
the paramount power of the federal government over interstate
commerce. Thus it may control the building of dams and other
improvements in the exercise of its function of preventing obstructions to navigation. 135 Finally, the power of eminent domain
is generally essential to the procuring of proper dam sites and
flood areas, as also for the erection of the necessary transmission
lines. This power, of course, can only be exercised when granted
by the state. Such a grant may be denied by a state, apparently,
even to a corporation coming into the state to do an interstate
business and seeking the eminent domain power in connection
therewith. 18 Some states, notably West Virginia 37 and Wis135Wisconsin has attempted to exert its control upon this basis. Wisconsin, Statutes 1931, sec. 30.01 (2), 31.04, 31.06. As interpreted by the

state courts, the practical result is that all streams that would have power
sites of any consequence are included. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v.
Railroad Commission, (1930) 201 Wis. 40, 45, 46, 229 N. W. 631.
' 3 GSee Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
(1877) 96 U. S. 1, 24 L. Ed. 708; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Ann
Arbor Railroad Co., (1900) 178 U. S.239, 243, 20 Sup. Ct. 867, 44 L. Ed.
1052; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., (1904)
195 U. S. 540, 563, 569, 574, 25 Sup. Ct. 133, 49 L. Ed. 312; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Southern Railway Co., (D.C. N.C. 1898) 89 Fed. 190,
191; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago
& St. Louis Ry. Co., (D.C. Ohio 1899) 94 Fed. 234, 237; 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain, 2d ed., sec. 35. This is not to say that a state may prevent
a corporation engaged in interstate commerce from exercising the power
of eminent domain within its borders if such corporation is created by Congress or has the power of eminent domain conferred upon it by Congress.
1 Lewis, Eminent Domain, 3d ed., sec. 374; 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain, 2d
ed., sec. 35; cf. Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
(1877) 96 U. S. 1, 12, 24 L. Ed. 708; Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining
& Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1888) 125 U. S.181, 8 Sup. Ct. 737, 31 L.
Ed. 650; California v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., (1888) 127 U. S.1, 39,
8 Sup. Ct. 1073, 32 L. Ed. 150.
137West Virginia, Code Ann. (Barnes, 1923) ch. 54B, secs. 3, 15.
138 Wisconsin, Statutes 1931, secs. 31.01, 31.04, 31.05, 31.15, 31.16.
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consin,l138 restrict the granting of dam permits and the power

of eminent domain for the condemnation of dam sites and of
property for transmission lines to domestic corporations. 39 Since
the state is under no duty or obligation to create corporations,
but may do so or not at its discretion, the added power to impose
conditions upon the privilege of being born as a corporation is
brought into operation. Whatever may be true as to the first of
these three situations mentioned above, it is obvious that as to the
last two-permitting obstructions in navigable streams and granting
the power of eminent domain-privileges are involved which the
state may grant or withhold. May it condition its grant upon
the requirement that no power be exported from the state, or
that exportation be limited to the surplus above local demands,
present and future?
If it may be assumed that the above discussion is sound, that
hydroelectric power is not a natural resource but a "manufactured" product and private property in which the state has no
such interest as it has in wild game or fresh water, and that in
consequence a right to transmit in interstate commerce is protected by the federal Constitution beyond the power of the state
to directly interfere with, then it would seem that the attempts of
the state to avoid this consequence by granting a permit on conditions restrictive of interstate commerce would present substantially the problem of unconstitutional conditions. It is not
proposed to discuss at length this problem which has been elaborately dealt with by other writers. 14 0 Suffice it to say at this
point that prior to the development of the doctrine here in question it was generally considered that where a state had a right
at its discretion to grant or withhold a privilege, it might impose
such conditions upon the grantee of such privilege as it might

see fit."4
39

The present doctrine developed in connection with the

1 Some state constitutions, notably those of Arkansas and Nebraska,
have for many years forbidden the granting of the power of eminent domain to foreign corporations. Arkansas const. (1874). art. 12, sec. 11 (all
corporations) ; Nebraska const. (1875), art. 11, sec. 8 (railroad corporations).40
1 Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, (1929) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
879; Note, Modern Developments of the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 676; Oppenheim, .Unconstitutional Conditions and State Power, (1927) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 176; Henderson, Position
of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law, ch. 8; 1 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States, 2d ed., 206-213. For a discussion of the doctrine as applied to the present problem, see Elsbree, Interstate Transmission of Electric Power, 44-56.
14'See, e.g. Paul v. Virginia, (1868) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 168, 19 L. Ed.
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power of a state to exclude foreign corporations, and, having the
power to exclude at will, to admit upon conditions. Attempts by
states to limit access of foreign corporations to the federal
courts, 42 to interfere with or burden their conduct of interstate
44
commerce,143 and to tax their property in other jurisdictions
145
led to the establishment of the doctrine by the Supreme Court.
Briefly stated, it denies to a state the power to impose as a condition of admission to do business the relinquishment of a constitutional right, or to set up as a basis of expulsion the refusal
to assume a burden against which the federal constitution affords
protection. The doctrine has not been wholly restricted in its
application to conditions that impinge upon the division of powers between the federal government and the states, such as restricting access to the federal courts or burdening interstate commerce, or that affect the division of powers among the states
as in extraterritorial taxation.'4 6 Neither has it been applied
357; Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania,
(1888) 125 U. S. 182, 8 Sup. Ct. 1047, 32 L. Ed. 66.
142Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, (1874) 20 Wall. (U.S.) 445, 22 L.
Ed. 365; Barron v. Burnside, (1887) 121 U. S. 186, 7 Sup. Ct. 931, 30 L.
Ed. 915; Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, (1892) 146 U. S. 202, 13 Sup. Ct.
44, 36 L. Ed. 942; Herndon v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.,
(1910) 218 U. S. 135, 30 Sup. Ct. 633, 54 L. Ed. 970; Harrison v. St. Louis
& San Francisco Railroad Co., (1914) 232 U. S. 318, 34 Sup. Ct. 333, 58
L. Ed. 621; Donald v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., (1916) 241
U. S. 329, 36 Sup. Ct. 563, 60 L. Ed. 1027; Terral v. Burke Constr. Co.,
(1922) 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 188, 66 L. Ed, 352. For cases (now
overruled) sustaining a method of imposing this restriction, see Doyle v.
Continental Insurance Co., (1876) 94 U. S. 535, 24 L. Ed. 148; Security
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, (1906) 202 U. S. 246, 26 Sup. Ct. 619, 50
L. Ed. 1013.
'"Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, (1910) 216 U. S. 1, 30
Sup. Ct. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, (1910) 216 U. S. 56,
30 Sup'. Ct. 232, 54 L. Ed. 378; Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
(1910) 216 U. S. 146, 30 Sup. Ct. 280, 54 L. Ed. 423; Looney v. Crane,
(1917) 245 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 85, 62 L. Ed. 230; Internat'l Paper Co. v.
Massachusetts, (1918) 246 U. S. 135, 38 Sup. Ct. 292, 62 L. Ed. 624;
Locomobile Company of America v. Massachusetts, (1918) 246 U. S. 146, 38
Sup. Ct. 298, 62 L. Ed. 631.
The earliest cases applying this doctrine in the matter of interstate
commerce involved common carriers, either telegraph companies or transportation companies. It has not been restricted to common carriers, however, as witness the last three cases cited herein.
144 Cases cited supra note 143.
'4"For early cases in which the Court asserted in general terms its
opposition to the imposition of unconstitutional conditions, see La Fayette
Insurance Co. v. French, (1855) 18 How. (U.S.) 404, 407, 15 L. Ed. 451;
Ducat v. Chicago, (1870) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 410, 415, 19 L. Ed. 972; St. Clair
v. Cox, (1882) 106 U. S. 350, 356, 1 Sup. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222; Philadelphia
Fire Association v. New York (1886) 119 U. S. 110, 120, 7 Sup. Ct. 108,
30 L. Ed. 342.
246Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, (1926)
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solely in the case of foreign corporations. 147 In so far, however,

as the creation of domestic corporations is concerned, the doctrine has never been applied to prevent the state from exacting
as the price of being born the assumption of burdens affecting interstate commerce and property outside the state.1 4 8 Whether any
justification exists for this difference seems at least open to serious doubt. Suppose a corporation is created, or a domestic corporation is authorized, to erect a dam in a navigable stream and
to exercise the power of eminent domain in acquiring sites and
building transmission lines. Suppose further that these grants
are made subject to the proviso that the public service commission of the state may, at its discretion, require the retention of
all power for use within the state. After the corporation has
developed its plant, built its transmission lines, and entered upon
the transmission of power to outside consumers, the state commission attempts to enforce the proviso that its exportation be
discontinued. As heretofore suggested, if such an attempt were
made where no requirement had been set up as a condition of the
grant, there seems no reason to believe that the Court should not
hold it beyond the state's power as an undue interference with
the conduct of interstate commerce. The fact that the corporation in question had the obligations of a public utility within the
state would not save the situation, as it did not in the West
Virginia natural gas case. 149 If this were a foreign corporation,
the condition here imposed, which would entirely destroy the
271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101, involved the application of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to protect a partnership
from being compelled to assume the status of a common carrier within the
state in which it was formed and was doing business (to be discussed infra).
Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Carr, (1926) 272 U. S. 494, 47 Sup. Ct. 179,
71 L. Ed. 372, applied the doctrine to protect from discriminatory taxation
a foreign corporation doing only local business in the state, with no question of7 extraterritorial taxation being involved.
'4 Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, (1926) 271 U. S. 583, 46
Sup. 48
Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101.
1 Railroad Co. v. Maryland, (1875) 21 Wall. (U.S.) 456, 22 L. Ed.
678; Ashley v. Ryan, (1894) 153 U. S. 436, 14 Sup. Ct. 865, 38 L. Ed. 773;
Kansas City, Memphis & Birmingham Railroad Co. v. Stiles, (1916) 242
U. S. 111, 37 Sup. Ct. 58, 61 L. Ed. 176. Only the last of these cases, however, has been decided sincz the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions may
be said to have been established by the decision of Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, (1910) 216 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355;
Pullman Co. v. Kansas, (1910) 216 U. S. 56, 30 Sup. Ct. 232, 54 L. Ed.
378; Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (1910) 216 U. S. 146, 30
Sup. Ct.
280, 54 L. Ed. 423.
149Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, (1923) 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658,
67 L. Ed. 1117.
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interstate business, would appear to fall within the doctrine of the
Court which invalidates a condition for the payment of taxes so
levied as to create a burden upon interstate commerce. 150 The
fact that the condition is imposed upon the grant of permission to
build a dam in a navigable stream, or of authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain, rather than upon the mere right to do
business in the state in connection with which the doctrine has
been developed, would not seem to be material. The power of the
state to refuse one grant is as complete as it is with respect to the
others. If the Court were to arrive at that conclusion in the case
of the foreign corporation, as it is believed it should, there would
appear to be great difficulty in sufficiently differentiating the case
of the domestic corporation to justify an opposite result.
That the Court is not likely to permit a direct discrimination
against interstate commerce in the grant of the power of eminent
domain seems quite evident from its decision in Oklahoma v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co.1' 5 It was there attempted to prevent the
exportation of natural gas by denying the power of eminent domain
or the privilege of using the highways for building the necessary
pipe lines. At the same time such grants were freely made to companies restricting their enterprise within the confines of the state.
This attempt, however, was frustrated by the Supreme Court. It
recognized natural gas as a legitimate article of interstate commerce and asserted that "no state by the exercise of, or by the
refusal to exercise, any or all of its powers, may substantially
discriminate against or directly regulate interstate commerce, or
the right to carry it on."'11 2 There is no reason to believe that
the attitude of the Court would be any different where the matter involved is the erection of transmission lines for the exportation of hydroelectric power.
The most recent case' 53 to expound in extenso the doctrine of
'50 Cases cited supra, note 143.
151(1911) 221 U. S. 229, 31 Sup. Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716.
152(1911) 221 U. S.229, 261, 31 Sup. Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716. See also
Haskell v. Cowham, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1911) 187 Fed. 403. But see Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Harless, (1891) 131 Ind. 446, 29 N. E. 1062; Note
(1911) 35 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1193, 1196; Note (1924) 32 A. L. R. 331, 334.
253Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, (1926) 271 U. S.583,
46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101. For other cases affirming the doctrine see
Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, (1914) 235 U. S.197, 35 Sup. Ct. 57, 59 L. Ed.
193; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, (1918) 247 U. S.105, 38 Sup.
Ct. 438, 62 L. Ed. 1006; Board of Public Utility Commrs. v. Ynchausti &
Co., (1920) 251 U. S.401, 40 Sup. Ct. 277, 64 L. Ed. 327; Missouri ex rel.
Burnes Nat'l Bank v. Duncan, (1924) 265 U. S.17, 44 Sup. Ct. 427, 68 L.
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the invalidity of unconstitutional conditions applied it to the case
of a partnership operating solely in intrastate commerce, and carried it beyond its previous application. A statute of California,
construed to require the assumption of the status of common carrier as a condition of permission to use the highways of the state
as a carrier for hire, was held invalid. Here were involved none
ot the features which predominated in the earlier cases referred to
above. But since it would have been violative of due process to
compel a private carrier to assume the status of a common carrier' by affirmative action, the attempt to bring about the same
result by making that a condition of the grant of a privilege which,
it was assumed, the state might withhold was not permitted. The
opinion in that case might well be interpreted to mean that all
rights protected by the Constitution are to be placed beyond the
bargaining power of the states and brought within the scope of
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. After reviewing the
prior cases in which the doctrine had been applied, Mr. Justice
Sutherland, speaking for the Court, said:
"The principle, that a state is without power to impose an.
unconstitutional requirement as a condition for granting a privilege, is broader than the applications thus far made of it...
Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end.

,

. . 'The states cannot use their most

characteristic powers to reach unconstitutional results.' "15
At least one writer has suggested that this case carries the
doctrine too far, and that it should be restricted to the type of
cases in connection with which it had its development, i.e., that
it should be applied only to cases "bound up with the division of
powers among the states, and between the states and the central
government," such as the free conduct of interstate commerce,
liberty of access to the national courts, and freedom of each state
from the effects of extraterritorial legislation by the others. As
to constitutional guarantees set up primarily for the benefit of the
individual, such as the guarantees of the due process and equal
protection clauses, he would deny the application of the doctrine. 56
Ed. 881; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, (1926) 270 U. S.426, 46 Sup.
Ct. 331, 70 L. Ed. 664; Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1928) 277
U. S.389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553, 72 L. Ed. 927; Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation v. Alabama, (1933) 288 U. S.218, 53 Sup. Ct. 373, 77 L. Ed. 710.
'54Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, (1925) 266 U. S.570,
45 Sup. Ct. 191, 69 L. Ed. 445. See Producers Transp. Co. v. Railroad Commission, (1920) 251 U. S.228, 230. 40 Sup. Ct. 131. 64 L. Ed. 239.
'55(1926) 271 U. S. 583, 598, 599, 46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101.
'56Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, (1929) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
879, 882 et seq.
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What the attitude of the Supreme Court toward such a suggestion
may be remains to be seen. Adherence to it would require the
reversal of the Frost Case'17 and perhaps others."' 8 It would not,
however, affect one way or the other the case of exportation of
hydroelectric power. If held to be within the broader doctrine
of the Frost Case, it would likewise be within the more restricted
formula, since it makes its claim on the basis of interstate commerce, and that is the special province of the federal government.
One other case"59 in this connection merits special consideration, though it does not purport to involve the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, and no cases which apply the doctrine were
mentioned by the Court in its decision. It does, however, direct-

ly affect the hydroelectric power problem.

It brings in question

the recapture provision of Wisconsin's water power statute, 160 requiring as a condition of a permit to erect or maintain a dam in a
navigable stream an advance agreement that the state may, after
a stated period of time, acquire the property at what the Court
admitted or assumed may be less than its fair value. It is worthy
of note that the state legislature inserted in this section the
proviso, "if the state shall hae the constitutional power," and that
the state supreme court upheld the statute by an even division.
Apparently no such doubts enshrouded the matter before the
United States Supreme Court, affirmance being without dissent.
The Wisconsin trial court took the position that the right of the
riparian owner to utilize the water power of a navigable river by
the maintenance of a dam is subordinate to the "plenary power of
the state to regulate the use or obstruction of navigable waters;
that the state may forbid all obstruction by dam or otherwise;
157Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, (1926) 271 U. S. 583,
46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101.
lzsFor example, Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Carr, (1926) 272 U. S.
494, 47 Sup. Ct. 179, 71 L. Ed. 372; cf. Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, (1927)
274 U. S. 490, 47 Sup. Ct. 678, 71 L. Ed. 1165; Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, (1928) 277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553, 72 L. Ed. 927; see also
cases cited by Merrill, -Unconstitutional Conditions, (1929) 77 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 879, notes 32-39.
'59Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission, (1927) 274 U. S. 651,
47 Sup.
Ct. 669, 71 L. Ed. 1279.
' 60 "That the State of Wisconsin, if it shall have the constitutional power, .... on not less than one year's notice, at any time after the expiration
of thirty years after the permit becomes effective, may acquire all of the
property of the grantee used and useful under the permit .

.

. by paying

therefor, the cost of reproduction in their existing condition of all dams,
works, buildings, or other structures or equipment,... as determined by the
commission, ...

pensation."

and ...

the applicant waives all right to any further com-

Wisconsin, Statutes 1931, sec. 31.09 (3).
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hence, the right of the riparian owner to develop water power by
the construction of the dam remains inchoate until the state has
given its consent." With this there would seem to be no legitimate
basis for quarrel. The question arises with respect to the further provision quoted by Mr. Justice Stone with apparently complete approval.
"If the legislature may wholly refuse permission to erect a dam
or other structure in the navigable waters of the state, it follows
that it may grant such permission upon such terms as it shall determine will best protect the interests of the Nblic. The legislature could impose the condition that the dam should be removed
when it obstructed navigation or that it should be removed at
the end of a definite period of time, for example, 30 years."''6
Even with this, the only quarrel would be with an interpretation
of "such terms as it shall determine will best protect the interests
of the public" that would permit the commission to require the
relinquishment of a constitutional right. Certainly a requirement
of removal when the dam proved an obstruction to navigation
would be quite properY.62

Mr. Justice Stone leaves no doubt as

to the interpretation of the above quotation when he asserts in
his closing sentence that "compliance with section 31.09 [of the
Wisconsin statute] is the price which plaintiffs must pay to secure
the right to maintain their dam."
The theory of the Supreme Court in the case of United States
v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 163 that there is no property right in a dam maintained under a permit which can be asserted against a public need for purposes of navigation, and that
removal of such dam may be required without compensation, falls
short of justification for the decision here in question. No purpose to remove an obstruction to navigation is involved. The
mere fact that the dam is to be maintained merely at sufferance, in
ihe sense that its removal may be required at any time on the determination that it obstructs navigation, does not mean that it would
not be valuable property, protected against every other sort of
invasion. When the state seeks, not its removal, but its acquisition for a public use, the principle upon which a requirement of
"just compensation" can be dispensed with is by no means dear.
If such a plant were developed under a permit without condition,
161(1927) 274 U. S. 651, 654, 655, 47 Sup. Ct. 669, 71 L. Ed. 1279.
(Italics supplied).
l6-United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., (1913) 229 U.
S.53, 33 Sup. Ct. 667, 57 L. Ed. 1063.
163(1913) 229 U. S.53, 33 Sup. Ct. 667, 57 L. Ed. 1063.
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it seems quite obvious that the "just compensation" requirement
implicit in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
would apply to any attempt on the part of the state to acquire the
property for public use. When its surrender for less than the
compensation thus constitutionally required is imposed as the
price of a permit, it appears to differ from the unconstitutional
conditions heretofore dealt with by the Court in no essential particular. If that be true, then assume that the applicant filed the
agreement and received the permit. Would the state be permitted
to enforce it? Decisions prior to the Fox River Case and culminating in the Frost decision would logically seem to require a
negative reply.
The reason for Mr. Justice Stone's complete silence with respect to this matter is not readily apparent. 64 Whether the Court
intended to depart from the doctrine of the Frost Case is not clear.
Logically the two cases would be difficult to reconcile. However,
the application of such constitutional principles is -not solely a
matter of logic. It is rather a matter of judgment, and as a matter of judgment the Court may well have felt that a distinction
can be made between the privilege of using the highways of a state
in common with the rest of the public and the privilege of damming up a navigable stream for the sole use of the grantee of the
privilege. In view of the important nature of the state's interest
in controlling its navigable waters, more vital it would seem than
the exclusion of foreign corporations, and the relatively mild invasion of an individual right (something less than an assurance
of "just compensation"), the Court may very well have concluded in the exercise of its judgment, upon considerations of
policy, that the price involved was one that the company might not
164The Fox River Company here sought by mandamus to force the commission to proceed with a hearing on its application, although it had not
filed the required agreement. None of the cases heretofore discussed or cited
involve attempts to compel the issuance of a permit without compliance with
the prescribed conditions. Possibly it may be suggested that a privilege is
involved which the state may grant or withhold as it sees fit, and that the
applicant can, in no event, demand a permit as of right. Like a foreign corporation seeking admission, it cannot compel the state to grant it a permit,
regardless of the conditions. Therefore, it has no standing to demand that
the privilege be granted otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the
statute, but by accepting those terms it will not have waived is constitutional
rights and may assert them at the appropriate time to prevent confiscation
of its property. There is, however, no language in Mr. Justice Stone's
opinion to suggest that any such notion as this may have been entertained by
the Court. But see Tennessee Eastern Electric Co. v. Hannah, (1928) P.
U. R. 1928D 50, aff'd on the basis of statutory construction in (1928) 157
Tenn. 582, 12 S. W. (2d) 372.
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unconstitutionally be compelled to pay for the privilege it sought.
Such a determination would not necessarily do violence to prior
decisions, but would merely indicate that the Court regards the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as a flexible one capable of
adjustment to the peculiar circumstances of particular cases.
The Wisconsin recapture provision above dealt with is contained in the same statute with the provision heretofore discussed
requiring a preliminary agreement to the power of the commission to cancel contracts for the exportation of hydroelectric current.8 5 When that provision comes to be tested, no doubt the
Fox River Case will furnish strong precedent for sustaining its
validity. If, however, the view should be accepted that a distinction should be made between conditions that are related to the
working of our federal system of government on the one hand,
and those which affect only individual rights on the other, and that
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should be restricted in
its application to the former,'-6 then a different result may well be
arrived at. The conduct of interstate commerce is clearly involved, and interstate commerce as clearly falls in the former category. No specific indication has yet come from the Court that
such a distinction is to be applied. But the decided cases do furnish a very definite indication of the Court's attitude toward the
protection of interstate commerce. Perhaps the Fox River Case
cannot be distinguished logically from the situation where the export of power in interstate commerce is involved. But the Court
is not always controlled by logic. "Commerce among the several
states is a practical conception, ' ' 16 7 not to be controlled by analogies

that fail to take into account the nature of the condition that is
being imposed. The Supreme Court, from the beginning of our
federal system, has been very solicitous about the protection of interstate commerce. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions owes its development, in no small measure,
to the solicitude of the Court for the protection of interstate commerce from encroachment at the hands of the states. True, the
doctrine had much of its early growth in the line of cases dealing with access by foreign corporations to the federal courts.""
165Wisconsin, Statutes 1931, secs. 31.27, 31.095, supra note 95.
186Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, (1929) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
879.

187 Rearick v. Pennsylvania, (1906) 203 U. S. 507, 512, 27 Sup. Ct. 159,
51 L. Ed.
295.
168 Cases cited supra note 142.
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But one need only turn to the cases intervening between the Preu it Case'69 in 1906, upholding a state statute authorizing the expulsion of a foreign corporation for taking a case into the federal
courts, and the Terral Case'70 in 1922 overruling it, to see the part
played by interstate commerce in this development.' 7 ' The fact,
then, that the Court in the Fox River Case had allowed a state to
bargain with respect to a condition that appears to be unconstitutional, but in which only the interests of the other pary to the
bargain are involved, does not necessarily mean that it will
allow the same sort of bargaining when the conduct of interstate
commerce is at stake. The privilege sought in the two cases is
the same, but the conditions imposed are vastly different. It is
the condition in each case that is the most significant feature.
2. Conclusion as to Validity
What the ultimate fate of state restrictions upon the exportation of hydroelectric power is to be, is, of course, still a matter of
no little uncertainty. The states feel that this is a matter of
vital importance to them in the conservation of a natural resource
for the benefit of their own inhabitants. To what extent other
motives have entered in, one can only conjecture. Foreign power
corporations are sometimes viewed as despoilers of the state's
scenic beauty, preying upon the resources of the state for their
own financial profit to the later possible disadvantage of the community. If one approach the matter from this point of view, it is
entirely possible to arrive at the conclusion that the states should
be allowed to exercise a broad power for the protection of local
interests. If another starting point be employed, a different conclusion may well follow. This is the sort of matter, however, that
169Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Prewitt, (1906) 202 U. S.
246, 26 Sup. Ct. 619, 50 L. Ed. 1013.
1T 0Terral v. Burke Construction Co., (1922) 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct.
188, 66 L. Ed. 352.
17'Herndon v Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., (1910) 218
U. S. 135, 30 Sup. Ct. 633, 54 L. Ed. 970; Harrison v. St. Louis & San
Francisco Railway Co., (1914) 232 U. S. 318, 34 Sup. Ct. 333, 58 L. Ed.
621; Donald v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., (1916) 241
U. S. 329, 36 Sup. Ct. 563, 60 L. Ed. 1027. In each of these cases the corporation involved was engaged in interstate commerce. The effect of that
fact is especially discussed in the Harrison case. Even more important for
the later development of the doctrine were the strictly interstate commerce
cases, also decided in this intervening period. Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Kansas, (1910) 216 U. S. 1. 30 Su. Ct. 190. 54 L. Ed. 355: Pullman Co.
v. Kansas, (1910) 216 U. S. 56, 30 Sup. Ct. 232, 54 L. Ed. 378; Ludwig v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., (1910) 216 U. S. 146, 30 Sup. Ct. 280, 54
L. Ed. 423.
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should not be disposed of on the basis of a priori conceptions of
doctrinal law, or a mere logical analysis of past decisions; it calls
for the application of sound judgment and broad judicial statesmanship. Possibly the present writer has unconsciously adhered
too closely to a point of view that interstate commerce in what
is fast becoming a commodity of first importance ought not to be
subjected to restrictions and prohibitions at the hands of the
states. As a matter of national policy, however, such restrictions
certainly are highly undesirable. What was formerly a matter of
local concern only is no longer so. It must be recognized that here
is involved a national problem of vast and growing importance. Its
real significance is only realized when inquiry is pursued far
enough to see the enormous wealth invested in electric power and
its production' 1 2 and the closeness with which it touches individuals and communities in their everyday life, both domestic and industrial. When it is realized that the farm,"7 3 the factory, the mine,
the mill, the home,'7 4 et cetera, are all coming to be more or less
intimately dependent upon the production and distribution of electric power, it must be admitted that the problem here involved is
not local but national in its significance and should not be controlled in its ultimate solution by any partial analogies to court
decisions of another era. As one writer has recently suggested,
"even a lawyer is prepared to admit that functionally the transmission of electric energy ought not to be dependent upon the law
of game birds in Connecticut or of shrimp in Louisiana."' 75

PART II.
STATE CONTROL OVER RATES AND SERVICE

The control of gas and electric rates and service by state
public service commissions has, for many years, been a common phenomenon. In so far as interstate commerce in these commodities is involved, so as to be of special interest for the present discussion, the matter is of much more recent development.
That the transmission of gas and electric light and power current
from one state to another is a transaction in interstate commerce
7
1 2N. E. L. A. Statistical Bull. No. 8 (July 1932).
173N. E. L. A. Statistical Bull. No. 8 (July 1932).

174Moody, Public Utilities (1931) xxi.

'75Book Review (1931) 41 Yale L. J.645.
T6

' Supra notes 7 and 8.
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is now definitely well established,"7 6 although as to the latter, it is
not a determination of very long standing.17 That the interstate
aspects of the gas and electric power enterprises have recently
come to assume very considerable proportions has been sufficiently
indicated above. That such service presents the same need for
regulation and control that is found in the ordinary local enterprise of a similar nature, perhaps no one seriously doubts. The
states have not hesitated to impose regulations for the protection
of their own inhabitants though the service in question extended
across state lines. For the most part, such regulations have been
restricted to attempts to control rates to consumers. But the
proper adjustment between the respective spheres of state and
federal control in this situation is not a matter of easy determination. With respect to hydroelectric current the difficulties
involved have been distinctly recognized by the Federal Power
Commission.
"In very few branches of governmental activity is the legal
or economic line of demarcation between state and federal control less clearly drawn than in dealing with the use of water
for hydroelectric development. .

.

.The power industry is today

neither exclusively local nor exclusively national, and if complete
and effective supervision is to be had it must7 8 be had through
cooperation of both local and national control.'
State intervention, assuming complete control in many instances,
has been due, partially at least, to the fact that the federal government has not in the past attempted to regulate service or fix rates
even when the interstate character of the enterprise has been
79
well recognized.
177 The first court decision to give definite recognition to electric
current as an article of interstate commerce was Mill Creek Coal &
Coke Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1919) 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S.E.
557.
178(1931) Eleventh Ann. Rep. Federal Power Commission 12, 14.
It is not proposed to treat the matter of proper administrative adjustments for state or federal control, or possible means of cooperation
between
the two governments, in this article.
179 The rates of gas companies transmitting gas in interstate commerce have not only not been regulated by Congress heretofore, but the
Interstate Commerce Act as amended expressly withholds the subject
from control by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 34 Stat. at L.
584, ch. 3591, sec. 1; 36 Stat. at L. 539, 544, ch. 309, sec. 7; 49 U. S. C. A.
I b, 3 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 49, sec. 1 b.
Section 9a of the National Industrial Recovery Act (15 U.S.C.A.
709) authorizes the President to initiate before the Interstate Commerce Commission proceedings necessary to control the operation of
oil pipe lines and fix reasonable rates for the transportation of
petroleum and its products by pipe lines. The NRA Code for the
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Two theories have been advanced in justification of state
control over such services not confined within a single state. In
Petroleum Industry, article 1, section 2, provides that the term
Petroleiin. [ndustry includes the production, transportation and marketing of crude petroleum and its products, including the production of
natural gas in conjunction with petroleum.
Other sections of the code specifically authorize control and
regulation of shipment in interstate commerce (article III, sections
4 and 7) and wholesale and retail prices (article III, section 6a and
article V, rules 4 and 26), but the regulations thus far imposed do not
materially affect the problems being discussed herein. Registry No.
711-1-21; Prentice-Hall, Federal Trade and Industry Service, 12321.318-21-22-30-52-58; 12334.
The Blanket Code for the Natural Gas Industry regulates only
hours and wages for employees in the industry. Release Aug. 11,
1933; release No. 745-J, Sept. 9, 1933. Prentice-Hall, Federal Trade
and Industry Service, 10365.
Neither has the federal government in the past regulated the interstate transmission of electric current. The Federal Water Power
Act of 1920, applicable only to licensees under the Act, provided in
section 19 for complete state control where interstate commerce was
not involved. It further provided that if a state had no commission
or other authority to regulate rates and service, "it is agreed as a
condition of such license that jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon
the commission [Federal Power Commission] . . . [under certain
circumstances] to so regulate and control until the state has provided
a commission or other authority therefor." 16 U. S. C. A. 812, 1 Mason's
U. S. Code, tit. 16, sec. 812.
As to interstate aspects of the power generated by such licensee,
control was also left very largely to the states. Section 20, Federal
Water Power Act, 1920, 16 U. S. C. A. 813, 1 Mason's U. S. Code,
tit. 16, sec. 813.
More recently, however, provision has been made in the National
Industrial Recovery Act (Section 202 of Title II-Public Works and
Construction Projects) authorizing the Federal Emergency Administrator of Public Works to "prepare a comprehensive program of
public works, which shall include among other things . . . (b) conservation and development of natural resources . . .. development of
water power, transmission of electrical energy .....
" 40 U. S. C. A.
402. In this connection the Federal Power Commission has been
directed to prepare a comprehensive national plan for the development of water power and the transmission of electricity, cooperating
with the Public Service Commissions of the states, the Public Works
Administration, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Prentice-Hall,
Federal Trade and Industry Service 28201.
Such a national power survey is now in the process of being
made. At the request of the Senate the Federal Power Commission
is also making a study of the cost of distribution of electrical energy
in relation to the costs of generation and transmission. A resolution
now pending in the House of Representatives authorizes the commission to make an official compilation of electric rates in every community in the United States. (Address of Basil Manly, Vice Chairman,
Federal Power Commission, City Club of Boston, March 9, 1934).
How far complete control may ultimately be assumed by the
federal government remains to be determined. For the federal government's experiment in production and distribution of electric power
both to consumers and distributing companies, with a control over
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the first place, the position is sometimes taken that interstate
commerce is directly involved throughout. It is assumed that the
transmission of such commodities as gas and electricity across state
lines in one continuous movement from producing wells or generating plants in one state to consumers in another is interstate
commerce from beginning to end. But it is asserted that the business of furnishing gas or electric current within a state to local
consumers is a matter so far local in character that the state may
act to impose regulations so long as Congress has not seen fit to
assume control. 8 ' In the second place, it is asserted that the
interstate commerce involved in the transmission of gas or electric
current from one state to another has come to an end, and that
the commodities which clearly have been a part of interstate commerce have been so mingled with, and so far become a part of,
the common mass of property in the state as to be divested of their
interstate character before the impingement of the state regulations. On this basis it is held that distribution and sale to consumers is a purely local business, not unlike that of a local gas
or electric company supplying its commodity from sources within
the state, and, therefore, completely subject to state regulation and
control. 8 1
The courts that have had occasion to deal with this problem have divided their allegiance between these two theories, 82
resale by the latter, see Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 16 U. S. C. A.
831c (i) and (j), 831i and 831k. For an example of its relation to
state commissions, see Re Tennessee Electric Power Company,
(Tenn. R.R. & P.U.C. 1934) 2 P. U. R. (N.S.) 4.
The Blanket Code for the Electric Light and Power Industry
merely regulates hours and wages of employees in the industry.
Prentice-Hall,
Federal Trade and Industry Service, 10072.
' 80 Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., (1920) 252 U. S.
23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279, 64 L. Ed. 434; Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co.
v. Ott, (D.C. W.Va. 1914) 215 Fed. 940; In re Pennsylvania Gas Co.,
(1919) 225 N. Y. 397, 122 N. E. 260; Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v.
Public Service Comm., (1919) 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S. E. 557; Trades
& Labor Council v. Fayette County Gas Co., (Pa. P.S.C. 1917) P. U. R.
1918B 165; Re Appalachian Power Co., (W.Va. P.S.C. 1919) P. U. R.
1919D8 286.
1 'Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, (1919) 249 U. S. 236,
39 Sup. Ct. 268, 63 L. Ed. 577; East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission
of Ohio, (1931) 283 U. S. 465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499, 75 L. Ed. 1171; South
Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, (D.C. S.C.
1931) 52 F. (2d) 515; South Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina
Tax Commission, (D.C. S.C. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 528; State v. Flannelly,
(1915) 96 Kan. 372, 152 Pac. 22; West Virginia & Maryland Gas Co.
v. Towers,
(1919) 134 Md. 137, 106 Atl. 265.
182 Sometimes a doubt has existed as to whether interstate commerce had come to an end, and both theories have been employed in
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and even the Supreme Court of the United States has vacillated
back and forth, now adhering to the one and now to the other.
At the present time the latter formula seems to have become
the accepted doctrine of the Court.
While the two theories may lead to the same conclusion with
respect to the power of a state to act in a particular case, the
choice is nevertheless an important one. If the former, Congress
may act at any time to occupy the field and put an end to state control. If the latter, Congress is without power and the states
must be left a free hand, except in so far as the doctrine which
permits federal regulation of intrastate commerce incident to the
regulation of interstate commerce may find application,'"3 as it is
now being applied under the National Recovery program.'8"
A.

RATE REGULATION AS LOCAL ASPECT OF INTERSTATE

COMMERCE

The leading case adhering to the doctrine that the whole
transaction involved in the transmission of gas or electricity from
a source of supply in one state and its distribution to consumers
in another is interstate commerce is Pennsylvania Gas Co. v.
Public Service Commission.'85 The Pennsylvania Gas Company
was engaged in transmitting natural gas by its own pipe lines

from its source of supply in Pennsylvania and selling and delivering it to consumers in various localities in the state of New York.
The public service commission in the latter state asserted its
power to reduce the rates to consumers in the city of Jamestown
the disposition of the matter. Washington Water Power Co. v. Montana Power Co., (Idaho P.U.C. 1916) P. U. R. 1916E 144; cf. Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co. v. Ott, (C.C.A. W.Va. 1914) 215 Fed.
940; Trades & Labor Council v. Fayette County Gas Co., (Pa. P.S.C.
1917) P. U. R. 1918B 165; Re Appalachian Power Co., (W.Va. P.S.C.
1919) P. U. R. 1919D 286; State v. Flannelly, (1915) 96 Kan. 372,
152 Pac. 22; West Virginia & Maryland Gas Co. v. Towers, (1919)
134 Md. 137, 106 Atl. 265.
' 83Minnesota Rate Cases, (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729,
57 L. Ed. 1511; Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States
(Shreveport Case), (1914) 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833, 58 L. Ed.
1341; Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co.,
(1922) 257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232, 66 L. Ed. 371; United States v.
Village of Hubbard, (1924) 266 U. S. 474, 45 Sup. Ct. 160, 69 L. Ed.
389; 84
United States v. State, (U.S. 1933) 54 Sup. Ct. 28.
' The National Industrial Recovery Act is specifically made applicable to "transactions in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce." See secs. 3(f) and 4(a) and (b); 15 U. S. C. A. 703(f), 704(a)
and (b). See supra note 179.
1'(1920) 252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279, 64 L. Ed. 434.
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and was met by a contention that this was an attempt to regulate
interstate commerce and an invalid encroachment upon the constitutional power granted to Congress over such commerce. While
the Court vigorously asserted the continuance of the interstate
character of the transaction throughout, apparently little difficulty
was experienced in arriving at the conclusion that the regulation
of such rates was a matter peculiarly local in its nature and subject to the control of the states in the absence of regulation by
Congress. This case had been before the New York court of
appeals"8" the preceding year, and the present Mr. Justice Cardozo had disposed of the issue in a very able opinion with which
the Supreme Court agreed. In the same year the case of Mill
Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public Service Commission,8 7 involving
a similar problem with respect to hydroelectric light and power
current, had likewise brought forth a very exhaustive discussion
by Judge Lynch of the supreme court of appeals of West Virginia
with the same result. In neither of the cases was there any serious
contention that such transmission did not involve interstate commerce. While the Mill Creek Case was substantially one of first
impression with respect to the interstate transmission of electricity,
it was thought sufficient merely to assert that there could no
longer be any doubt that interstate commerce was involved and to
cite the oil and gas cases as complete authority.' 8 Whether the
commodities retained their interstate character until the consumers were reached and, if so, whether the state was excluded
thereby from exercising its power of regulation to fix rates were
the issues to be met. In each case the commodity was supplied
directly to the consumer by the company engaged in the interstate
transportation without the intervention of a local distributing
company. The intervention of such local distributing company
and the passage of gas into its mains had been held, in Public
Utilities Commission v. Landon,'89 to break the continuity of the
ISSIn re Pennsylvania Gas Co., (1919) 225 N. Y. 397, 122 N. E. 260.
187(1919) 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S. E. 557.
'88The analogy between natural gas and hydroelectric energy was

found to be very striking in the problems involved in the first part of
this paper, though possibly not so complete as to be fully controlling
in all cases. In this part dealing with state regulation of rates and
service it is believed that the analogy will be found to be much more
complete, due to an absence of any consideration of state control over
streams and water power sites. A decision as to one is believed to be
complete authority for a similar situation with respect to the other,
and the courts have so treated them.
189(1919) 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268, 63 L. Ed. 577.
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transaction and put an end to its interstate character. In this
case the Kansas Natural Gas Company was engaged in transporting natural gas by means of its system of pipe lines from its
sources of supply in Kansas and Oklahoma to various points
in Missouri and Kansas where it was delivered to local distributing companies for sale to consumers. Permanent physical connections permitted the gas to pass freely from the transportation
company's lines into the distribution mains of the local companies.
Though not necessary to a decision, sale and delivery to such local
companies were treated as parts of interstate commerce and
free from state control. But with the passage of the gas into the
local mains interstate movement was said to have ended, and
on that basis state control of rates to consumers was considered a
legitimate regulation of a mere local business.
In distinguishing the Landon Case and arriving at the conclusion that the interstate character persisted throughout the whole
of the transaction, the decisions here under consideration relied
heavily upon the case of Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Foster.190 That case involved the transmission of market quotations of the New York Stock Exchange by the Western Union
Telegraph Company and its subsidiaries to subscribers in Boston.
The local service involved the translation of the quotations from
the Morse code into English by a local telegraph operator and
their transmission to the tickers in the offices of the subscribing
brokers. Mr. Justice Holmes asserted that the "transmission of
the quotations did not lose its character of interstate commerce
until it was completed in the brokers' offices."" 9' The facts that
there was a break in the continuous transmission of the quotations by receipt and translation in the local telegraph office and
that the transmission from such office to the individual brokers
was in a different form were not thought to destroy the interstate
character of the transaction. "If the normal, contemplated and
followed course is a transmission as continuous and rapid as
science can make it from Exchange to broker's office, it does not
matter what are the stages. .".."I'll
The interstate character was
thought to continue until the point was reached "where the parties originally intended that the movement should finally end,"' 93
190(1918) 247 U. S. 105, 38 Sup. Ct. 438, 62 L. Ed. 1006.
191(1918) 247 U. S.105, 112, 38 Sup. Ct. 438, 62 L. Ed. 1006.
192(1918) 247 U. S.105, 113, 38 Sup. Ct. 438, 62 L. Ed. 1006.
193 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Louisiana Railroad Commission,
(1915) 236 U. S. 157, 163, 35 Sup. Ct. 275, 59 L. Ed. 517.
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though the Exchange had no contract with the individual brokers.
The doctrine of this case was thought to be entirely applicable to
the transmission of gas and electricity. Judge Cardozo asserted
as to the gas in In re Pennsylvania Gas Co., that there was "no
break in the continuity of the transmission from pumping station
in Pennsylvania to home and office and factory in J~tnestown,"
and that "interstate commerce did not end till the gas had reached
its goal."'19 ' Referring to the above quotation from Mr. Justice
Holmes in the Foster Case relative to continuity of transmission,
Judge Lynch in the Mill Creek Case asserted that the "transmission of hydro-electricity generated in Virginia to consumers in
West Virginia was as expeditious as science could make it ;" that
it was "a direct transmission from seller to buyer, with an incidental and temporary stop en route for the purpose of transformation into a commercial voltage."' 9
In asserting that this
reduction in voltage was an immaterial circumstance, he denied
the contention of the public service commission that this put an
end to the interstate character of the transaction. 196 Mr. Justice
Day, speaking for the Supreme Court in the Pennsylvania Gas
Co. Case, followed substantially the other two decisions herein
discussed, but emphasized the absence of any intervening distributing company between producer and consumer, and, on that
basis, distinguished the Landon Case. Here the transmission
was said to be direct, continuous and single, without intervention
of any sort between buyer and seller, and interstate commerce
throughout.
Having determined this aspect of the situation, there still remained the primary question of whether or not the state had
power to regulate rates charged to consumers. If the interstate
commerce thus involved could properly be considered essentially
104In re Pennsylvania Gas Co., (1919) 225 N. Y. 397, 122 N. E.
260.
19 Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public Service Commission,
(1919) 84 W. Va. 662, 671, 100 S. E. 557.
' 90 This contention was based on a decision by the court of appeals
of Maryland in the same year. The original package doctrine was
there applied by analogy. It was held that the reduction in pressure
for purposes of distribution to consumers was the equivalent of breaking an original package for the sale of its contents at retail and that
the interstate character of the transaction was thereby brought to an
end. West Virginia and Maryland Gas Co. v. Towers, (1919) 134 Md.
137, 106 Atl. 265.
'97(1851) 12 How. (U.S.) 299, 13 L. Ed. 996.
198(1913) 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511.
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local in its nature, the doctrine of Cooley v. Board of Wardens
of the Port of Philadelphia'" might be applied to bring it within
the scope of the state's regulatory power, since Congress had
not acted to occupy the field. That doctrine, as expounded by
the present Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in the Minnesota Rate
Cases,1 98 was thought by all of the courts concerned to be clearly
applicable. It was there recognized that there exists within certain limits a rather broad range of authority which the states may
exercise, although interstate commerce may be affected. Such
authority may be legitimately exercised over all of those matters
so far local in their nature that it is impossible to derive from
the constitutional grant to Congress of power to regulate interstate commerce "an intention that they should go uncontrolled
pending federal intervention."' 99
"Where the subject is peculiarly one of local concern, and
from its nature belongs to the class with which the state appropriately deals in making reasonable provision for local needs,
it cannot be regarded as left to the unregulated wills of individuals
because Congress has not acted, although it may have such a
relation to interstate
commerce as to be within the reach of the
200
federal power."
By the failure of Congress to assume the function of regulating the distribution and sale of gas and electric light and power
current in interstate commerce, such service was left to go entirely unregulated unless the states were permitted to act. Experience seemed to demonstrate, however, that regulation by some
authority was essential for the protection of the public interest.
"The silence of Congress cannot be interpreted as a declaration
that public service corporations, serving the needs of the locality,
20
may charge anything they please." '
The services which the state commission had undertaken to
regulate in these cases, while considered part of interstate transmission, were rightly thought not to require a national plan of
regulation. They involved in each case the furnishing of natural
gas or electric current to consumers in a local community within
the state. While the pipes or lines which reached the consumers
served were supplied with the gas or electric current directly from
the mains or transmission lines of the company bringing the
commodity into the state, the nature of the service rendered was
quite properly considered essentially local. In such a situation
199(1913) 230 U. S. 352, 402, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511.
200(1913) 230 U. S. 352, 402, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511.
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the distribution pipes or wires occupy the streets of a city by
virtue of its permission and in the same way as those of a local
plant rendering a similar service to consumers within the city.
The local nature of the service rendered is the same whether
the commodity furnished originates within or without the state.
Such being the nature of the transactions involved, the exercise
of authority by the states in the fixing of rates to consumers, so
long as Congress has not acted, would seem to be in no way violative of the commerce clause of the federal constitution.
In the cases above discussed the distinction was pointed out
between regulating the local sale of the commodity to consumers
held to be properly within the competence of the states and regulating the transportation determined to be interstate or the rates
therefor, the latter being a field where regulation, if there is to
be any, must be uniform. Especially was this emphasized by
Judge Lynch in the Mill Creek Case.
"The vital distinction should be noted between regulation of
rates of transportation and of the rates at which a commodity
shall be sold. Transportation across state lines, involving as it
frequently does many or all states, is generally a matter of national importance requiring uniformity of regulation respecting the
rates thereof, and hence is usually beyond the regulatory power
of the state. Because of the very nature of the subject-matter
conflicting state regulations respecting rates ordinarily would result in discord and chaos....
"In fixing rates of sale, however, as distinguished from rates
of transportation, the duty regulated is of an entirely different
nature. The duty of the power company to sell at reasonable
rates was owed both to the citizens of Virginia and to the public
of this state (West Virginia). But the two duties do not overlap as they do where rates of transportation are concerned. The
price at which a commodity is sold is essentially local, affecting
chiefly those in the community where it is' 20 made,
and only in2
cidentally, if at all, touching those outside.
It is interesting to note a certain contrast in the method of
approach employed in the Supreme Court opinion and in those of
the other courts, particularly that of Judge Cardozo. Mr. Justice
Day, in speaking for the Supreme Court, dealt with the situation
as a matter of interstate commerce requiring regulation as to
which the states were competent, by virtue of its local nature,
2

OlJudge Cardozo in In re Pennsylvania Gas Co., (1919) 225 N. Y.
397, 20
410,
122 N. E. 260.
2
Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Public Service Commission
(1919) 84 W. Va. 662, 673, 674, 100 S. E. 557.
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until Congress should act. Judge Cardozo considered it a matter for the exercise of state police power, which incidentally affected interstate commerce, but which was clearly within the competence of the states until Congress should supersede such
measures by an exercise of its commerce power. While the problem is thus approached from slightly different angles, the same
result is arrived at in both cases.20° Regardless of the method of
-approach employed, the decision reached left the way open for
Congress to act at any time it might consider such general regulation to be desirable.
With the conclusion arrived at in these cases, that the states
may regulate rates to local consumers although the commodity
has been brought directly from another state, there would seem
to be little reason for disagreement. The theory of all the cases
that maintain the proposition of the continuing interstate character of the transaction is that the busineess of furnishing gas and
electricity to consumers is characteristically a local enterprise,
that it does not appropriately admit of a single uniform system
of regulation, and is, therefore, not that type of interstate commerce which requires exclusive legislation by Congress. The
fact that such price regulation must of necessity affect somewhat
the interstate transportation of these commodities does not detract from the soundness of the conclusion as to state power.
The matter upon which unanimity of opinion is less likely, and
with regard to which the decisions have not been in accord, is
the preliminary question of whether or not the interstate character of the transaction may have been brought to an end before
the consumer is reached.
B.

RATE

CONTROL AS REGULATION

OF INTRASTATE

COMTMERCE

In determining that interstate commerce has been brought
to an end so that a state may regulate sales to consumers as a
purely local enterprise, the courts have frequently made use of the
original package analogy, although the same result has been
reached in some cases without express application of that doctrine.
As ordinarily conceived, the original package doctrine has application, as the term implies, to articles of commerce contained in
a conventional package, bundle or crate, convenient for whole20
3For a discussion of local regulations of interstate commerce
by the states, and of police power as affecting interstate commerce,
see 2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law of the United States, 2d ed.,
sec. 598 et seq.; cf. Reynolds, Distribution of Power to Regulate Interstate Carriers Between The Nation And The States 78, 81.
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sale shipping, which must be opened before sale of its contents
at retail. In such a case it was originally set forth, and, no
doubt, in most instances has been so applied. It is clear, however,
both from its first assertion and its later application that it need
not be so restricted. It is capable of being applied, at least by
analogy, as a general principle, to other situations of a similar
nature, and is not a restricted definition of the method by which
a single type of transaction may divest itself of its interstate character. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in the original promulgation
'' 20 4
of the doctrine, used the expression "original form or package,
which may indicate that its application was not meant to be restricted to such articles as are capable of being put up in the form
of a package in the commonly accepted meaning of that word.20 5
At most, of course, it is only a convenient test by means of which
the courts may frequently determine whether a commodity
brought from outside has taken on a local character. The
broader aspect of the doctrine, of which the package idea is really
only a part, which asserts that when the thing imported has been
so acted upon by the importer as to become incorporated and
mixed up with the mass of property in the state, it loses its character as an import, has also been invoked in the gas and electricity
cases. While the term import, as used by Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall in the promulgation of the doctrine with respect to state
taxation of goods from abroad, has no proper application to interstate commerce, the doctrine finds appropriate place in determining whether a commodity such as here involved has been
divested of its interstate character so as to be properly subject to
the police power in the state of its destination.
The first state court case to involve the regulation of rates
for gas, part of which had been brought from without the state,
invoked the original package doctrine to justify the regulation.
The position was taken that when the first gas was taken out of
the pipe lines and sold within the state the original package was
204

Brown v. Maryland, (1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419, 442, 6 L. Ed.

509.

2 05
For the application of the doctrine to oil in tank cars, see Askren
v. Continental Oil Co., (1920) 252 U. S. 444, 40 Sup. Ct. 355, 64 L. Ed.
654. While this case has probably been substantially overruled, the
inapplicability of the doctrine to oil was not the cause. Sonneborn
Brothers v. Cureton, (1923) 262 U. S. 506, 43 Sup. Ct. 643, 67 L. Ed.
1095. See also Texas Co. v. Brown. (1922) 258 U. S.466, 42 Sup. Ct.
375, 66 L. Ed. 721; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Standard Oil
Co., (1927) 275 U. S.257, 48 Sup. Ct. 107, 72 L. Ed. 270.
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broken and the gas ceased to be an article of interstate commerce.
"If the analogy of original packages or importation of property
in bulk applies to gas in the mains, it ceases to apply when thousands of service pipes are filled with gas to be drawn off at such
times and in such quantities as the individual consumer desires.
Interstate commerce is at an end when the bulk of the imported
gas is broken up for indiscriminate distribution to individual purchasers at retail. ' 2 6 The fact that the gas from outside had been
mingled in the same pipes with gas produced within the state
was also considered a matter of some significance.
In some respects the most important early case applying the
original package doctrine to gas or electricity is West Virginia &
207
Maryland Gas Co. v. Towers..

Natural gas, the regulation of

whose rates to consumers was involved, was transmitted in highpressure pipe lines from West Virginia to the gates of the Maryland communities in which it was to be sold and delivered. There
it left the main pipe lines and entered intermediate low-pressure
lines for sale and distribution. Its pressure was reduced because that in the main line was too high for service to consumers. In entering the intermediate lines it was so separated from
that in the main line that it could not return but awaited consumption as needed. By this process the interstate transmission was
thought to be ended, and the subsequent sale and delivery to consumers were considered proper subjects for local regulation.
"Whether the gas is separated from the general bulk of gas
and confined in the intermediate pipe lines .

. .,

or ...

is separated

and stored in tanks awaiting consumption, the effect is the same
20
6State v. Flannelly, (1915) 96 Kan. 372, 383, 152 Pac. 22. See

also Washington Water Power Co. v. Montana Power Co., (Idaho
P.U.C. 1916) P. U. R. 1916E 144; Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co.
v. Ott, (D.C. W.Va. 1914) 215 Fed. 940; Re Appalachian Power Co.,
(W.Va. P.S.C. 1919) P. U. R. 1919D 286.
207(1919) 134 Md. 137, 106 Atl. 265.
An added significance attaches
to this case by virtue of its recent complete approval by the United
States Supreme Court in East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of
Ohio, (1931) 283 U. S. 465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499, 75 L. Ed. 1171.
It is worthy of note that the Supreme Court in 1918 had rejected
an attempt to apply the original package analogy to the case of telegraph messages. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, (1918)
247 U. S. 105, 38 Sup. Ct. 438, 62 L. Ed. 1006, a case much relied on
in the cases discussed above under A, the translation of stock market
quotations from code into English at a local telegraph office and their
distribution in the form of new messages to individual brokers was
held not to be sufficiently analogous to the receiver of a package breaking bulk and selling the contents at retail to put an end to the interstate transaction before delivery to the brokers.
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in determining the question whether the original package has been
broken and2 08the gas mixed with the common mass of property in
this state.11
It was contended that since the regulators which reduced the
pressure on entrance into the intermediate pipes did not interrupt
the continuous flow from producing well to consumer, it must
be considered interstate commerce throughout. The court asserted, however, that although "there may be a constant movement of the molecules of the gas," it did not see how this movement, "because of the peculiar properties of the article, can affect
the question to be determined. ' 20 9 It thus refused to adopt the
view which prevailed in the Pennsylvania Gas Co. and Mill Creek
cases. It should be noted in this connection that prior to the decision of the Pennsylvania Gas Co. Case the Supreme Court of
the United States in Public Utilities Commission v'. Landon210 had
sustained the power of a state to regulate the sale to consumers
of gas brought from another state in an opinion that seemed
to indicate substantial agreement with the West Virginia & Maryland Gas Co. Case. No attempt was made to employ the original
package doctrine, but the enterprise was characterized as purely
intrastate commerce and subject to complete state control, although it was recognized that interstate transmission would be
remotely affected.
"In no proper sense," said the Court, "under the facts here
disclosed, can it be said that sale and delivery of gas to their customers at burner-tips by the local companies operating under
special franchises constituted any part of interstate commerce.
The companies received supplies which had moved in such commerce and then disposed thereof at retail in due course of their
local business ....
Interstate movement ended when the gas passed
''
into local mains." 1
The fact that permanent physical connections permitted the
gas to pass freely from the transporting company's mains into
those of the distributing companies was considered immaterial.
Nothing was said as to reduction in pressure. A distinguishing
feature of this case was the intervention of local distributing companies between the transporting company and the consumers. It
is not entirely clear whether the Court considered the interstate
20 8
West Virginia & Maryland Gas Co. v. Towers, (1919) 134 Md.
137, 145, 106 Atl. 265.
-o0West Virginia & Maryland Gas Co. v. Towers, (1919) 134 Md.
137, 145, 106 AtI. 265.
210(1919) 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268, 63 L. Ed. 577.
211(1919) 249 U. S. 236, 245, 39 Sup. Ct. 268, 63 L. Ed. 577.
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character of the transaction to have been destroyed by the sale
of the gas to the distributing companies, by its passage into the
local distributing mains, or by both.
The intervention of the local distributing companies is the
sole distinguishing feature between this case and Pennsylvania
Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission. In holding the transaction to be interstate throughout in the latter case, the Supreme
Court approved the Landon Case and gave to it an interpretation
that made the local or interstate character of the business of selling gas to consumers depend solely on whether or not there had
been a sale to a local distributing company. On the basis of these
cases, if one gas or electric company brings its own supply from
outside the state, its business of furnishing the commodity to local
consumers will be interstate commerce throughout. If another
company does exactly the same business, and its supply comes
from the same outside source by permanent physical connections,
but is purchased from a transporting company making delivery
within the state or at the border line, its business will be solely
intrastate. Both, however, will, by the cases, be subject to state
control. The important difference arises in the fact that the former
would be subject to the superior power of Congress, while as to
2 12

the latter, state control would be complete.

Whether the doctrine of the Pennsylvania Gas Co. Case was

2 13
weakened by the case of Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.

is not entirely clear. The problem was not necessarily before the
Court in that case, but the facts were the same as in the Landon
Case and its doctrine was expressly approved. The Pennsylvania
Gas Co. Case was not questioned, but, after referring to both decisions, the Court asserted, in what amounted to dictum, that
"the business of supplying, on demand, local consumers is a local
business, even though the gas be brought from another state and
drawn for distribution directly from interstate mains; and this is
so whether the local distribution be made by the transporting
com2 14
pany or by independent distributing companies.1

If any inconsistency was thought to exist between the two cases, it
21 2
See notes 183 and 184, supra, as to federal regulation of "transactions in or affecting interstate commerce."
213(1924) 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 501, 68 L. Ed. 1045. The issue
here involved was whether or not a state could regulate the sale to a
local distributing company by a company transporting from another

state. This feature will be discussed under C, infra.

214(1924) 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 501, 68 L. Ed. 1045.
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was made quite clear that the Court was in full accord with the
Landan Case.
No subsequent case involving state regulation of rates or
service has been before the Supreme Court. In a recent tax
case, 215 however, the issue of interstate or local character of service to consumers was dealt with in a unanimous opinion by Mr.
Justice Butler. The doctrine of the Pennsylvania Gas Co. Case
was repudiated, and with it its interpretation 216 of the Landon
Case. Delivery of gas was made in this case by the Hope Natural
Gas Company of West Virginia at the West Virginia-Ohio state
line and carried at high pressure in the transmission lines of the
Ohio company to its pressure reducing stations. From these it
was transmitted at a lower pressure to its local supply mains
wherein the pressure was further reduced to that necessary for
delivery to consumers. The transportation of the gas from the
source of supply in West Virginia to the connection with the
Ohio company's local system was all considered a part of interstate commerce. The delivery of the gas at the state line to the
company that was ultimately to make distribution to consumers,
the gas having been neither reduced in pressure nor entered into
the system from which distribution was to be made, was held not
to end the interstate transaction. "The mere fact that the title or
the custody of the gas passes while it is en route from state to
state is not determinative of the question where interstate commerce ends. ' 217 Whether the transmission through the so-called
distribution lines between the reducing stations and the local supply mains was a part of the interstate transmission, or a part of
the intrastate business, the Court did not expressly state. But it
appears to have been more closely identified with the business of
local delivery than with interstate transmission and might well
have been so characterized. With the passage of the gas from
these intermediary distribution lines into the local supply mains,
it was relieved of nearly all of its pressure, its volume was greatly
expanded, and it was divided into numerous tiny streams by
which it passed into the service pipes on the consumers' premises.
This process was thought by the Court, not merely to characterize
it as interstate commerce of a local nature as in the Pennsylvania
21 5

East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio, (1931) 283 U. S.
465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499, 75 L. Ed. 1171.
216
Supra p. 674.
217(1931) 283 U. S. 465, 470, 51 Sup. Ct. 499, 75 L. Ed. 1171.
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Gas Co. Case, but to completely put an end to the interstate character of the commodity and subject it to complete state control.
This was said to be "like the breaking of an original package,
after shipment in interstate commerce, in order that its contents
may be treated, prepared for sale and sold at retail.

' 21 8

The

early state cases that had .employed the original package doctrine
219
to reach the same result were given approval.

"It follows," said the Court, "that the furnishing of gas to
consumers in Ohio municipalities by means of distribution plants
to supply the gas suitably for the service for which it is intended
is not interstate commerce, but is a business of purely
' 22 local concern exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state.

1

This was in direct repudiation of the doctrine of Pennsylvania
Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, and that case was expressly disapproved. 21 This decision would seem to put an end to the
Court's wavering upon this problem, and in so doing it definitely
closes the door to possible federal regulation of rates to consumers as a part of interstate commerce which had theretofore been
left open. That federal regulation might be attempted as incident
to interstate control in a way analogous to the situatiori with respect
to railroad rates has seemed highly improbable heretofore, in view
of the fundamental distinction between the regulation of rates
for service and of transportation rates and the difference in the
relation of the two to the interstate business involved. But with
the present far-reaching regulations under the National Recovery
Act of various "transactions in or affecting interstate commerce,"
it is quite possible that federal control may assume considerable
significance.
There seems to be no conceivable reason why the conclusion
arrived at with respect to gas should not be applied in the case of
218(1931) 283 U. S. 465, 471, 51 Sup. Ct. 499, 75 L. Ed. 1171.
State v. Flannelly, (1915) 96 Kan. 372, 152 Pac. 22; West Virginia & Maryland Gas Co. v. Towers, (1919) 134 Md. 137, 106 Atl. 265.
220(1931) 283 U. S. 465, 471, 51 Sup. Ct. 499, 75 L. Ed. 1171.
219

221

The Court asserted that the Pennsylvania Gas Co. Case had

been decided on the basis of a theory not entirely consistent with the
views expressed in Public Utilities Commission v. Landon and in
Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., and intimated that, had the same
considerations been there presented with respect to the ending of interstate commerce by the passage of the gas into local distribution
systems, a different conclusion might have been arrived at. Whether
the effect of this case in its repudiation of the Pennsylvania Gas Co.
case is to be taken in a restricted sense, because the one case involves
regulation and the other taxation, is not entirely clear. This matter

is discussed infra in Part III, p. 703.
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electric current brought from without the state. While we have
no Supreme Court opinion on the matter, the doctrine of the East
Ohio Gas Co. Case2 2 " has been fully applied in recent inferior federal court decisions. 223 As in the Supreme Court decision, the matter under consideration was taxation rather than rates for service,
but the question of the interstate or local character of service to
consumers was dealt with at considerable length. The reduction
of the high-voltage current brought into the state in interstate commerce to many currents of low voltage for sale to consumers was
thought to put an end to the interstate character of the transaction.
"While electric current can hardly be said to 'come to rest' within
a state, its interstate journey ends at the transformer which uses
it for the production of low-voltage currents for use within the
state. The situation is the same in principle as the breaking up of
an original package ... .224
The latter of these decisions2225 went somewhat beyond the
previous cases and took the position that current not reduced in
voltage and not sold to a local distributing company might, nevertheless, lose its interstate character. The broader aspects of the
business being carried on were considered, and it was found that
the company had a great system of lines within the state for the
transmission and sale of electric current. Numerous mills, factories and towns were served from this system. In some cases
the current was reduced in voltage at the time of its delivery to the
purchasers; in other cases it was delivered from the same lines at
high voltage. All such lines maintained for the purpose of distribution and sale of electric current throughout the state, whether
at reduced or high voltage, were considered parts of the company's
local distribution system and not instruments of interstate commerce. "When current brought in from another state is placed
on these lines for local distribution and sale, it loses its interstate
character. And it makes no difference that delivery is made to
the local customer at high voltage."22 6 The business was likened
222(1931) 283 U. S. 465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499, 75 L. Ed. 1171.

223South Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission,
(D.C. S.C. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 515, affirmed without opinion in Broad
River Power Co. v. Query, (1931) 286 U. S. 525, 52 Sup. Ct. 494, 76 L.
Ed. 1268; South Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, (D.C. S.C. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 528, affirmed in Broad River Power
Co. v. Query, (1933) 288 U. S. 178, 53 Sup. Ct. 326, 77 L. Ed. 685, the
commerce
clause contention not being presented to the Supreme Court.
224 (D.C. S.C. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 515, 525.
225(D.C. S.C. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 528.
226(D.C. S.C. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 528, 529.
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to that of a dealer who brings into the state a cargo of fertilizer
in bulk and sells it partly at wholesale and partly at retail. In a
more or less strained attempt to apply the original package doctrine,
the court said that "the quantity of current is measured, not in
volts, but in amperes; and, when current is drawn off the lines, the
'original package' is broken and the amperage remaining on the
line is reduced.122 7

It should be borne in mind that any doctrine

or formula for determining when interstate commerce ends and
local business begins, such as the original package doctrine, is, after
all, merely a convenient test which may be useful to the courts in
appropriate cases. But its inapplicability in a particular case is by
no means a matter of controlling significance.
The position of the federal district court in this case would
seem to be out of accord with the attitude of the Supreme Court
in People's NaturalGas Co. v. Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania.228 There delivery of gas was received at the state line
and carried by the People's Company to various points in Pennsylvania for sale and delivery direct to consumers. At the city
of Johnstown delivery was made to a local distributing company,
and as to this the Court asserted that it was all a part of interstate
commerce. The language used was sufficiently broad to apply to
the deliveries made direct to consumers, however, and the Court
may have been merely following the doctrine of the Pennsylvania
Gas Co. Case, since repudiated. Furthermore, it was found that
the continuity of service there sought to be compelled could be
satisfied out of that proportion of the company's supply produced
within the state without affecting interstate commerce. Thus the
assertion of the Court was not more than dictum. Were it to be
considered otherwise, however, there is reason to believe that it
should not be followed. The company was making delivery from
its pipe lines to large numbers of consumers in numerous communities before the Johnstown city gates were reached. It was
maintaining a large system of lines throughout the state by means
of which it was conducting an extensive business, serving innumerable consumers with an essential commodity of everyday use. The
business was being conducted in competition with local enterprise,
and in exactly the same manner. When the gas entered the com227(D.C. S.C. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 528, 529. This is quite comparable
to the first attempt to apply the doctrine to gas. State v. Flannelly,
(1915) 96 Kan. 372, 152 Pac. 22.
228(1926) 270 U. S. 550, 46 Sup. Ct. 371, 70 L. Ed. 726.
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pany's network of lines maintained as its distribution system within
the state, its interstate character would seem to have come to an
end. Whether the analogy to the fertilizer dealer referred to above
is an apt one or not, it does seem that the business here conducted
is more nearly assimilable to that, or even to that of a salesman
who carries his goods with him, than to the ordinary case of a
wholesale shipment from another state direct to the purchaser.
Where new types of commodities and fundamentally different
methods of dealing are involved, however, analogies to transactions placed in certain catagories in an earlier stage of our development are of necessity incomplete and of very doubtful validity.
Instead of analogies, it is rather a matter of judgment from "the
established facts and known commercial methods"22 9 that enables
one to make a satisfactory classification of such transactions. It
is upon that basis that the conclusion herein suggested has been
arrived at. In any view of the matter, it seems difficult to say
that this is interstate commerce national in character and requiring
230
a uniform plan of regulation.
Considering this latest case and the East Ohio Gas Co. Case
together, it becomes clear that no one test is to be applied to determine when interstate commerce ends and local business begins.
In the one case, sale to the company that is to distribute to consumers is held not to strip the commodity of its interstate character. In the other, delivery by the company that has conducted
the transmission from outside the state to a purchaser without
reduction of voltage does not make such sale and delivery a part
of interstate commerce. In the former situation, however, the
method of doing business was to accept delivery at the state line
but continue an uninterrupted high-pressure transmission of the
gas to the purchasing company's reducing stations. It was only
after passing these that any deliveries were made, or that the busi22

0Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, (1919) 249 U. S. 236,
39 Sup. Ct. 268, 63 L. Ed. 577.
230
Since the South Carolina Power Co. case was one of taxation
rather than regulation, and since the scope of state power is wider in
that respect, it might be suggested that a differentiation should here
be made on that basis and the tax upheld on the theory of such cases
as Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton, (1923) 262 U. S. 506, 43 Sup. Ct.
643, 67 L. Ed. 1095, while regulation would not be permitted. There
is nothing in the case to suggest any such distinction, nor in other
tax cases to be discussed infra, e.g., East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio, (1931) 283 U. S.465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499, 75 L. Ed. 1171,
and State Tax Commission of Mississippi v. Interstate Natural Gas
Co., (1931) 284 U. S. 41, 52 Sup. Ct. 62, 76 L. Ed. 156.
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ness assumed a local character. In the latter, the company's method
of distribution was to tap its high-tension lines and deliver to
purchasers, sometimes through transformers at a reduced voltage,
sometimes directly at high voltage. But, "applying the cardinal
principle that interstate commerce as contemplated by the constitution 'is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one drawn
from the course of business,' "231 it follows that each particular
case must be dealt with on the basis of its own peculiar circumstances. On such a basis there would seem to be no reason to
quarrel with either decision; and whether the one method or the
other be employed, the regulation of rates to consumers seems to
be a proper matter for state control.
So far as the decided cases go, the control of the states over
rates and service to consumers of gas and electric light and
power current would now appear to be substantially complete,
although the commodity being furnished comes from outside
the state, and whether furnished to consumers by a local distributing company or by a company transporting it directly from
the source of supply in another jurisdiction. Except for regulations that may be imposed on the basis of "transactions . . .
affecting interstate ... commerce" in carrying out the policies of
the National Recovery program, the attitude of the Supreme
Court would seem to indicate that state control is exclusive of
any power on the part of Congress because of the prior termination of the interstate aspect of the transaction.
C.

EFFECT

OF WHOLESALE

CONTRACTS

Where the supply of gas or electric light and power current
is brought from without the state, an important factor in the
determination of rates to be charged by local distributing companies to consumers is the wholesale purchase price of the
commodity in question. The ability or inability of the state to
regulate that purchase price may have an important bearing
upon the effectiveness of its control over local rates. What the
state's power in this respect may be must depend upon the nature of the transaction from the standpoint of interstate commerce, whether or not a part of such commerce, and if so,
23

IMinnesota v. Blasius, (1933) 54 Sup. Ct. 34, 36; Swift and
196 U. S. 375, 398, 25 Sup. Ct. 276,
49 L. Ed. 518.
Company v. United States, (1905)
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whether predominantly local or national in character. The cases
heretofore considered in which a local distributing company intervened have all held that interstate commerce came to an end,
by delivery to the local company, 232 by entrance of the commodity
into the local distribution system, 23 3 or by its reduction in pressure or voltage preparatory thereto.2 4 In any case it seems to
be after the consummation of the wholesale transaction between
the transporting company and the distributing company. Whatever test is applied, then, to determine the point of time at which
interstate commerce ends and the local business begins, the wholesale transfer would seem to fall within the former category. Such
has been the uniform attitude of the courts from the outset. The
sole controversy in this respect has been as to whether the transaction is so far identified with the local service as to be subject
to state regulation in the absence of action by Congress, or is a
part of that commerce which is national in character and within
the exclusive domain of the federal government.
Control of such wholesale rates is likely to be much more
frequently of immediate concern to the state into which the commodity is being transmitted and in which it is to be supplied
to consumers than to the state of its origin. That both states
may feel impelled under certain circumstances to undertake such
regulation as a means of protecting important local interests is
evidenced by Supreme Court decisions. The state of destination
not infrequently finds this the most important single element of
expense to be taken into account in the determination of a rate
base for the utility whose service to consumers it seeks to regulate. Where municipalities maintain their own distribution systems and purchase their supplies from transportation companies
for delivery at their own city gates, this charge becomes a controlling factor in their ability to furnish their citizens adequate
service at reasonable rates.
The leading case from the point of view of the state of
232
Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, (1919) 249 U. S. 236,
39 Sup. Ct. 268, 63 L. Ed. 577.
23 3
South Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission,
(D.C. S.C. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 528; West Virginia & Maryland Gas Co.
v. Towers, (1919) 134 Md. 137, 106 Atl. 265.
234
East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio, (1931) 283
U. S. 465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499, 75 L. Ed. 1171; South Carolina Power Co.
v. South Carolina Tax Commission, (D.C. S.C. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 515.
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destination is Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 2315 The business of the gas company was conceded to be almost wholly interstate commerce, transporting natural gas by pipe lines from the
source of supply in Oklahoma into Kansas and Missouri and
there selling and delivering it in wholesale quantities to local distributing companies supplying consumers in numerous communities in both states. Contrary to the attitude of the Kansas supreme court, the Supreme Court of the United States took the
position that such sales were inseparable parts of a transaction
in interstate commerce essentially national in character, and that
the enforcement by the state of a selling price placed a direct
burden upon such commerce "inconsistent with that freedom of
interstate trade which it was the purpose of the commerce clause
to secure and preserve." It was said to be as though the state
commission "stood at the state line and imposed its regulation
upon the final step in the process at the moment the interstate
commodity entered the state and before it had become part of
the general mass of property therein. ' 238 The transportation,
sale and delivery were thought to constitute an unbroken chain,
fundamentally interstate from beginning to end.
By way of
contrast with the Pennsylvania Gas Co. Case where the transporting company sold and delivered directly to consumers, it
was asserted that the paramount interest was "not local but national, admitting of and requiring uniformity of regulation. Such uniformity, even though it be the uniformity of governnental nonaction, may be highly necessary to preserve equality of opportunity and treatment among the various communities and states
concerned.

2 37

Substantially the same set of facts had been

before the Court five years before in the Landon Case where the
question at issue was the state's power to regulate the sale by
the local distributing companies to consumers and where it was
asserted by way of dictum that such wholesale transactions would
2

be beyond the bounds of state control. 11
235(1924) 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544, 68 L. Ed. 1027. Three
cases were consolidated in the Supreme Court: Missouri v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., (D.C. Mo. 1922) 282 Fed. 341; Central Trust Company of New York v. Consumers' Light, Heat & Power Co., (D.C.
Kan. 1922) 282 Fed. 680; and State ex rel. Helm v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., (1922) 111 Kan. 809, 208 Pac. 622.
236(1924) 265 U. S. 298, 308, 44 Sup. Ct. 544, 68 L. Ed. 1027.
237(1924) 265 U. S. 298, 309, 44 Sup. Ct. 544, 68 L. Ed. 1027. (Italics
supplied).
238
Cf. People's Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission,
(1926) 270 U. S. 550, 554, 555, 46 Sup. Ct. 371, 70 L. Ed. 726.
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That, in general, the transportation of legitimate articles of
interstate commerce across state lines and their sale by previous
contract in the state of their destination constitute parts of that
type of interstate commerce which is considered to involve interests of a national character and to be beyond the power of
such state to control has long been well established.2 3 9 That
the transaction here in question is properly placed within that
category seems hardly open to serious doubt. The fact, which
all will no doubt concede, that the business is one which, in the
interest of the public, should be subjected to regulation by some
public authority does not bestow upon the states a power which
otherwise Congress alone is cnmpetent to exercise. Problems
with respect to the proper administrative machinery for the
regulation of transactions of this nature thereby arise, due to the
peculiar relation of such commerce in gas and electricity to local
service in those commodities, which have not been presented by
commercial transactions of an earlier period.
That the same doctrine as here asserted with respect to natural
gas would be completely applicable to a similar transmission and
sale of electric light and power current seems quite obvious. Only
three years after the Kansas Natural Gas Co. decision-the doctrine was given such application from the standpoint of the state
of origin in Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v.
Attleboro Steam and Electric Co.240 The Narragansett Electric
Lighting Company of Rhode Island, engaged in generating electric current in that state and selling it to local consumers, was
under contract to supply the needs of the Attleboro Company
of Massachusetts at a specified rate for a stated period of yearb.
Current was delivered under the contract at the state line and
metered at the plant of the Attleboro Company in Massachusetts.
After some years of operation the Narragansett Company filed
new schedules of rates with the Public Utilities Commission of
239
Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., (1888) 125
U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 1062, 31 L. Ed. 700; Leisy v. Hardin, (1890)
135, U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128; Minnesota Rate Cases,
(1913) 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511.
240(1927) 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294, 71 L. Ed. 549. This is
the first case in the Supreme Court, or any federal court for that
matter, in which it was necessary to decide whether the transmission
of electricity across state lines constituted interstate commerce. That
was assumed, however, on the basis of Mill Creek Coal & Coke Co. v.
Public Service Commission, (1919) 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S. E. 557, and
on what was considered the complete analogy to the gas cases, without
discussion.
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Rhode Island, increasing the charge to the Attleboro Company
and seeking the authority of the commission to put them into
effect. An investigation by the commission disclosed that the
Narragansett Company had been operating at a loss under the
contract rates, that its rates to its local customers in Rhode
Island, of which there were more than 70,000 and to whom
more than 97% of its product was sold, yielded a fair return,
and that continued operation under the contract rates would be
detrimental to the general public welfare by preventing the
company from performing its full duty to its local customers.
Accordingly, an order was made putting the new rates into
operation. Thus was squarely raised the issue whether a state,
in the regulation of one of its public utilities, may, for the protection of the interests of its own inhabitants, so regulate the
interstate business of the company as to prevent it from disabling
itself from furnishing adequate local service at reasonable rates.
The issue thus raised is probably quite as important for the
state of origin as that in the Kansas Natural Gas Co. Case for
the state of destination. In both cases the effectiveness of the
state's power to so control the gas and electric companies operating locally within its borders as to protect the interests of its
own inhabitants in fair rates and efficient service is very vitally
involved. It was contended in the Attleboro Case that the Rhode
Island Commission could not effectively exercise its function of
regulating rates and service by the company to local consumers
without also regulating the rates in question and that if the
Narragansett Company were permitted to continue to supply the
Attleboro Company at a loss it would tend to increase the burden
upon local consumers and impair the ability of the company to
give them good service at reasonable rates. It was therefore
asserted that the order of the commission should be sustained
as being essentially a local regulation necessary for the protection
of local interests and affecting interstate commerce only indirectly and incidentally. Thus considered from the point of view
of the state it may well appear to be a matter predominantly
of local concern. This was especially emphasized in the Attleboro Case because the great bulk of the company's business was
purely local in character. The principle involved, however, would
seem to be the same whether much or little of the company's
business were of the interstate variety. Such was the attitude
of the Court.
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Viewed from the standpoint of the particular transaction
itself, rather than from that of its effect upon the local business
within the state, it assumes the form of a purely interstate transaction. The order in question fixes the price at which a company
in one state may sell and deliver in wholesale quantities a legitimate article of interstate commerce to a purchaser in another
state. It is not the sale direct to consumers in the conduct of a
local business as in the Pennsylvania Gas Co. Case, but an interstate wholesale delivery preparatory to such local resale to consumers by the purchaser, substantially as in the Kansas Natural
Gas Co. Case. Referring to the latter case, the Court said it
was immaterial that the Narragansett Company was a Rhode
Island corporation and subject to regulation by the commission
in the conduct of its local business, or that its business was
chiefly of that nature. The test of the validity of such state
regulations was said to be "not the character of the general business of the company, but whether the particular bus:ness which
is regulated is local or national in character." 24' It was further
assumed that if the state in which the current was generated
could place such a direct burden as this would be upon the interstate business on the theory that it would result in an indirect
benefit to consumers served by the generating company in that
state, the state of destination, by parity of reasoning, might reduce the rates on the interstate business in order to benefit local
consumers in that state, with, of course, an impossible situation
resulting.
"Plainly, however," said the Court, "the paramount interest
in the interstate business carried on betwen the two companies is
not local to either state, but is essentially national in character.
The rate is therefore not subject to regulation by either of the
two states in the guise of protection to their respective local
interests; but if legislation is required it can only
be attained
242
by the exercise of the power vested in Congress."
The mere fact that pressure or voltage may have been reduced
before delivery to a local distributing company will not necessarily
destroy the purely interstate character of such a wholesale transaction or bestow upon the state of destination any power to regulate the wholesale delivery. This may appear to be inconsistent
with those cases discussed above which find in such changes a
241(1927) 273 U. S. 83, 90, 47 Sup. Ct. 294, 71 L. Ed. 549.
242(1927) 273 U. S. 83, 90, 47 Sup. Ct. 294, 71 L. Ed. 549.
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basis for applying the original package doctrine by analogy. 43
But here again each case must depend upon its own peculiar
circumstances. In State Tax Commission of Mississippiv. Interstate Natural Gas Co.141 the gas company bringing its product

into the state made no local sales to consumers but was engaged
exclusively in transporting and delivering the gas to local distributing companies in wholesale quantities. In some instances
delivery was made at reduced pressure for the accommodation of
the local distributor. As such, the reduction was quite properly
characterized as incidental to the sale and delivery to the wholesale customer in interstate commerce.

245

Since the determination of the Attleboro and Kansas Natural
Gas Co. cases, the door seems to be completely dosed to any
regulation by the states of rates in interstate wholesale contracts,
even though the effect upon local rates and service may be tremendously important..2 4'

To what extent, with the increasing

volume and consequent importance of this type of business, the
federal government may feel called upon to assume control of
247
such rates is still a matter concealed within the future.
D.

INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS AFFECTING RATE REGULATION

Perhaps the most interesting and important aspects of the
wholesale contract problem arise in connection with dealings
between interrelated corporate entities. It is there that the wholesale price may be manipulated for the purpose of increasing costs
upon which the rate to consumers is to be based, and in this
way it becomes a matter of very vital importance from the
standpoint of state control. From the foregoing study it has
been found that bona fide wholesale contracts for delivery of
gas and electricity across state lines are beyond state control,
although important local interests may be affected. If all arrange24 3

See especially South Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax
Commission, (D.C. S.C. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 515, discussed more in detail
in Part III, infra.
244(1931) 284 U. S. 41, 52 Sup. Ct. 62, 76 L. Ed. 156.
24 5
- For a further discussion of this problem see Part III. infra.
246
For other cases holding or assuming that only Congress is
competent to regulate rates in interstate wholesale contracts, see
Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission of Kansas,
(1932) 285 U. S. 119, 52 Sup. Ct. 283, 76 L. Ed. 648; Galloway v. Bell,
(D.C. App. 1926) 56 App. D. C. 172, 11 F. (2d) 558.
247Cf. Petroleum Code, article III, sections 6 and 7, article V, rules
4 and 26.
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ments in the form of such wholesale contracts, though made
between interrelated corporate entities, were likewise beyond state
competence, serious abuses would be possible and the efficacy
of state regulatory commissions would be largely destroyed. Until
very recently considerable doubt surrounded the matter of
effective state regulation in this type of situation. The price
which a local distributing company paid for its supply of gas
or electric current was said to be one of the fixed costs which
a state commission must allow in fixing rates to consumers. That
ordinarily this is true, there would seem to be no doubt. But
where the distributing company is a subsidiary of the transporting company, or by other intercorporate relationship there
is an absence of the ordinary elements of free bargain and sale
between them, as a result of which the wholesale price may conceivably be pushed up for the sole purpose of justifying a higher
rate to consumers, there seems to be ample reason for allowing
the state authority to inquire into the reasonableness of that
wholesale rate as an element of the cost of rendering the local
service. The Supreme Court has said that valuation for rate
making purposes is a matter of "reasonable judgment having its
basis in a proper consideration of all relevant facts. '248 That
statement would seem to be as applicable to costs of service as to
property valuation, and the element here under consideration clearly is a "relevant fact." This is not to say that the state may fix
the wholesale rate. That is still beyond its power. But it may thus
have the way opened by which it may refuse to allow more than
a reasonable amount for this element of cost in arriving at the
proper rate base for the service to local consumers. Such a point
of view was forecast by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 249 where Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes asserted that the state might inquire into the
reasonableness of the price paid by a local telephone company for
equipment being furnished by another company from outside the
state, both companies being subsidiaries of the same parent cor248

Minnesota Rate Cases, (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 434, 33 Sup. Ct.

729, 57 L. Ed. 1511.
249(1930) 282 U. S. 133, 51 Sup. Ct. 65, 75 L. Ed. 255. For discussions of this problem prior to the Illinois Bell Telephone Co. case,
see Elsbree, Interstate Transmission of Electric Power 75, et seq.;
Mosher, Electrical Utilities 119, et seq. For a more general discussion
of this matter, see Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary
Corporations, (1926) 60 Am. L. Rev. 19; note (1928) 13 Corn. L. Q.

99.
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poration, and that a like inquiry might be made with respect to
the price being paid as rental for instruments furnished, and as
compensation for certain services rendered, by the parent corporation. 250 Neither of the two companies to which the payments
were being made were doing business locally within the state.
More recently the Supreme Court has elaborated upon this
doctrine and applied it to the case of wholesale contracts for
interstate delivery of natural gas to local distributing ompanies, in
Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission of
Kansas.25" The Western Distributing Company, operating a
distribution system for natural gas in a city in Kansas, sought
an increase in rates to local consumers. Its supply of gas was
being furnished at the city gates by Cities Service Gas Company,
by which it was brought from a source of supply outside the state.
Since the wholesale contract in such a case cannot be controlled
by the state, and since the distributing company is entitled to a
fair return, the burden of the wholesale rates must ordinarily
be borne by the consumer. Upon such a basis, the requested
increase in rates appeared to be well founded. Where, however,
the intercorporate relationship between the transporting company
and the local distributing company is such as to suggest the
possibility of arbitrary wholesale rates as an indirect means of
evading local regulation, the case for some method of relief
becomes a very strong one.
In this case a highly complicated intercorporate set-up was
found to exist, by which both the transporting and the distributing companies were subject to control by the same holding
company. And while it was admitted that the state commission
could exercise no control over the wholesale rate, it was asserted
that in order to determine the reasonableness of the requested
increase in rates to consumers, inquiry must be permitted into the
propriety of the wholesale rate as one of the costs necessarily
to be considered in fixing local rates. It was contended on the
part of the distributing company that such an investigation by
the state commission in the alleged effort to determine whether
the price paid for its supply was fair and reasonable amounted
to an indirect attempt at regulation of the wholesale contract and
25 0
For an earlier case in which the Court allowed the state commission to look through the intercorporate set-up in fixing gas rates,
see United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Kentucky, (1929)
278 U. S. 300, 49 Sup. Ct. 150, 73 L. Ed. 390.
251(1932) 285 U. S. 119, 52 Sup. Ct. 283, 76 L. Ed. 655.
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an invalid interference with federal control over interstate commerce. To this contention, Mr. Justice Roberts gave what appears
to be a complete answer, and in so doing made possible a more
or less satisfactory handling by the states of a difficult problem
which has recently come to assume a very considerable importance.
"Having in mind the affiliation of buyer and seller and the
unity of control thus engendered, we think the position of the
appellees is sound, and that the court below was right in holding
that, if appellant desired an increase of rates, it was bound to
offer satisfactory evidence with respect to all the costs which
entered into the ascertainment of a reasonable rate. Those in
control of the situation have combined the interstate carriage of
the commodity with its local distribution in what is in practical
effect one organization. There is an absence of arms' length
bargaining between the two corporate entities involved and of all
the elements which ordinarily go to fix market value. The
opportunity exists for one member of the combination to charge
the other an unreasonable rate for the gas furnished, and thus
to make such unfair charge in part the basis of the retail rate.
The state authority whose powers are invoked to fix a reasonable
rate is certainly entitled to be informed whether advantage has
been taken of the situation to put an unreasonable burden upon
the distributing company, and the mere fact that the charge is
made for an interstate service does not constrain the commission
to desist from all inquiry as to its fairness. Any other rule would
make possible the gravest injustice, and would tie the hands of the
state authority in such fashion that it could not effectively regulate the intrastate
service which unquestionably lies within its
2 2
jurisdiction." 5
The appellant company contended that by its showing of an
inability to secure a lower rate for a similar supply from any
other source, together with certain other facts, it had made a
prima facie case for the reasonableness of the rate charged. But
the Court thought that the elements of "double profit and the
reasonableness of inter-company charges must necessarily be the
subject of inquiry and scrutiny" by the state commission before
the matter of the lawfulness of the retail rate based thereon
could be satisfactorily determined. To the further contention
that the requirement of proofs demanded by the commission,
making necessary an extensive valuation of the pipe line company's property and an analysis of its business, placed upon the
appellant an unjustifiable burden, it was said that, "in view of
the relations of the parties and the power implicit therein arbitrarily to fix and maintain costs as respects the distributing com22(1932) 285 U. S. 119, 124, 125, 52 Sup. Ct. 283, 76 L. Ed. 655.
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pany which do not represent the true value of the service rendered,
the state authority is entitled to a fair showing of the reasonableness of such costs,"

25 3

although that might necessitate a presen-

tation of evidence which would not be required where the parties
were dealing at arms' length and where the usual safeguards of
4

25
bargaining and competition were present.

Thus it appears that the state into which gas and electric light
and power current are transmitted has a fairly adequte means of
protecting itself against the most serious difficulties that may arise
from the unregulated wholesale interstate transmission of such
commodities. The exercise of this power by the state necessarily
has an indirect effect upon the wholesale rate and thus upon
interstate commerce of a type held to be national in its nature.
This effect, however, would seem to be properly classified as only
"indirect and incidental," and the imperative necessity from the
standpoint of effective regulation by the state of rates properly
within its control would appear to be ample justification for the
decisions which sustain it.
For the state of origin no such means of control have yet been
presented to the courts, but there would appear to be no insuperable obstacle to its inquiry in a proper case into the adequacy of
rates for a commodity sent out of the state, in connection with
its consideration of whether established intrastate rates are yielding a fair return.1 5 The necessity for such action by the state
of origin, however, is likely to arise much less frequently than in
253(1932) 285 U. S. 119; 127, 52 Sup. Ct. 283, 76 L. Ed. 655.
a case applying the doctrine of Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. and Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission
of Kansas to electric companies, see Federal Trade Commission v.
4
25 For

Smith, (D.C. N.Y. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 247. See also Wichita Gas Co.

v. Public Service Commission of Kansas, (D.C. Kan. 1933) 2 F. Supp.

792, P. U. R. 1933B 537, same, (D.C. Kan. 1933) 3 F. Supp. 722, aff'd

in State Corporation Commission v. Wichita Gas Co., (U.S. 1934) 54

Sup. Ct. 321; Columbia Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio, (1933) 127 Ohio St. 90, 187 N. E. 7.; Re Cities Service Company, Kan. P. S. C. 1932, No. 13,127; City of Fulton v. Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co., (Mo. P.S.C. 1932) P. U. R. 1933A 256; Re
Columbus Gas & Fuel Company, (Ohio P.U.C. 1932) P. U. R. 1933A
337; Re Lone Star Gas Company, (Okla. C.C. 1933) P. U. R. 1933C 1;
cf. New York State Electric & Gas Corporation v. Maltbie, (1933)

147 Misc. Rep. 560, 264 N. Y. S. 97, P. U. R. 1933D, 140.

255
For a case in which a state commission disregarded the contract rate at which a power company was delivering current to a sub-

sidiary in another state and substituted therefor production cost plus
certain percentages for losses and a legitimate profit, in determining
whether rates were yielding a fair return, see In re Kansas City Light

& Power Co., (1918) 8 Mo. P. S. C. R. 223, 276.
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the case of the state of destination. Interests involved in intercorporate relations are much less likely to dictate an unduly low
rate to a subsidiary than an unreasonably high one, the burden
of which may be passed on to the consumer.
If the above assumption with respect to the power of the
state of origin to look behind the contract price is sound, both
stateF may protect themselves against an unwarranted demand
for increased rates. Neither, however, may be able to prevent
the standard of service being thereby affected, except in so far
as the lowering of intrastate rates or the refusal to allow an
increase may result in a modification of the wholesale rate in
question.
PART III.
STATE TAXATION
During the past decade gas and electricity have become
common subjects of taxation by the states, and a not inconsiderable volume of revenue is now being raised from levies upon
their production, sale, transportation and consumption.2 56 The
25
OSince 1925 more than twenty states have enacted statutes imposing some type of special taxes on gas or electricity, or upon both.
The most common tax imposed has been the production tax. Alabama,
Gen. Acts 1931, No. 277, p. 325 (tax on gross receipts from electric
-companies); Arkansas, Acts 1929, Act 283, p. 1187 (production tax on
natural gas); Connecticut, Pub. Acts 1927, ch. 210, pp. 4283, 4284 (tax
on production and sale of both artificial and natural gas and electricity);
Florida, Gen. Laws 1931, ch. 15658, sec. 1 (tax on sale of natural and
artificial gas and electricity); Idaho, Laws, Ex. Session 1931, ch. 3
(tax on generation of electricity); Illinois Laws 1933, p. 924, secs. 2
and 3 (retailers' occupation tax measured by gross receipts from sales
and construed as applicable to sales of gas and electricity); Indiana,
Acts 1933, ch. 50, sec. 3 (tax on gross income of those producing,
transmitting or selling gas or electricity); Louisiana, Acts 1928, No.
5, sec. 2 (8) (severance tax on natural gas); Louisiana, Acts 1932,
No. 6 (tax on generation, sale and use of electricity); Maine, Laws
1929, ch. 280, sec. 5 (tax on gross receipts from sale of surplus of
hydroelectric power); Michigan, Public Acts 1929, No. 48, pp. 85-88
(severance tax on natural gas), Public Acts 1933, No. 167, sec. 1 (b2)
(general sales tax applicable to sales of gas and electricity); Missouri,
Laws 1933, p. 422 (tax on electric transmission lines and gas pipe lines),
1933 Ex. Sess., p. 157, sec. 2-a (sales tax applicable to gas and electricity); Mississippi, Laws 1930, ch. 88, sec. 163 (tax on transportation
,of natural or artificial gas in pipe lines), ch. 90, a.1, sec. 2-a (tax on
production of natural gas), sec. 2-d (tax on gross income of gas and
electric light and power companies); Montana Laws 1933, ch. 180
(tax on distribution or transportation of natural gas through pipe
lines); North Carolina, Pub. Laws 1925, ch. 101, sec. 83a (tax on gross
receipts from sale of gas and electricity); New Hampshire, Laws 1931,
ch. 124, sec. 1 (tax on all persons or corporations engaged in manu-
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subjection to a general property tax of the facilities for producing
and dealing in these commodities creates no problem of special
interest for the present discussion. The same considerations are
involved as in the similar application of such a tax to other types
of property, and it has long been recognized that the mere fact
of use in the conduct of interstate business gives no valid claim
to immunity from state taxation.2 5 7 The more specialized types
of taxes, however, have given rise to some interesting problems
in relation to interstate commerce. The most common of these
have been the production taxes and the sales taxes.
A.

TAXES ON PRODUCTION AND GENERATION

State taxes on the production of natural gas and the generation
of electrical energy have been more widely adopted than any other
type of tax affecting these commodities, and at the same time have
brought forth the most important questions from the point of view
of the student of interstate commerce. Production or manufacture
is not a part of interstate commerce, though the commodity produced may be intended for shipment to another state.25 8 And
while an article in actual transit on its way outside the state is
beyond the control of the state, 259 until so started on its interstate
facture, generation, distribution, transmission or sale of gas or electric
energy); New Mexico, Laws 1925, ch. 83 (production tax on natural
gas); Ohio, Gen. Code (Page, 1931) secs. 5416, 5470, 5475, 5481, 5483
(tax on gross receipts from sale of natural gas); Oklahoma, Session
Laws 1931, ch. 66, art. 5 (production tax on natural gas), Session Laws
1933, ch. 196, sec. 4 (tax on gross proceeds of all sales of gas and
electricity); Pennsylvania, Laws 1929, No. 285, p. 662-665 (tax on
gross receipts from sale of electricity); Rhode Island, Acts and
Resolves 1932, ch. 1919, secs. 7, 8 (statute authorizing cities and towns
to levy a tax on consumption of gas and electricity); South Carolina,
Acts 1931, No. 258, sec. 1 (tax on generation and sale of electric
power); Texas, Laws, 5th Call. Sess. 1930, ch. 134, sec. 2 (tax on gross
receipts of gas and electric companies); 1931, ch. 73 (tax on production
and sale of natural gas and electricity); Vermont, Public Laws 1931,
No. 18, Part II, sec. 2 (tax on generation of electricity); West Virginia
Acts, Ex. Sess. 1925, ch. 1, sec. 2(a) (tax on production of natural gas).
To this list may be added the Federal Power Tax of 3% of the
amount paid for all electrical energy furnished for domestic or commercial consumption. Revenue Act of 1932, sec. 616.
257
Postal Telegraph Co. v. Adams, (1895) 155 U. S. 688, 15 Sup.
Ct. 268, 360, 39 L. Ed. 311; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, (1897) 165
U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305, 41 L. Ed. 683.
25
8Kidd v. Pearson, (1888) 128 U. S. 1, 9 Sup. Ct. 6, 32 L. Ed. 346;
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., (1895) 156 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 249,
39 L. Ed. 325; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, (1902) 183 U. S. 238,
22 Sup. Ct. 120, 46 L. Ed. 171; cf. Cornell v. Coyne, (1904) 192 U. S.
418, 24 Sup. Ct. 383, 48 L. Ed. 504.
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journey, or entrusted to a carrier for that purpose, it may be
subjected to taxation by the state of its origin.2 60 For the ordinary
type of interstate transactions the doctrines thus announced in
Kiddv. Pearson261 and Coe v. Erro262 have never been seriously
questioned. When the line of demarcation between those acts
which produce an article of commerce and those which start it on
its interstate journey becomes impossible to draw with clarity, the
proper application of these doctrines becomes a matter of no little
difficulty.
Prior to the cases involving production taxes on natural gas
and electrical energy, the Supreme Court applied these doctrines
to a mining case under circumstances that created an important
precedent for the cases to be discussed herein. In Oliver Iron
Mining Co. v. Lord,26 3 the Court sustained the application of an
occupation tax to the business of a mining company, practically
all of whose product was mined to fill existing contracts with
consumers in other states and passed at once into the channels of
interstate commerce. There was no market within the state for
more than a very small percentage of the mining company's product, and most of the ore was loaded on the cars for its immediate
interstate journey by the same action of the steam shovels which
removed it from its natural bed. That there was a continuity of
movement from the instant of severance and thus no perceptible
break between the final act of mining and the beginning of the
interstate transportation and that the burden of the tax would be
shifted wholly to consumers in other states264 did not deter the
Court from finding that the mining was a local business within the
taxing power of the state. Despite its inseparable connection with
the interstate shipment on pre-existing orders, the act of severing
the ore from its natural bed was treated as a distinct act of production analogous to manufacture.
2 9
Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, (1922) 260 U. S.
366, 43 Sup. Ct. 146, 67 L. Ed. 309; Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, (1926) 272 U. S. 469, 47 Sup. Ct. 170, 71 L. Ed. 359. For an
exhaustive treatment of this problem, see Powell, Taxation of Things
in Transit, (1920) 7 Va. L. Rev. 167, 245, 429, 497.
260
Coe v. Errol, (1886) 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475, 29 L. Ed. 715.
261(1888) 128 U. S. 1, 9 Sup. Ct. 6, 32 L. Ed. 346.
262(1886) 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475, 29 L. Ed. 715.
263(1923) 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup. Ct. 526, 67 L. Ed. 929. This case
was discussed from a slightly different point of view, supra note 70.
264
For an excellent discussion of this aspect of the problem and
the consequent effect on interstate commerce, see Powell, State Production Taxes and the Commerce Clause, (1923) 12 Calif. L. Rev. 17.
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Because of its similarity to the leading gas production tax case,
the decision of the Supreme Court in Heisler v. Thontas Colliery
Co.26 should not be overlooked in this preliminary discussion,
although it involved the imposition of a property tax. The tax
there sustained by the Court was imposed by a statute of Pennsylvania upon the value of all anthracite coal when prepared for
market and ready for shipment or sale.2" 8 Aside from the peculiar
circumstances of the particular case, such a tax, non-discriminatory
in its terms, would have no special significance for the student of
interstate commerce. Here, however, not less than eighty per cent
of all such anthracite was prepared for and went immediately into
interstate commerce, and the extra-state consumers were almost
completely dependent upon the Pennsylvania supply. Thus again,
the burden of the tax was placed almost solely upon consumers outside the state,26 7 and the nature of that burden was substantially no
265(1922) 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83, 67 L. Ed. 237; cf. Missouri,
Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Meyer, (D.C. Okla. 1913) 204 Fed.
140. But see State v. Cumberland & Pennsylvania Railroad Co., (1874)
40 Md.
266 22.
See Commonwealth v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
(1924) 278 Pa. St. 338, 123 Att. 315. Cf. American Manufacturing Co.
v. City of St. Louis, (1919) 250 U. S. 459, 39 Sup. Ct. 522, 63 L. Ed.
1084.267
There was some indication that this fact was one of the reasons
for the enactment of the statute. The contention that for that reason
it was a burden on or an attempt to regulate interstate commerce and
invalid was dismissed by Mr. Justice McKenna with the statement
that "a tax upon articles in one state that are destined for use in
another state cannot be called a regulation of interstate commerce,
-whether imposed in the certainty of a return from a monopoly existing, or in the doubt and chances because of competition." The contention, he thought, was substantially an assertion that "the products
of a state that have, or are destined to have, a market in other states
are subjects of interstate commerce, though they have not moved from
the place of their production or preparation. .

.

. If the possibility,

or, indeed, certainty of exportation of a product or article from a state
-determines it to be in interstate commerce before the commencement
of its movement from the state, it would seem that it is such from the
instant of its growth or production, and in the case of coals, as they
lie in the ground. The result would be curious. It would nationalize

all industries . . . and withdraw from state jurisdiction and deliver to
federal commercial control . . . fruits unpicked, cotton and wheat

-ungathered, hides and flesh of cattle yet 'on the hoof,' wool yet unshorn,
and coal yet unmined, because they are in varying percentages destined
for and surely to be exported to states other than those of their pro•duction." (1922) 260 U. S. 245, 259, 260, 43 Sup. Ct. 83, 67 L. Ed. 237.
There was no attempt at a rational discussion of the actual effect
of such a tax, in the circumstances of this case, upon the interstate
,commerce in the coal. It was treated as an ordinary property tax on
-an article later to become the subject of interstate commerce and upheld
on the authority of such cases as Coe v. Errol, (1886) 116 U. S. 517,
-6 Sup. Ct. 475, 29 L. Ed. 715.
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different from that of a tax imposed directly upon the privilege or
the act of interstate transportation. 8 The Court saw no serious
obstacle to validity in these considerations, nor in the further fact
that this was not a general property tax with its safeguards against
burdening interstate business more heavily than local business, but
a special levy upon a product the principal markets for which were
in other states, and thus more or less discriminatory against interstate commerce in its ultimate economic effect.
With these cases as a background, and in the light of their
determination, the Court approached the consideration of its first
gas production tax case, Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall,2 9 involving a statute of West Virginia imposing an occupation tax upon
the business of mining or producing natural gas and other named
natural resources, the tax to be measured by the gross proceeds
from their sale "regardless of the place of sale or the fact that
deliveries are made to points outside the state."270 Practically all
of the product of the Hope Natural Gas Company passed into
interstate commerce by a continuous movement directly from the
producing wells, and was sold, delivered and consumed in Ohio
and Pennsylvania. Where permanent physical connections exist
by means of which the gas is released from the producing wells
in one state and conducted directly to the burner-tips in another
by the single operation of opening a valve or turning a gas jet in
the latter state, it is not possible to mark the dividing line between
production and interstate transportation in any satisfactory fashion.
Even where the natural pressure is insufficient and the gas is
pumped at higher pressure, the situation is not essentially different.
The continuity of production and transportation is even more
direct than in the Oliver Iron Mining Co. Case. If, by the doctrine asserted in Coe v. Errol and applied in the Champlain
Realty Co. and Hughes Brothers Timber Co. cases,2 ' the gas is
beyond the state's taxing power the moment it is started on a
continuous movement outside the state, and if the single act of
pumping or of turning the gas jet under natural pressure which
starts the continuous movement is also the only act of production,
268

For a careful consideration of this matter, see Powell, State
Production Taxes and the Commerce Clause, (1923) 12 Calif. L. Rev.

17.

269(1927) 274 U. S.284, 47 Sup. Ct. 639, 71 L. Ed. 1049.
West Virginia Acts, Ex. Sess. 1925, ch. 1, sec. 2(a).
271
Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, (1922) 260 U. S.
366, 43 Sup. Ct. 146. 67 L. Ed. 309; Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, (1926) 272 U. S.469, 47 Sup. Ct. 170, 71 L. Ed. 359.
27 0
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it is somewhat difficult to find either a distinct and separate act of
production subject to an occupation tax or an instant of time at
which there is in existence gas separated from its natural reservoir
and not yet a part of interstate commerce so as to be subject to the
state's property tax. This feature was not pressed in the case,
however, the sole controversy having to do with the method of
valuation for tax purposes. It was apparently admitted by the
parties and assumed by the courts, on the basis of the mining
cases2 72 previously discussed, that such a production tax,
measured by the value of the gas at the well, would be valid.
But the trial court considered the statute as imposing a tax upon
the gross receipts from the sale of the gas, whether within or
without the state, and, as to the latter, invalid as an interference
with and burden upon interstate commerce. The supreme court
of appeals2 73 interpreted the statute as being applicable to the value
of the gas within the state and before it entered interstate commerce, said that the gross proceeds from sales in other states were
only to be taken into consideration for purposes of finding that
value, and modified the decree enjoining collection of the tax.
Although this was probably a highly strained interpretation of
the statute, it was accepted by the United States Supreme Court,
and the tax was sustained. The tax in this case was not restricted
in its application to gas but was applicable alike to the production
of numerous other natural resources, whether used within or without the state, and although the gas here involved was practically
all consumed outside the state, no point was made of the fact that
the tax would ultimately have to be paid, as in the Thomws Colliery
Co. Case, by consumers in other states.
The electrical generation tax cases have brought before the
courts as the principal issue the matter of continuity of production
and transportation as a single indivisible act which was passed
over in the Hope Natural Gas Co. Case. The most important of
these cases is Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfot.274 A statute of
Idaho imposed a license tax of one-half mill per kilowatt hour
upon the "manufacture, generation, or production, within the state,
for barter, sale, or exchange, of electricity and electrical energy" to
be "measured at the place of production. 27 5 The Utah Power
272Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, (1923) 262 U. S. 172, 43 Sup.

Ct. 526, 67 L. Ed. 929; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., (1922) 260 U. S.
245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83, 67 L. Ed. 237.
273(1926) 102 W. Va. 272, 135 S.E. 582.
274(1932) 286 U. S.165, 52 Sup. Ct. 548, 76 L. Ed. 1038.
2 75

Idaho, Laws, Ex. Sess. 1931, ch. 3.
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and Light Company maintained hydroelectric plants in Idaho at
which it generated a large volume of electrical energy and supplied
it to consumers in Idaho, Utah and Wyoming. More than eightysix per cent. of its total product was being sent outside the state of
generation, and the tax was attacked as a direct burden on interstate commerce. The issue as stated by the Court was whether the
generation of electrical energy was to be considered as a process
essentially local in character and complete in itself, like manufacture or production generally, or as so linked with the transmission
as to make it an inseparable part of a transaction in interstate
commerce. Opposing theories were presented by the Power and
Light Company and by the Commissioner of Law Enforcement
against whom a restraining order was sought, as to the nature of
the process involved in the generation and transmission of electricity. By the former it was asserted that its entire electric system
was solely a transferring device for transmitting the force of the
falling water to its place of utilization, a single continuous process,
all of which was a part of interstate commerce and not subject to
the taxing power of the state. On the part of the commissioner
it was asserted that the tax was laid upon the generation of electrical energy as a distinct act of production without regard to its
subsequent transmission; that the process of generation was one
of converting the mechanical energy of the falling water into
electrical energy; that the resulting change was substantial and was
completed before the pulses of the energy passed from the generator in their flow to the transformer; and that the transmission was
subsequent to and separable from generation, in effect, as the
transportation of tangible goods is subsequent to and separable
from their manufacture. The Court inclined to the latter view.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, it was asserted that a
distinct product was brought into being by the process of generation and transmitted to the places of use.
"The result is not merely transmission; nor is it transmission
of the mechanical energy of falling water to the places of consumption; but it is, first, conversion of that form of energy into
something else, and, second, the transmission of that something
else to the consumers. While conversion and transmission are
substantially instantaneous, they are ...

essentially separable and

distinct operations. 278
In response to the contention that the process is merely one
by which the consumer in Utah turns a switch and draws directly
276(1932) 286 U. S. 165, 179, 52 Sup. Ct. 548, 76 L. Ed. 1038.
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from the water fall in Idaho electrical energy which appears instantaneously ready for use, it was asserted by Mr. Justice
Sutherland that,
"The turning of the switch in Utah is not to draw electrical
energy directly from the water fall, where it does not exist except
as a potentiality, but to set in operation the generating appliances
in Idaho, which thereupon receive power from the falling water
and transform it into electrical energy. In response to what in
effect is an order, there is production as well as transmission of a
definite supply of an article of trade. . . . The generator and the
transmission lines perform different functions, with a result comparable, so far as the question here under consideration is concerned, to the manufacture of physical articles of trade27and
their
7
subsequent shipment and transportation in commerce.
It was thought by the Court that the principles adhered to in
the Oliver Iron Mining Co. and Hope Natural Gas Co. cases were
completely controlling and necessitated a similar result.
As is not infrequently the case, the scientific and engineering
experts differed in their opinions as to just what was the real
nature of the process.278 But even if it be scientifically correct
that there are not two separate and distinct processes, perhaps that
should not necessarily control the legal conclusion with respect to
the constitutional power of the states.
On the theory that nothing takes place but the transmission
of the energy of falling water from the waterfall where nature
placed it to the point of consumption in another state, and that
the whole process is therefore included in interstate commerce, a
distinction would apparently have to be made between the steam
and the hydro generated products. In the case of the former,
clearly something more takes place than the transmission of the
latent energy in coal and water, and probably it would not be
seriously contended that the process is not assimilable to that of
manufacture for purposes of state taxation. And yet the process
is as continuous and instantaneous in the one case as in the other.
The same turning of a switch has a like effect in both cases. By
either process, according to the courts, a distinct product279 is
277(1932) 286 U. S. 165, 179, 180, 52 Sup. Ct. 548, 76 L. Ed. 1038.
278
Utah Power and Light Co. v. Pfost, (D.C. Idaho 1931) 54 F.
(2d) 803, 804.

2--79To the contention that there is nothing in the process equivalent
to manufacture or production, that no new energy is created but merely
that existing energy is changed in form, it may be said that the same
is largely true of many other processes about which there is no question in this connection. In the same sense, little but change of form
takes place when lumber is made into boxes, leather into shoes, or
wheat into flour.
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brought into being which is transmitted to points of utilization in
other states. If the generation and transmission are more instantaneous than in the case of natural gas or the ore in the Oliver Iron
Mining Co. Case, there is nevertheless the creation of a distinct
product which is not true in the latter cases. There, instead of
production in the sense of manufacture, it is rather the severance
or extraction from its place in nature of a commodity already
For purposes of applying constitutional principles,
existing.
however, the processes are distinctly analogous.
There would seem to be no greater difficulty in conceiving of
the generation of electrical energy as distinct from its transmission, or as bringing into existence a new article or force, the
creation of which is a local process and therefore taxable as such,
than in conceiving of electrical energy or force as a commodity of
interstate trade in the same sense that coal or shoes or grain are
said to be. The latter proposition is, of course, no longer open to
question. There is, perhaps, no greater reason for exempting
electrical generation from state taxation because the product is
to go across state lines than for exempting mining or manufacture
for the same reason, although the immediacy of the interstate movement is much greater in the one case than in the others. The real
source of difficulty appears to be that our terms, production and
transportation, were invented and applied at a time when electric
light and power current as an article of trade, or the hydroelectric
generating plant as a means of its production, had never yet been
dreamed of. It is a question of whether our categories are rigid
and restricted to the exact transaction originally placed within
them, or are sufficiently flexible to be made to embrace new situations as they arise. Our whole constitutional development points
irresistibly to the latter view. The new processes fit neither into
the one category nor the other without some readjustment of conventional notions. Manufacture as commonly understood, or even
production, hardly describes the process by which a waterfall is
harnessed and its energy turned into electricity. Neither is the
whole enterprise one of transportation in the sense that a product
of manufacture, or a natural object previously prepared therefor,
is transported from state to state. The terms manufacture and
transportation as thus used are not strait-jackets for the conceptions involved, which can never be varied to include new processes, but, like other language, are merely the vehicles by which
the conceptions are given expression, and when applied to those
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conceptions upon which the force of governmental powers may be
brought to bear, must maintain that flexibility of which the constitution itself as a living instrument is the best exemplification. Our
hitherto formulated notions of manufacture or production and
transportation as separate transactions, the former of which is essentially local while the latter may be completely interstate, should
not be rigidly restricted to those conventional transactions from
which they derived their origin. Rather, they should be considered
sufficiently broad to include within their scope new and different
methods of dealing. The principles as originally enunciated in Coe
v. Errol and Kidd v. Pearson,and since adhered to, are not to be
considered iron clad dogmas requiring strait-jacketed adherence
for all time, but, like the provisions of the Constitution itself,
flexible enough to be applied to changing conditions. The question
for determination is not solely whether a commodity has been
manufactured or produced in the orthodox sense. It is rather, again,
a matter of judgment. And when there is conducted within a state,
under the protection of local laws, a profitable enterprise which
results in a commodity of interstate commerce, there seems ample
reason for saying that those principles, originally enunciated as
applicable to the production within a state by an ordinary process
of manufacture of commodities of interstate commerce, may be
made to apply, directly or by analogy, to the new enterprise and
28
bring it within the taxing power of the state. 1
8
2&For
a full consideration of the problems herein discussed by
a federal district court, see South Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina
Tax Commission, (D.C. S.C. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 515. The expert testimony of Dr. Robert A. Millikan, physicist, to the effect that the whole
electric system is merely a device for transferring the force of falling
water to and applying it at the point of utilization, was set forth at
some length and the contention was considered in detail. The court
came to the conclusion that the principles of Oliver Iron Mining Co.
v. Lord and Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall were controlling and
sustained the tax. (Aff'd by the Supreme Court in Broad River Power
Co. v. Query, (1933) 288 U. S. 178, 53 Sup. Ct. 326, 77 L. Ed. 685.)
A variant note is injected by the assertion of the court that the "current generated in South Carolina, upon which the tax is imposed, is
not the current transmitted in interstate commerce. The current upon
which the tax is imposed is the generated low-voltage current; the
current transmitted in interstate commerce is the high-voltage current
induced in the transformers of the company. The statute does not
attempt to impose a tax upon this." (52 F. (2d) 515, 525).
For a criticism of the cases herein discussed and a point of view
contrary to that of the present writer, see Note, State Taxation of
Electric Power, (1932) 42 Yale L. J. 94. The position is there taken
that if the decisions are to be justified the doctrine of Coe v. Errol
must be modified. The Court should assert, it is said, that in all
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In the Utah Power & Light Co. Case no point was made of the
fact that the tax in question was not a general one but a special
excise on the generation of electricity, or that all but a small
percentage of the current upon which the tax was levied went to
consumers outside the state 28 ' and thus the ultimate burden of
supplying that part of the state's revenue fell upon residents of
other states. Apparently the Hope Natural Gas Co. Case is regarded as having fully settled these matters. Despite the fact that
such a tax may place upon interstate commerce substantially the
same degree of burden as would a forbidden tax on transportation,
the decision in that case is probably sound. That interstate
28 2
commerce may be taxed if only it is done in the right way
is amply borne out by the cases. In the situation here in question
there is no positive discrimination against extra-state consumers
in the sense that they are made to bear a burden of which domestic
consumers are relieved.2 8 3 It merely chances that most consumers
of the product reside in other states, and, as the nature of the tax
is such that it may be readily shifted by the producer, the ultimate
economic burden is borne primarily by such non-residents.

B.

TAXES ON SALES AND

GRoss

RECEIPTS

While sales tax statutes applicable to gas and electricity have
become a common legislative phenomenon in recent years, 2 4 few
questions involving the commerce clause have been before the
courts. Just as a state may not impose a tax upon interstate transportation, 28 5 it finds a similar obstacle in the commerce clause to
cases interstate commerce will be held not to commence until after
production is completed, even though the extra-state movement has
already begun, and that wherever the doctrines of Coe v. Errol and
Kidd2 v. Pearson conflict, the latter shall prevail.
810f all the electrical energy produced in the State of Idaho in
1931, approximately 40% was exported. N. E. L. A. Statistical Bull.
No. 8 (July 1932). According to the study made by the Bureau of
Business Research of Harvard University in 1926, Idaho at that time
exported 63% of the power generated within her borders. Mosher,
Electrical
Utilities 133.
282
Powell, State Production Taxes and the Commerce Clause,
(1923)
12 Calif. L. Rev. 17, 18.
28
3Powell, State Production Taxes and the Commerce Clause,
(1923)28 4 12 Calif. L. Rev. 17, 18, 21, et seq.
Supra note 256.
285
Case of State Freight Tax, (1873) 15 Wall. (U.S.) 232, 21 L.
Ed. 146; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, (1882) 105 U. S. 460,
26 L. Ed. 1067; Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, (1921) 257 U. S.
265, 42 Sup. Ct. 101, 66 L. Ed. 227; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan,
(1921) 257 U. S. 277, 42 Sup. Ct. 105, 66 L. Ed. 234; State Tax Coin-
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the taxation of interstate sales.28 6 For that reason, no doubt, care
has been taken in drafting the statutes in several states to exclude
interstate sales. 287 As a result the problem of the sales tax as an
interference with interstate commerce has not been a serious one
for the state of origin. Such litigation as has arisen has involved
the taxing statutes of the states of destination. The one issue of
importance has been the determination of when the commodity
loses its interstate character and becomes mingled with the mass
of property within the state. This question was discussed somewhat at length above in connection with state regulation of rates
because of the fact that the Supreme Court in the leading taxation
case under the present heading expressly repudiated the doctrine of
Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commissiot,2s8 theretofore

the leading regulation case dealing with this matter.
reason the present discussion may well be brief.

For that

East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio28 9 involved a

so-called excise or privilege tax upon all natural gas companies
operating in the state, measured by a percentage of the gross
receipts from sales in intrastate business. The sole difficulty
involved was the determination of what business was thus included.
The East Ohio Gas Company obtained three-fourths of its supply
from West Virginia and Pennsylvania and one-fourth in Ohio.
Some customers were supplied with gas solely from Ohio wells,
others from a mixture of that originating within and without the
state, and still others with gas of extra-state origin alone. The
principal controversy had to do with the tax on the receipts from
the last group. Ownership and control of the gas was assumed
at the state line, but the whole passage from the producing wells
in the other states through the high-pressure lines to the connection with the East Ohio Company's local systems was treated as
interstate commerce of a national character throughout. But the
reduction in pressure by passing through reducing stations and
the division into tiny streams for delivery to consumers were said
to be analogous to the breaking of an original package for the
disposition of its contents at retail. The subsequent sale and
mission of Mississippi v. Interstate Natural Gas Co. (1931) 284 U. S.
41, 52 Sup. Ct. 4, 76 L. Ed. 131.

28
6Heyman v. Hays, (1915) 236 U. S. 178, 35 Sup. Ct. 403, 59 L.
Ed. 527.
8

2 7See, e.g., the statutes of Florida, North Carolina, Pennsylvania
and South Carolina, supra note 256.
288(1920) 252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279, 64 L. Ed. 434.
289(1931) 283 U. S. 465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499, 75 L. Ed. 1171.
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delivery was, therefore, held to be not a part of interstate commerce but a purely local business subject to the complete control
of the state. With its interstate character thus ended, in the
determination of which the Pennsylvania Gas Co. Case was expressly disapproved, no objection remained to the validity of the
state tax. Had the doctrine of this earlier case been followed, it
would have been interesting to see whether an attempt would have
been made to apply the principle of Cooley v. Board of Wardens
of the Port of Philadelphia290 to sustain a privilege tax on interstate
commerce local in nature. Thus far that doctrine has apparently
been restricted to police power cases.29' Had the Court been less
specific in its disapproval of the Pennsylvania Gas Co. Case, it
might be thought that the door was left open for possible application of this doctrine to taxation in the gas and electricity cases.
Since the case here under discussion is a tax case and the Pennsylzvania Gas Co. Case was one of rate regulation, it may be thought
that the latter should be distinguished, but the Court had before it
exactly the same problem as to local or interstate business and
expressly stated that the former case had been decided on the
basis of a theory not entirely consistent with earlier regulation
cases,2-9 2 that the considerations leading to its present decision
had not been there presented to the Court, and that "the opinion in
that case must be disapproved to the extent that it is in conflict
with our decision here.12 93 The Court may adhere to different
theories as to the power to tax and the power to regulate where it
considers interstate commerce of a local nature as being involved,
but it is hardly likely that it will treat the same business as purely
intrastate for one purpose and as interstate, local in nature, for
2 94
another..
Certain other theories might be suggested as conceivable
bases for reaching the same result in the principal case. An at290(1851)
12 How. (U.S.) 299, 13 L. Ed. 996.
2
0'It is interesting to note in this connection that the federal dis-

trict court in Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, (D.C. Idaho 1931)

52 F. (2d) 226, in sustaining a tax on the generation of electricity,
used this as a partial basis for its holding. No mention was made of
it, however, in the decision of the Supreme Court, (1932) 286 U. S.
165, 52 Sup. Ct. 548, 76 L. Ed. 1038, discussed supra under taxes on
generation
and production.
292
Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, (1919) 249 U. S.236,
39 Sup. Ct. 268, 63 L. Ed. 577; Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
(1924) 265 U. S.298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544, 68 L. Ed. 1027.

293(1931) 283 U. S. 465, 472, 51 Sup. Ct. 499, 75 L. Ed. 1171.
But cf. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, (1899)
U. S.211, 246, 20 Sup. Ct. 96, 44 L. Ed. 136.
2 94
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tempt might have been made, without invoking the original package doctrine, to treat the gas as having been brought into the
state for purposes of sale, with its interstate transmission at an
end, and on that basis subject to non-discriminatory state taxation
under the doctrine of Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton.293 No such
suggestion seems to have been made, however. Possibly also such
a business might be likened to that of a salesman from
another state who carries his goods with him to serve the needs
of an established group of customers, 29 6 and subject to taxation which makes no discrimination

because of the extra-state

origin of the articles he has for sale.

Be that as it may, perhaps

the theory employed by the Court is as satisfactory as any that
may be devised, and it appears to reach an entirely desirable
result.
The doctrine of the East Ohio Gas Co. Case has been applied
to a kilowatt tax on the sale of electricity in South Carolina
Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission.29 7
In the first
295(1923) 262 U. S. 506, 43 Sup. Ct. 643, 67 L. Ed. 1095.
2 96
Wagner v. City of Covington, (1919) 251 U. S. 95, 40 Sup. Ct.
93, 64
2 97 L. Ed. 157.
(D.C. S.C. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 515. The statute of South Carolina,
supra note 256, imposed a tax of five-tenths of one mill upon each
kilowatt hour of electric power sold in the state. The South Carolina
Power Company brought much of its current from its own hydroelectric plants in Georgia and sold and delivered it to consumers in
South Carolina. In some cases it delivered to industrial consumers at
high voltage and to two towns which had their own distribution
systems. In one of the latter delivery was made at high voltage, in
the other with voltage reduced. As to all other purchasers, it delivered
at reduced voltage ready for consumption. No point was made of these
differences in the first case, but an attempt was made to restrain
enforcement of the statute as to all as a burden on interstate commerce. The denial of an interlocutory injunction was affirmed by the
Supreme Court without opinion in Broad River Power Co. v. Query,
(1932) 286 U. S. 525, 52 Sup. Ct. 494, 76 L. Ed. 1268. When the case
came on for final hearing, (D.C. S.C. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 528, which,
for purposes of the present discussion, might be treated as a separate
case, the court dealt solely with the deliveries to the towns and industrial purchasers but reached the same result. On final appeal to the
Supreme Court in Broad River Power Co. v. Query, (1933) 288 U. S.
178, 53 Sup. Ct. 326, 77 L. Ed. 685, where the interstate commerce
contention was not pressed, the denial of the injunction was again
affirmed. An additional feature of interest in these cases, involving
both the validity of the sales tax here considered and that of the
generation tax imposed by the same statute and discussed supra in
note 280, was the contention of the power companies that as licensees
of the Federal Power Commission they were agencies of the federal
government and not subject to the taxing power of the state. That
contention was dismissed, largely on the authority of Susquehanna
Power Co. v. State Tax Commission of Maryland, (1931) 283 U. S.
291, 51 Sup. Ct. 434, 75 L. Ed. 1042.
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decision of this case, dealing with sales to domestic consumers,
it was said that the change in voltage by stepping up or stepping
down was not a mere change in the current, but the production of
a new and different current. It was therefore concluded that
the tax on sales was not levied upon the high-voltage current which
comes into the state in interstate commerce, but upon the lowvoltage current which is sold. This was not the sole reliance of
the court, however. It found an analogy to the original package
idea in the breaking up of the high-voltage current and asserted
that the East Ohio Gas Co. Case was completely controlling to
end the interstate character of the transaction and validate the
tax. On final hearing, where the matter of deliveries at high voltage to mills and to a town with its own local distribution system
was dealt with, a different theory had to be invoked. This problem, which was discussed at some length above in connection
with regulation, will not be dealt with fully here. Suffice it to say
that the fact of distribution at reduced voltage from the same
lines to numerous consumers before the deliveries here in question were made was considered sufficient to characterize such lines
as the company's distribution system within the state by means
of which it carried on a local business. On that basis the interstate character of the current was thought to be lost when it
was placed upon those lines for its local sale and delivery. The
fact of delivery at high voltage in some cases was considered
immaterial. If this conclusion as to the ending of the interstate
business, as previously discussed, is sound, there can be no
doubt as to the validity of the tax. If it is not, this would
present an admirable situation for an attempt to apply the doc298
trine of the Sonneborn Case.
C. TAXES ON TRANSPORTATION
That a state may not, consistently with the commerce clause
of the constitution, impose a tax upon interstate transportation
is well settled.299 That the business of local transportation may
be subjected to state taxation is quite obvious. The only problem in the application of such a tax is in the determination of
whether the transportation is interstate or local. Few states have
provided for taxing the transmission of gas and electric light
and power current, and such cases as have come before the Supreme Court have resulted in a determination that the state had
298(1923) 262 U. S. 506, 43 Sup. Ct. 643, 67 L. Ed. 1095.
29

Supra note 285.
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overstepped the proper bounds. West Virginia imposed a tax
some years ago on the transmission of natural gas in pipe lines
within the state which came before the Supreme Court of the
United States in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan.00 The gas
carried by the United Company, for the most part, was gathered
or purchased within the state, and the great bulk of it was destined
to points outside, either by its own lines or those of connecting
companies to whom much of the gas was sold. The whole of the
transportation with respect to that part which ultimately moved
out of the state was held to be interstate commerce, and beyond
the reach of the state's taxing power, although the necessities of
the business required that a much smaller part destined to points
within the state be carried undistinguished in the same pipes. 3°
The further fact that as to most of the gas sold to connecting
companies the United Company before sale, and the purchasers
thereafter, were free to change their minds before the gas left
the state and make other disposition of it was considered immaterial.

30 2

A similar result was reached in the application of a like tax
by the state of destination in State Tax Connission of Mississippi
v. Interstate Natural Gas Co.303 Interstate transportation of gas
was being carried on through trunk lines of pipe extending from
gas fields in Louisiana into Mississippi and back into the former
state. From this trunk line passing through Mississippi, deliveries were made to certain distributing companies with pressure reduced. This reduction in pressure by the pipe line company before the gas passed into the lines of the purchasers was
held not to affect the interstate character of the transaction or
bring it within the taxing power of the state. It was characterized
by Mr. Justice Holmes as being work done upon the flowing gas
to help the delivery and plainly incident to the interstate trans300(1921) 257 U. S. 277, 42 Sup. Ct. 105, 66 L. Ed. 234.

301Cf. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, (1921) 257 U. S. 265,
42 Sup. Ct. 101, 66 L. Ed. 227, arriving at a similar result with respect
to oil under the same statute. West Virginia, Acts, Ex. Sess. 1919,
ch. 5.
302
The state court had taken the position that at the time the gas
sold to three of the connecting companies was put in course of transportation it had no fixed destination other than the point of delivery
to the purchasing company, that it was not then known what percentage would ultimately leave the state, and that, although past experience
justified the assumption that much of it would do so, none of it was,
as yet, in interstate commerce. The tax was consequently upheld.
Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, (1920) 87 W. Va. 396, 105 S. E. 506.
303(1931) 284 U. S. 41, 52 Sup. Ct. 62, 76 L. Ed. 151.
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mission. "The plaintiff simply transports gas and delivers it
wholesale, not otherwise worked over than to make it ready for
delivery to independent parties that dispose of it by retail."30 4 As
involving wholesale deliveries direct from interstate transportation lines, the case is entirely consistent with the regulation cases
heretofore considered, such as Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co. 30 1 and Public Utilities Commission v. Landon,3 08 6 both of
which were here relied on. It has been noted that reduction in
pressure or voltage has been emphasized in some cases307 as the
equivalent of breaking an original package and as marking the
transition from interstate to intrastate business. In those cases,
the contention, based on expert testimony, that all stepping up
or stepping down in pressure or voltage was merely incident to
the proper transportation and delivery of the commodities in interstate commerce was rejected by the courts. This was especially urged in the South Carolina Power Co. Case with respect to
electricity, but it is equally applicable to gas. In this last mentioned case the reduction in voltage was for the purpose of delivery to consumers, and the current was then put on the wires
of the local distribution system. Quite properly, it would appear, this reduction in voltage and entrance upon the system of
wires maintained for service to local consumers was held to
bring the interstate transaction to an end. What came thereafter was intrastate business. In the Interstate Natural Gas Co.
Case the reduction in pressure was not for delivery to consumers
as a local business, but was merely incident to the convenient
reception by the wholesale customer from the interstate transportation company. The cases are, therefore, entirely reconcilable. As previously emphasized, no single test, such as reduction
in pressure or voltage, or delivery at the state line, is a never failing guide. "Interstate commerce is a practical conception, and
what falls within it must be determined upon a consideration of
established facts and known commercial methods. 3 0 8 So it is in
these cases with respect to that which brings such commerce to
an end and marks the beginning of a local business subject to the
taxing power of the states.
304(1931) 284 U. S. 41, 44, 52 Sup. Ct. 62, 76 L. Ed. 151.
305(1924) 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544, 68 L. Ed. 1027.
306(1924) 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544, 68 L. Ed. 1027.
907East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio, (1920) 252
U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279, 64 L. Ed. 434; South Carolina Power Co. v.
South Carolina Tax Commission, (D.C. S.C. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 515.
308
Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, (1919) 249 U. S. 236, 245,
39 Sup. Ct. 268, 63 L. Ed. 577.

